Event Notification Report for February 25, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/24/2007 - 02/25/2007
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43276
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/04/2007
Notification Time: 14:01 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2007
Event Time: 03:58 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2007
Notification Time: 14:01 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2007
Event Time: 03:58 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) [general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves]. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(a). On February 25, 2007 at 3:58 AM EST Units 1 and 2 received an invalid full Secondary Containment Isolation. The following initiations and isolations were observed: All Fission Product Monitor Valves isolated, both Units' SBGT trains initiated and the reactor building ventilation supply and exhaust fans tripped and isolated, and the refueling floor ventilation supply and exhaust fans tripped and isolated. Operations personnel verified that all Secondary Containment isolations and initiations occurred
as expected.
"The isolation was caused by a blown fuse. During investigation into the Secondary Containment isolation, fuse 1D11A-F14A in panel 1H11-P606 was found to be blown. After replacing this fuse, the isolation signal cleared and all related systems were returned to normal operation. Fuse 1D11A-F14A supplies the trip auxiliary units 1C51A-Z2A and 1C51A-Z2C. Loss of power to these units de-energizes several relays which are also deenergized as a result of a Refueling Floor Vent High Radiation signal which would actuate the same isolation logic and cause an SBGT initiation.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
"The four Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) fans auto started and both Unit One and Unit Two reactor building and refueling floor normal ventilation systems automatically shutdown and isolated. The SBGT initiation and the ventilation system shutdown were both complete actuations.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"The above system functioned successfully."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) [general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves]. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(a). On February 25, 2007 at 3:58 AM EST Units 1 and 2 received an invalid full Secondary Containment Isolation. The following initiations and isolations were observed: All Fission Product Monitor Valves isolated, both Units' SBGT trains initiated and the reactor building ventilation supply and exhaust fans tripped and isolated, and the refueling floor ventilation supply and exhaust fans tripped and isolated. Operations personnel verified that all Secondary Containment isolations and initiations occurred
as expected.
"The isolation was caused by a blown fuse. During investigation into the Secondary Containment isolation, fuse 1D11A-F14A in panel 1H11-P606 was found to be blown. After replacing this fuse, the isolation signal cleared and all related systems were returned to normal operation. Fuse 1D11A-F14A supplies the trip auxiliary units 1C51A-Z2A and 1C51A-Z2C. Loss of power to these units de-energizes several relays which are also deenergized as a result of a Refueling Floor Vent High Radiation signal which would actuate the same isolation logic and cause an SBGT initiation.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
"The four Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) fans auto started and both Unit One and Unit Two reactor building and refueling floor normal ventilation systems automatically shutdown and isolated. The SBGT initiation and the ventilation system shutdown were both complete actuations.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"The above system functioned successfully."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43186
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL KANE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL KANE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/25/2007
Notification Time: 17:49 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2007
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2007
Notification Time: 17:49 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2007
Event Time: 13:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DEGRADED ELECTRICAL CABLES TO CCW SYSTEM
"On February 17, 2007, it was discovered that cables in a cable tray associated with the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system and Service Water system had sustained external damage by the heat effects from an un-insulated pipe that was in close proximity to the cable tray.
"On February 25, 2007, at 1100 hrs, as a result of continued evaluation of the cables in the cable tray and the discovery of a cable with unacceptable cable damage, it was determined that all cables located within the cable tray at the effected zone (that were not already isolated or replaced) were inoperable due to the loss of qualification life and the potential for cable-to-cable interaction from degradation of the cable insulation. This condition could potentially result in spurious equipment operation, causing components to be positioned in other than their desired safety position.
"Subsequently, on February 25, 2007, at 1300 hrs, it was recognized that a specific combination of two postulated cable faults could affect the CCW system resulting in a condition where there would be less than 100% of the required CCW post accident cooling capability, per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.7.C. As a result, TS 3.0.3 was entered. At 1322 hrs, TS 3.0.3 was exited, following isolation of one of the two postulated cable faults, which restored the capability for 100% of the required CCW post accident cooling.
"The condition of potentially having less than 100% of the required CCW post accident cooling is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems (CCW system) that are needed to remove residual heat."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY BARB DOTSON TO JASON KOZAL ON 9/14/07 AT 1523 * * *
"EN #43186 reported on February 21, 2007, that cables associated with the component cooling water system had sustained external damage by the heat effects from an uninsulated pipe in close proximity to the cable tray. This was reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the component cooling water system, which is needed to remove residual heat.
"Subsequent evaluation of past operability concluded that these cables would not have failed as postulated, and are considered to have been operable. Therefore, the condition did not prevent fulfillment of a safety function and EN #43186 is being retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (S. Burgess).
"On February 17, 2007, it was discovered that cables in a cable tray associated with the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system and Service Water system had sustained external damage by the heat effects from an un-insulated pipe that was in close proximity to the cable tray.
"On February 25, 2007, at 1100 hrs, as a result of continued evaluation of the cables in the cable tray and the discovery of a cable with unacceptable cable damage, it was determined that all cables located within the cable tray at the effected zone (that were not already isolated or replaced) were inoperable due to the loss of qualification life and the potential for cable-to-cable interaction from degradation of the cable insulation. This condition could potentially result in spurious equipment operation, causing components to be positioned in other than their desired safety position.
"Subsequently, on February 25, 2007, at 1300 hrs, it was recognized that a specific combination of two postulated cable faults could affect the CCW system resulting in a condition where there would be less than 100% of the required CCW post accident cooling capability, per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.7.C. As a result, TS 3.0.3 was entered. At 1322 hrs, TS 3.0.3 was exited, following isolation of one of the two postulated cable faults, which restored the capability for 100% of the required CCW post accident cooling.
"The condition of potentially having less than 100% of the required CCW post accident cooling is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems (CCW system) that are needed to remove residual heat."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY BARB DOTSON TO JASON KOZAL ON 9/14/07 AT 1523 * * *
"EN #43186 reported on February 21, 2007, that cables associated with the component cooling water system had sustained external damage by the heat effects from an uninsulated pipe in close proximity to the cable tray. This was reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the component cooling water system, which is needed to remove residual heat.
"Subsequent evaluation of past operability concluded that these cables would not have failed as postulated, and are considered to have been operable. Therefore, the condition did not prevent fulfillment of a safety function and EN #43186 is being retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (S. Burgess).