Event Notification Report for March 15, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/14/2007 - 03/15/2007
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43242
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: AL DEES
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: AL DEES
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/15/2007
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2007
Event Time: 15:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2007
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2007
Event Time: 15:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 1 | Startup | 1 | Startup |
HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING STARTUP TESTING
"While performing the HPCI Pump Operability Test (34SV-E41-005-2), HPCI failed to start. Upon starting the HPCI Turbine, the turbine control valve failed to open. It was observed that alarm 'Oil Filler Differential Pressure High' was received (setpoint 11 psid). Local indication indicated that the differential pressure was 12 psid. Operators locally at the turbine did not observe any movement of the turbine shaft. The HPCI system was returned to standby and an investigation by Engineering and I & C has been initiated. [The licensee] suspects a problem with the EGR (Electronic Governor Module)."
The licensee will remain at the current power level and mode until the HPCI is repaired.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"While performing the HPCI Pump Operability Test (34SV-E41-005-2), HPCI failed to start. Upon starting the HPCI Turbine, the turbine control valve failed to open. It was observed that alarm 'Oil Filler Differential Pressure High' was received (setpoint 11 psid). Local indication indicated that the differential pressure was 12 psid. Operators locally at the turbine did not observe any movement of the turbine shaft. The HPCI system was returned to standby and an investigation by Engineering and I & C has been initiated. [The licensee] suspects a problem with the EGR (Electronic Governor Module)."
The licensee will remain at the current power level and mode until the HPCI is repaired.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43302
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEXAS INSTRUMENTS
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: TEXAS INSTRUMENTS
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 04/13/2007
Notification Time: 18:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2007
Notification Time: 18:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
ABY MOHSENI (FSME)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
ABY MOHSENI (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - THREE LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS
"The RSO called [1625 CDT on 4/13/07] to report that during their quarterly inventory check, the facility discovered that (3) tritium exit signs were lost: Mfg: BetaLux Model 171-20-R-U-WH-D-RD, Serial Numbers: 255-381; 255-319; 255-399, Activity Source: 20 Ci each.
"Root Cause: The RSO [and] Incident Review board believe the exits signs were inadvertently knocked down [and] thrown away, so that the person responsible would not be found out [and] held accountable. TI runs a 24 hour-7day operation, so the RSO explains it is very difficult to find the culprit(s).
"Committee corrective action: Current [and] replacement signs will be attached with a secondary tether so that if the signs are knocked down, they will not fall down, but dangle until refastening is performed.
"Texas Incident Number: I-8403."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.
"The RSO called [1625 CDT on 4/13/07] to report that during their quarterly inventory check, the facility discovered that (3) tritium exit signs were lost: Mfg: BetaLux Model 171-20-R-U-WH-D-RD, Serial Numbers: 255-381; 255-319; 255-399, Activity Source: 20 Ci each.
"Root Cause: The RSO [and] Incident Review board believe the exits signs were inadvertently knocked down [and] thrown away, so that the person responsible would not be found out [and] held accountable. TI runs a 24 hour-7day operation, so the RSO explains it is very difficult to find the culprit(s).
"Committee corrective action: Current [and] replacement signs will be attached with a secondary tether so that if the signs are knocked down, they will not fall down, but dangle until refastening is performed.
"Texas Incident Number: I-8403."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43358
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: TODD GRANLUND
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: TODD GRANLUND
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 05/11/2007
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2007
Event Time: 01:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2007
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2007
Event Time: 01:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3)
PATTY PELKE (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
INVALID ECCS AND SYSTEM ACTUATIONS
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On March 15, 2007, with Unit 2 in a refueling outage, the reactor vessel was filled to a solid condition and being depressurized following the completion of the vessel hydrostatic test. At 0102 CDST, with pressure indicating approximately 43 psig, the 2B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump was started in the shutdown cooling mode. With the vessel solid, the resultant pressure transient caused invalid reactor vessel low-level trip signals and Division 2 and 3 ECCS actuations.
"The 2C RHR pump auto-started and injected into the vessel. The 2A Diesel Generator (DG) started, and 2B RHR Injection valve (2E12-F042B) auto-opened. The Division 3 ECCS actuation did not result in any equipment starts because the High Pressure Core Spray pump and the 2B DG were properly removed from service at the time of the event. The operators verified that the reactor vessel low-level trips and ECCS actuations were invalid, and shut down the 2C RHR pump and the 2A DG. The 2B RHR Injection Valve was also closed.
"The cause was determined to be a knowledge deficiency compounded by less than adequate procedural guidance regarding starting shutdown cooling while the reactor vessel is in a solid condition. Corrective actions included reviewing the event with licensed operators, revising the appropriate operating procedures, and developing just-in-time training for future use.
"The event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid ECCS actuation and invalid system actuation."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On March 15, 2007, with Unit 2 in a refueling outage, the reactor vessel was filled to a solid condition and being depressurized following the completion of the vessel hydrostatic test. At 0102 CDST, with pressure indicating approximately 43 psig, the 2B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump was started in the shutdown cooling mode. With the vessel solid, the resultant pressure transient caused invalid reactor vessel low-level trip signals and Division 2 and 3 ECCS actuations.
"The 2C RHR pump auto-started and injected into the vessel. The 2A Diesel Generator (DG) started, and 2B RHR Injection valve (2E12-F042B) auto-opened. The Division 3 ECCS actuation did not result in any equipment starts because the High Pressure Core Spray pump and the 2B DG were properly removed from service at the time of the event. The operators verified that the reactor vessel low-level trips and ECCS actuations were invalid, and shut down the 2C RHR pump and the 2A DG. The 2B RHR Injection Valve was also closed.
"The cause was determined to be a knowledge deficiency compounded by less than adequate procedural guidance regarding starting shutdown cooling while the reactor vessel is in a solid condition. Corrective actions included reviewing the event with licensed operators, revising the appropriate operating procedures, and developing just-in-time training for future use.
"The event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid ECCS actuation and invalid system actuation."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.