Event Notification Report for April 02, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/01/2007 - 04/02/2007
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43271
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/02/2007
Notification Time: 12:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2007
Event Time: 11:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2007
Notification Time: 12:48 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2007
Event Time: 11:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)
LAURA KOZAK (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOWERING REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL
"This report is being made under 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for inserting a manual scram due to lowering reactor pressure vessel level. The lowering level resulted from a loss of non-essential 4160 VAC bus 1A2 and subsequent loss of 'B' Reactor Feed Pump.
"In addition this report is being made under 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section due to PCIS groups 2, 3, and 4 being received when reactor water level dropped below 170". All isolations went to completion. The reactor water level drop is normal following a scram from full power due to void collapse in the reactor vessel.
"After the initial scram, vessel level rose to 211" causing the 'A' Reactor Feed Pump to trip. Before a Reactor Feed Pump could be restarted and adequate feed flow established, another scram signal and isolation occurred when vessel level dropped below 170". Control rods were already fully inserted and isolation valves in the isolated condition when this occurred. Reactor water level was restored to normal and the PCIS group isolations were reset.
"The current plan is to remain in Hot Standby (Mode 3) and determine the cause of the loss of 1A2 non-essential 4160 VAC bus."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY MIKE DAVIS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1621 EDT ON 04/02/07 * * *
"This update is being added to clarify that the second scram on 170 " vessel level described in the original report also constituted a 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) reportable event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Kozak)
"This report is being made under 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for inserting a manual scram due to lowering reactor pressure vessel level. The lowering level resulted from a loss of non-essential 4160 VAC bus 1A2 and subsequent loss of 'B' Reactor Feed Pump.
"In addition this report is being made under 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section due to PCIS groups 2, 3, and 4 being received when reactor water level dropped below 170". All isolations went to completion. The reactor water level drop is normal following a scram from full power due to void collapse in the reactor vessel.
"After the initial scram, vessel level rose to 211" causing the 'A' Reactor Feed Pump to trip. Before a Reactor Feed Pump could be restarted and adequate feed flow established, another scram signal and isolation occurred when vessel level dropped below 170". Control rods were already fully inserted and isolation valves in the isolated condition when this occurred. Reactor water level was restored to normal and the PCIS group isolations were reset.
"The current plan is to remain in Hot Standby (Mode 3) and determine the cause of the loss of 1A2 non-essential 4160 VAC bus."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY MIKE DAVIS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1621 EDT ON 04/02/07 * * *
"This update is being added to clarify that the second scram on 170 " vessel level described in the original report also constituted a 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) reportable event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Kozak)
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43277
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: UTAH POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
Region: 4
City: PRICE State: UT
County:
License #: UT 1800163
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GWEN GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: UTAH POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
Region: 4
City: PRICE State: UT
County:
License #: UT 1800163
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GWEN GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/04/2007
Notification Time: 19:43 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2007
Event Time: 13:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2007
Notification Time: 19:43 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2007
Event Time: 13:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/07/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
DENNIS RATHBUN (FSME)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
DENNIS RATHBUN (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED LEVEL GAUGE SOURCE FAILURE TO RETRACT
The following information was reported to the NRC via facsimile:
The Utah Division of Radiation Control was initially notified by telephone on April 3, 2007 at about 10:20 am MST by the licensee's consultant that a source of a fixed level gauge at the Hunter Power Plant near Castle Dale, Utah failed to retract into the safe shielded position. The gauge is a Texas Nuclear Model 5197, Serial Number 1305 level gauge containing 100 millicuries of Cs-137. The licensee contacted their service consultant who discovered that the handle on the gauge was bent. The consultant indicated that it appeared that someone had attempted to turn the handle on the gauge without pulling the button. This act had apparently bent the handle. When the licensee had attempted to close the device properly, the bent handle did not allow the drive cable to align properly with the source to retract it.
This incident is being tracked by the State as Utah Report ID No. UT-07-0002.
* * * UPDATE AT 1320 EDT ON 5/7/07 FROM GWYN GALLOWAY TO S. SANDIN * * *
The State of Utah representative called to correct the incident date from March to April. Notified R4DO (O'Keefe) and FSME (Morell).
The following information was reported to the NRC via facsimile:
The Utah Division of Radiation Control was initially notified by telephone on April 3, 2007 at about 10:20 am MST by the licensee's consultant that a source of a fixed level gauge at the Hunter Power Plant near Castle Dale, Utah failed to retract into the safe shielded position. The gauge is a Texas Nuclear Model 5197, Serial Number 1305 level gauge containing 100 millicuries of Cs-137. The licensee contacted their service consultant who discovered that the handle on the gauge was bent. The consultant indicated that it appeared that someone had attempted to turn the handle on the gauge without pulling the button. This act had apparently bent the handle. When the licensee had attempted to close the device properly, the bent handle did not allow the drive cable to align properly with the source to retract it.
This incident is being tracked by the State as Utah Report ID No. UT-07-0002.
* * * UPDATE AT 1320 EDT ON 5/7/07 FROM GWYN GALLOWAY TO S. SANDIN * * *
The State of Utah representative called to correct the incident date from March to April. Notified R4DO (O'Keefe) and FSME (Morell).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43470
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: ROTELLA'S ITALIAN BAKERY, INC
Region: 4
City: OMAHA State: NE
County:
License #: GL0409
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: ROTELLA'S ITALIAN BAKERY, INC
Region: 4
City: OMAHA State: NE
County:
License #: GL0409
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TRUDY HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/03/2007
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2007
Notification Time: 14:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
ILTAB (via email)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
ILTAB (via email)
NEBRASKA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGN
The State provided the following information via email:
"The licensee purchased the facility in December of 2006 from Hartland Warehouse. Upon receiving the State of Nebraska's annual inventory of Generally Licensed Devices in April of 2007, they did an inventory and found the following sign missing: Isolite Exit Sign model 2040-01-02 containing 10 curies of H-3 in January of 1992 and serial #1135.
"The current licensee believes that the missing sign was located on the second floor of the office at one time. A door that led to a landing on the second floor and stair steps that led down to the first floor at sometime previously were torn down and the door blocked off. The licensee believes that the sign was removed and disposed of in the landfill."
Nebraska Event Number: NE070003
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The State provided the following information via email:
"The licensee purchased the facility in December of 2006 from Hartland Warehouse. Upon receiving the State of Nebraska's annual inventory of Generally Licensed Devices in April of 2007, they did an inventory and found the following sign missing: Isolite Exit Sign model 2040-01-02 containing 10 curies of H-3 in January of 1992 and serial #1135.
"The current licensee believes that the missing sign was located on the second floor of the office at one time. A door that led to a landing on the second floor and stair steps that led down to the first floor at sometime previously were torn down and the door blocked off. The licensee believes that the sign was removed and disposed of in the landfill."
Nebraska Event Number: NE070003
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source