Event Notification Report for March 13, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/12/2007 - 03/13/2007
EVENT NUMBERS
43231432334323443235
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43231
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEAN BROILLET
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEAN BROILLET
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 03/13/2007
Notification Time: 15:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2007
Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2007
Notification Time: 15:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2007
Event Time: 07:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHRIS HOTT (R1)
CHRIS HOTT (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Refueling |
LOW MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM ISOLATION SIGNAL RECEIVED DURING PLANT SHUTDOWN
"It was discovered that a valid Low Main Condenser Vacuum group 1A Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NS4) isolation for the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) had been received while breaking main condenser vacuum while in Mode 4 for planned refueling outage 2R09. The isolation actuation was received as main condenser vacuum lowered below the isolation setpoint during the planned evolution of breaking of main condenser [vacuum]. All valves for this isolation signal had previously been closed by approved plant procedures while in Mode 3. The valid isolation signal was caused by not having the isolation signal bypassed as allowed by approved plant procedures."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"It was discovered that a valid Low Main Condenser Vacuum group 1A Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NS4) isolation for the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) had been received while breaking main condenser vacuum while in Mode 4 for planned refueling outage 2R09. The isolation actuation was received as main condenser vacuum lowered below the isolation setpoint during the planned evolution of breaking of main condenser [vacuum]. All valves for this isolation signal had previously been closed by approved plant procedures while in Mode 3. The valid isolation signal was caused by not having the isolation signal bypassed as allowed by approved plant procedures."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43233
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: H.EAVES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: H.EAVES
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/13/2007
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2007
Event Time: 15:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2007
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2007
Event Time: 15:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO "A" MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP
"At 1527 EST on 3/13/07 a manual reactor trip was actuated on Unit 2 due to 'A' MFPT (main feedwater pump turbine) malfunction. All systems responded as expected following the manual trip. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at 547 (degrees) F. No primary system or steam generator safety valves opened due to this trip. AFW (auxiliary feedwater pumps) system started and operated as designed."
All emergency core cooling systems, emergency diesel generators are fully operable if needed and the electrical grid is stable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
"At 1527 EST on 3/13/07 a manual reactor trip was actuated on Unit 2 due to 'A' MFPT (main feedwater pump turbine) malfunction. All systems responded as expected following the manual trip. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) at 547 (degrees) F. No primary system or steam generator safety valves opened due to this trip. AFW (auxiliary feedwater pumps) system started and operated as designed."
All emergency core cooling systems, emergency diesel generators are fully operable if needed and the electrical grid is stable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 43234
Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 03/13/2007
Notification Time: 20:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2007
Event Time: 14:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2007
Notification Time: 20:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2007
Event Time: 14:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/13/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
JOSEPH GIITTER (FSME)
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
JOSEPH GIITTER (FSME)
POTENTIAL HAZARD AFFECTING CRITICALITY CONTROLS DISCOVERED
"BACKGROUND:
"AREVA NP Richland routinely uses propane powered forklifts to move SNM in and between process buildings and warehouses. These forklifts have been routinely left inside these warehouses when not being used. During re-evaluations of facility hazards, AREVA safety staff questioned the acceptability of such practices in the context of 10CFR 70.61.
"EVENT DESCRIPTION:
"On March 13, 2007 at approximately 14:30 PDST, a member of the AREVA safety staff briefed site management on the conclusion of the safety staff that the practice of leaving propane powered forklifts unattended inside SNM storage warehouses for extended periods of time did not meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 in that under certain postulated circumstances, a propane deflagration could occur and initiate a large fire. During some postulated fire-fighting scenarios, it was determined that accidental nuclear criticality was not 'highly unlikely'.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT:
"The safety significance of this condition is low because an accidental nuclear criticality is still considered unlikely. The municipal fire department works closely with the AREVA emergency response organization when they respond to plant abnormal events and emergencies. The NCS organization is an integral part of the ERO and participates in the decision making during such events if NCS concerns exist.
"There have been no propane fires on site during the time of the deficient analysis.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"Criticality could potentially occur during firefighting if the SNM in storage looses geometry control coincident with moderation.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"The process parameters controlled in the various storage warehouses include geometry, mass, moderation and neutron absorbers depending upon the storage configuration.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"Plant-wide fire controls are established to ensure that large fires that would require the intervention by the municipal fire department are highly unlikely. This assures that the potential NCS concerns relative to fire-fighting with water are compliant with regulatory requirements. However, in certain areas of the plant the scenario of a propane deflagration and the potential subsequent large fire and response by the municipal fire department could not be shown to be highly unlikely during this unlikely condition.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"After discovery of the deficiency, a prohibition of allowing propane powered vehicles to remain unattended for significant amounts of time in warehouses is being established. Additionally, a restriction against using water for fire-fighting in the areas of concern, without approval of a Criticality Safety Engineer is being established. These administrative actions will ensure that accidental nuclear criticality due to a propane-induced fire scenario remains highly unlikely."
"BACKGROUND:
"AREVA NP Richland routinely uses propane powered forklifts to move SNM in and between process buildings and warehouses. These forklifts have been routinely left inside these warehouses when not being used. During re-evaluations of facility hazards, AREVA safety staff questioned the acceptability of such practices in the context of 10CFR 70.61.
"EVENT DESCRIPTION:
"On March 13, 2007 at approximately 14:30 PDST, a member of the AREVA safety staff briefed site management on the conclusion of the safety staff that the practice of leaving propane powered forklifts unattended inside SNM storage warehouses for extended periods of time did not meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 in that under certain postulated circumstances, a propane deflagration could occur and initiate a large fire. During some postulated fire-fighting scenarios, it was determined that accidental nuclear criticality was not 'highly unlikely'.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT:
"The safety significance of this condition is low because an accidental nuclear criticality is still considered unlikely. The municipal fire department works closely with the AREVA emergency response organization when they respond to plant abnormal events and emergencies. The NCS organization is an integral part of the ERO and participates in the decision making during such events if NCS concerns exist.
"There have been no propane fires on site during the time of the deficient analysis.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):
"Criticality could potentially occur during firefighting if the SNM in storage looses geometry control coincident with moderation.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
"The process parameters controlled in the various storage warehouses include geometry, mass, moderation and neutron absorbers depending upon the storage configuration.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"Plant-wide fire controls are established to ensure that large fires that would require the intervention by the municipal fire department are highly unlikely. This assures that the potential NCS concerns relative to fire-fighting with water are compliant with regulatory requirements. However, in certain areas of the plant the scenario of a propane deflagration and the potential subsequent large fire and response by the municipal fire department could not be shown to be highly unlikely during this unlikely condition.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"After discovery of the deficiency, a prohibition of allowing propane powered vehicles to remain unattended for significant amounts of time in warehouses is being established. Additionally, a restriction against using water for fire-fighting in the areas of concern, without approval of a Criticality Safety Engineer is being established. These administrative actions will ensure that accidental nuclear criticality due to a propane-induced fire scenario remains highly unlikely."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43235
Rep Org: FAIRBANKS MORSE
Licensee: FAIRBANKS MORSE
Region: 3
City: BELOIT State: WI
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOMINIC DEDOLPH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: FAIRBANKS MORSE
Region: 3
City: BELOIT State: WI
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOMINIC DEDOLPH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/14/2007
Notification Time: 11:41 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2007
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2007
Notification Time: 11:41 [ET]
Event Date: 03/13/2007
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
10 CFR 21 NOTIFICATON - IDENTIFICATION OF DEFECT WOODWARD GOVERNOR PIVOT PIN DEFECT
This Part 21 was received via facsimile
Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(ii), Fairbanks Morse Engine is submitting a written notification on the identification of a defect that is considered to be a substantial safety hazard.
(II) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.
Facility: Duane Arnold Energy Center
Basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:
Woodward governor actuator model EGB13P, part number 16403190, Woodward part number 9903-561 for Fairbanks Morse Engine Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG).
(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
Fairbanks Morse Engine
701 White Avenue
Beloit, WI 53511
(IV) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
Nature of defect:
Per Woodward service bulletin 01393 dated January 2007, a pivot pin within the governor actuator was manufactured from incorrect material. The subsequent case hardening of the pivot pin made from incorrect material resulted in through hardening, making the pivot pin more brittle.
Safety hazard which could be created by such defect:
Per Woodward service bulletin 01393, a potential for pivot pin fracture exists which would result in the governor actuator going to the minimum fuel setting. The EDG would not be capable of carrying load under this condition.
The inability of an EDG to carry a load during a design basis event would be considered a loss of safety function.
(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
Fairbanks Morse Engine received Woodward service bulletin 01393 on 1/11/07. Duane Arnold Energy Center was notified of this situation via e-mail dated 1/12/07.
(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
The list of potentially affected governor actuators identified in Woodward service bulletin 01393 contains only 3 units (serial numbers 14693610, 14687576 and 14699005) that were purchased by Fairbanks Morse Engine on purchase order 1079037-I. All 3 units were sold to Duane Arnold Energy Center and had not been assembled to the EDGs.
(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
The 3 units were repaired at Woodward on 1/18/07 by replacing the though hardened pivot pin with one that was from a lot that was verified via destructive analysis to be hardened to the properly case depth. All future lots of pivot pins will have case depth measurements taken to ensure proper case depth.
(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, Is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
The need for repair of the 3 units was communicated to Duane Arnold Energy Center on 1/12/07. The repaired governor actuators were returned to Duane Arnold Energy Center on 1/26/07.
This Part 21 was received via facsimile
Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(ii), Fairbanks Morse Engine is submitting a written notification on the identification of a defect that is considered to be a substantial safety hazard.
(II) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.
Facility: Duane Arnold Energy Center
Basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:
Woodward governor actuator model EGB13P, part number 16403190, Woodward part number 9903-561 for Fairbanks Morse Engine Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG).
(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.
Fairbanks Morse Engine
701 White Avenue
Beloit, WI 53511
(IV) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.
Nature of defect:
Per Woodward service bulletin 01393 dated January 2007, a pivot pin within the governor actuator was manufactured from incorrect material. The subsequent case hardening of the pivot pin made from incorrect material resulted in through hardening, making the pivot pin more brittle.
Safety hazard which could be created by such defect:
Per Woodward service bulletin 01393, a potential for pivot pin fracture exists which would result in the governor actuator going to the minimum fuel setting. The EDG would not be capable of carrying load under this condition.
The inability of an EDG to carry a load during a design basis event would be considered a loss of safety function.
(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.
Fairbanks Morse Engine received Woodward service bulletin 01393 on 1/11/07. Duane Arnold Energy Center was notified of this situation via e-mail dated 1/12/07.
(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.
The list of potentially affected governor actuators identified in Woodward service bulletin 01393 contains only 3 units (serial numbers 14693610, 14687576 and 14699005) that were purchased by Fairbanks Morse Engine on purchase order 1079037-I. All 3 units were sold to Duane Arnold Energy Center and had not been assembled to the EDGs.
(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.
The 3 units were repaired at Woodward on 1/18/07 by replacing the though hardened pivot pin with one that was from a lot that was verified via destructive analysis to be hardened to the properly case depth. All future lots of pivot pins will have case depth measurements taken to ensure proper case depth.
(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, Is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.
The need for repair of the 3 units was communicated to Duane Arnold Energy Center on 1/12/07. The repaired governor actuators were returned to Duane Arnold Energy Center on 1/26/07.