Event Notification Report for March 03, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/02/2007 - 03/03/2007
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43254
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: CIRCLE INCORPORATED
Region: 4
City: ST. CHARLES PARISH State: LA
County:
License #: LA-6627-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: CIRCLE INCORPORATED
Region: 4
City: ST. CHARLES PARISH State: LA
County:
License #: LA-6627-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/22/2007
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2007
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
GREG PICK (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE - LOUISIANA - TROXLER GAUGE MALFUNCTION
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"On March 5, 2007 there was a malfunction with a Troxler gauge. After performing a moisture/density test, the technician squeezed the release handle, pulled up the rod, and walked away from the test location. While walking towards the truck, an assistant told the technician that he had dropped something. When the technician looked, [he] realized that the object that had fallen was the bottom piece on the Troxler gauge rod. The technician told the assistant to stay away from the broken piece. The technician then carefully picked up the piece with a shovel from the truck and placed it on the tailgate. A brief observation of the broken rod was taken by the technician to assure that the [source] pellet was still in place and not dropped on the ground. He then noticed that the weld on the rod was the main cause of the problem. At this time the technician immediately staked out the area and called his equipment manager - a repair technician [redacted] with Gamma-Tron, and his Supervisor [redacted]. He then shoveled the broken rod into the containment box were the gauge was located. It was locked and secured as he transported it to the company equipment container were it was placed and double locked for safety. A sign was placed at the container to keep other employees from disturbing the gauge. All of the previously mentioned personnel were contacted and made aware of the situation. On March 6, 2007, [the technician] from Gamma-Tron placed the source back into the safe position. [The technician from Gamma-Tron] assured the facility that the radioactivity was controlled. [The technician] then took the gauge to QSA Global so the unit could be disposed of properly."
LA report number LA070008
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"On March 5, 2007 there was a malfunction with a Troxler gauge. After performing a moisture/density test, the technician squeezed the release handle, pulled up the rod, and walked away from the test location. While walking towards the truck, an assistant told the technician that he had dropped something. When the technician looked, [he] realized that the object that had fallen was the bottom piece on the Troxler gauge rod. The technician told the assistant to stay away from the broken piece. The technician then carefully picked up the piece with a shovel from the truck and placed it on the tailgate. A brief observation of the broken rod was taken by the technician to assure that the [source] pellet was still in place and not dropped on the ground. He then noticed that the weld on the rod was the main cause of the problem. At this time the technician immediately staked out the area and called his equipment manager - a repair technician [redacted] with Gamma-Tron, and his Supervisor [redacted]. He then shoveled the broken rod into the containment box were the gauge was located. It was locked and secured as he transported it to the company equipment container were it was placed and double locked for safety. A sign was placed at the container to keep other employees from disturbing the gauge. All of the previously mentioned personnel were contacted and made aware of the situation. On March 6, 2007, [the technician] from Gamma-Tron placed the source back into the safe position. [The technician from Gamma-Tron] assured the facility that the radioactivity was controlled. [The technician] then took the gauge to QSA Global so the unit could be disposed of properly."
LA report number LA070008
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43333
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATT LACROIX
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATT LACROIX
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/01/2007
Notification Time: 13:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2007
Event Time: 08:14 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2007
Notification Time: 13:17 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2007
Event Time: 08:14 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID ECCS ACTUATION DURING REFUELING OUTAGE
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On March 3, 2007, Unit 2 was in a refueling outage. Reactor penetration nozzles were being flushed to remove crud deposits. At 0814 CST, Low Reactor Vessel Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 alarms were received in the Main Control Room, and the Division 1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiated. The Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) pump started on the ECCS initiation signal and injected into the Unit 2 reactor vessel. In addition, the '0' Diesel Generator auto-started, and the Low Pressure Coolant Injection valve (2E12-F042A) auto-opened.
"Operators verified that reactor vessel and reactor cavity water levels were normal, and then stopped the ECCS injection into the vessel by placing the LPCS pump control switch in pull-to-lock. ECCS is not required to be operable in Mode 5 with the spent fuel pool storage gates removed and water level greater than or equal to 22 feet above the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) flange.
"Investigation determined that the low reactor vessel water level signal occurred when the flushing wand was inserted into instrument nozzle N14A, which is the reference leg tap for the reactor vessel level instruments. The transient in differential pressure sensed by the level instruments resulted in the invalid actuation.
"Corrective actions included a revision to the model work order for this task to clearly identify the nozzles that shall and shall not be flushed during this evolution.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid ECCS actuation and invalid system actuation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On March 3, 2007, Unit 2 was in a refueling outage. Reactor penetration nozzles were being flushed to remove crud deposits. At 0814 CST, Low Reactor Vessel Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 alarms were received in the Main Control Room, and the Division 1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiated. The Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) pump started on the ECCS initiation signal and injected into the Unit 2 reactor vessel. In addition, the '0' Diesel Generator auto-started, and the Low Pressure Coolant Injection valve (2E12-F042A) auto-opened.
"Operators verified that reactor vessel and reactor cavity water levels were normal, and then stopped the ECCS injection into the vessel by placing the LPCS pump control switch in pull-to-lock. ECCS is not required to be operable in Mode 5 with the spent fuel pool storage gates removed and water level greater than or equal to 22 feet above the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) flange.
"Investigation determined that the low reactor vessel water level signal occurred when the flushing wand was inserted into instrument nozzle N14A, which is the reference leg tap for the reactor vessel level instruments. The transient in differential pressure sensed by the level instruments resulted in the invalid actuation.
"Corrective actions included a revision to the model work order for this task to clearly identify the nozzles that shall and shall not be flushed during this evolution.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid ECCS actuation and invalid system actuation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.