Event Notification Report for April 01, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/31/2007 - 04/01/2007
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43274
Rep Org: NEW MEXICO RAD CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: NEW MEXICO RAD CONTROL PROGRAM
Region: 4
City: ALBUQUERQUE State: NM
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WALTER MEDINA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: NEW MEXICO RAD CONTROL PROGRAM
Region: 4
City: ALBUQUERQUE State: NM
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WALTER MEDINA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/03/2007
Notification Time: 18:05 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2007
Notification Time: 18:05 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
DENNIS RATHBUN (FSME)
ILTAB (via e-mail)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
DENNIS RATHBUN (FSME)
ILTAB (via e-mail)
SEVERAL CHECK SOURCES STOLEN FROM A UTILITY TRAILER
The following information was received via e-mail from the State of New Mexico:
"[NM Radiation Protection Control Bureau] received notification at approximately 2:30 p.m. that seven (7) sets of button check sources licensed to the NM Radiation Control Bureau were being stored in a NM Department of Health utility trailer that was stolen in Albuquerque, NM over the weekend. These sources are used as check sources for survey meters (also stolen) during training sessions for emergency response personnel at facilities along the WIPP routes in NM. This incident is being investigated by NM State Police and the Albuquerque Police Department. Personnel from the Department of Homeland Security, the NM Department of Health, and the WIPP Emergency Response Program of the NM Radiation Control Bureau are also involved in the investigation and will provide a press release. The following sources were reported missing:
7-10 nanoCurie Pu-239
7-10 nanoCurie Sr-90 (exempt)
7-1 microCurie Cs-137 (exempt)
"More details will be provided as they become available."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.
The following information was received via e-mail from the State of New Mexico:
"[NM Radiation Protection Control Bureau] received notification at approximately 2:30 p.m. that seven (7) sets of button check sources licensed to the NM Radiation Control Bureau were being stored in a NM Department of Health utility trailer that was stolen in Albuquerque, NM over the weekend. These sources are used as check sources for survey meters (also stolen) during training sessions for emergency response personnel at facilities along the WIPP routes in NM. This incident is being investigated by NM State Police and the Albuquerque Police Department. Personnel from the Department of Homeland Security, the NM Department of Health, and the WIPP Emergency Response Program of the NM Radiation Control Bureau are also involved in the investigation and will provide a press release. The following sources were reported missing:
7-10 nanoCurie Pu-239
7-10 nanoCurie Sr-90 (exempt)
7-1 microCurie Cs-137 (exempt)
"More details will be provided as they become available."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43269
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL POTTER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL POTTER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 04/01/2007
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2007
Event Time: 10:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2007
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2007
Event Time: 10:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2)
JAY HENSON (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 53 | Power Operation |
TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO EDG INOPERABILITY
"During post-maintenance operability testing, Diesel Generator 4 exhibited unstable power output while synchronized to the grid. This testing was being performed at the conclusion of a planned Diesel Generator 4 maintenance outage. Preventive maintenance activities included in this scheduled outage included replacement of various relays in the Diesel Generator control logic and replacement of the engine governor.
"Brunswick Nuclear Plant Unit 1 is commencing a unit shutdown as required by Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition H due to the inoperability of Diesel Generator 4 lasting longer than seven (7) days. TS 3.8.1 Required Action H.1 requires Unit 1 to be in MODE 3 by 1615 on 4/1/2007 and in MODE 4 by 1615 on 4/2/2007. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i).
"Power reduction was commenced at 1045 in accordance with station procedures for unit shutdown. Power level has been reduced from 100% to 53%. Unit 1 shutdown will continue until the unit is in MODE 4 or until the engine is declared operable following appropriate repairs and testing.
"Unit 2 is in MODE 4, Cold Shutdown. The inoperable Diesel Generator 4 is not needed to meet the requirements of Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.8.2.
"The inoperability of Diesel Generator 4 is of minimal safety significance for Unit 1. Unit 1 has two operable off-site circuits and three (3) Diesel Generators are operable. The remaining three (3) operable Diesel Generators and off-site circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the on-site Class 1 E Distribution System. This maintains the safety function of the AC sources. Unit 1 is being shutdown to place the unit in MODE 4 where the inoperable Diesel Generator 4 is not required. Unit 2 is currently in MODE 4 and does not require Diesel Generator 4 to be operable. As such, this event is of zero safety significance for Unit 2.
"During post-maintenance operability testing, Diesel Generator 4 exhibited unstable power output while synchronized to the grid. Station engineering and a vendor representative continue to evaluate the engine/generator performance. Repair plans will be developed and implemented as appropriate following completion of the engineering evaluation."
The inoperability of Diesel Generator 4 will prevent Unit 2 from changing mode for returning the plant to service.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During post-maintenance operability testing, Diesel Generator 4 exhibited unstable power output while synchronized to the grid. This testing was being performed at the conclusion of a planned Diesel Generator 4 maintenance outage. Preventive maintenance activities included in this scheduled outage included replacement of various relays in the Diesel Generator control logic and replacement of the engine governor.
"Brunswick Nuclear Plant Unit 1 is commencing a unit shutdown as required by Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition H due to the inoperability of Diesel Generator 4 lasting longer than seven (7) days. TS 3.8.1 Required Action H.1 requires Unit 1 to be in MODE 3 by 1615 on 4/1/2007 and in MODE 4 by 1615 on 4/2/2007. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i).
"Power reduction was commenced at 1045 in accordance with station procedures for unit shutdown. Power level has been reduced from 100% to 53%. Unit 1 shutdown will continue until the unit is in MODE 4 or until the engine is declared operable following appropriate repairs and testing.
"Unit 2 is in MODE 4, Cold Shutdown. The inoperable Diesel Generator 4 is not needed to meet the requirements of Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.8.2.
"The inoperability of Diesel Generator 4 is of minimal safety significance for Unit 1. Unit 1 has two operable off-site circuits and three (3) Diesel Generators are operable. The remaining three (3) operable Diesel Generators and off-site circuits are adequate to supply electrical power to the on-site Class 1 E Distribution System. This maintains the safety function of the AC sources. Unit 1 is being shutdown to place the unit in MODE 4 where the inoperable Diesel Generator 4 is not required. Unit 2 is currently in MODE 4 and does not require Diesel Generator 4 to be operable. As such, this event is of zero safety significance for Unit 2.
"During post-maintenance operability testing, Diesel Generator 4 exhibited unstable power output while synchronized to the grid. Station engineering and a vendor representative continue to evaluate the engine/generator performance. Repair plans will be developed and implemented as appropriate following completion of the engineering evaluation."
The inoperability of Diesel Generator 4 will prevent Unit 2 from changing mode for returning the plant to service.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43387
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MURRELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MURRELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/24/2007
Notification Time: 12:54 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2007
Event Time: 02:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2007
Notification Time: 12:54 [ET]
Event Date: 04/01/2007
Event Time: 02:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) ACTUATION DUE TO A FAILED RELAY COIL
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"At 0249 on April 1, 2007, with the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) operating at 100% power, an invalid Group 3 isolation on the 'B' side of PCIS occurred. Group 3 isolation signals were generated for Primary Containment Isolation Valves for Drywell and Torus Ventilation, and Purge, Containment Nitrogen Compressor Suction and Discharge; Recirculation Pump Seals, and Post Accident Sample System.
"This event was caused by a failed (open) relay coil in a Potter Brumfield model KH4690 24VDC relay in the 'B' Fuel Pool Exhaust Radiation Monitor logic.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. Specifically, all actuations were complete and successful.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into DAEC's corrective action program for resolution.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"At 0249 on April 1, 2007, with the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) operating at 100% power, an invalid Group 3 isolation on the 'B' side of PCIS occurred. Group 3 isolation signals were generated for Primary Containment Isolation Valves for Drywell and Torus Ventilation, and Purge, Containment Nitrogen Compressor Suction and Discharge; Recirculation Pump Seals, and Post Accident Sample System.
"This event was caused by a failed (open) relay coil in a Potter Brumfield model KH4690 24VDC relay in the 'B' Fuel Pool Exhaust Radiation Monitor logic.
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. Specifically, all actuations were complete and successful.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into DAEC's corrective action program for resolution.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."