Event Notification Report for February 24, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/23/2007 - 02/24/2007
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43184
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ERIC MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ERIC MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/24/2007
Notification Time: 21:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2007
Event Time: 19:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/2007
Notification Time: 21:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2007
Event Time: 19:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/26/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
REDUCTION IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITY
"On February 24, 2007, at 1820 hours, 13 of 51 alert sirens in the Quad Cities Station Emergency Planning Zone were determined to be inoperable. This is considered a major loss of the Quad Cities offsite notification capability. The alert sirens were disabled due to a loss of power. Power was lost due to a major winter storm in the area. Repairs are in progress at the time of this notification. This report is being made due to the reduction in public notification capabilities in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
He licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be notifying the State.
* * * UPDATE AT 2006 ON 02/26/07 FROM JIM STORTZ TO W. GOTT * * *
This is a follow up notification to report that only 4 sirens remain inoperable with no estimated time of repair due to downed poles and high voltage power lines on the ground. This is also to correct the number of alert sirens available in the Quad Cities Station Emergency Planning Zone. There are 52 sirens not 51 reported in the original report. With 48 of the 52 alert sirens operational, the station no longer meets the reporting criteria.
Notified R3DO (R. Lanksbury)
"On February 24, 2007, at 1820 hours, 13 of 51 alert sirens in the Quad Cities Station Emergency Planning Zone were determined to be inoperable. This is considered a major loss of the Quad Cities offsite notification capability. The alert sirens were disabled due to a loss of power. Power was lost due to a major winter storm in the area. Repairs are in progress at the time of this notification. This report is being made due to the reduction in public notification capabilities in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
He licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be notifying the State.
* * * UPDATE AT 2006 ON 02/26/07 FROM JIM STORTZ TO W. GOTT * * *
This is a follow up notification to report that only 4 sirens remain inoperable with no estimated time of repair due to downed poles and high voltage power lines on the ground. This is also to correct the number of alert sirens available in the Quad Cities Station Emergency Planning Zone. There are 52 sirens not 51 reported in the original report. With 48 of the 52 alert sirens operational, the station no longer meets the reporting criteria.
Notified R3DO (R. Lanksbury)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43185
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID MANKIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID MANKIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/24/2007
Notification Time: 23:03 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2007
Event Time: 17:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2007
Notification Time: 23:03 [ET]
Event Date: 02/24/2007
Event Time: 17:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
LOSS OF NORMAL ELECTRICAL LINEUP DUE TO GRID INSTABILITY FROM ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS
"Immediate notifications are being made for the following events:
1) Valid RPS non-critical actuation: 8 hour notification per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)
2) Group 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 isolations: 8 hour notification per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)
3) Loss of decay heat removal (RHR Shutdown Cooling) isolated: 8 hour notification per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A)
4) Auto start of 'A' Standby Diesel Generator and subsequent pick up of essential buses by both 'A' and 'B' Standby Diesel Generators: 8 hour notification per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Just prior to the event the plant was in Mode 5 with core alterations in progress and the 'B' Standby Diesel Generator being run manually for post maintenance testing. At 1756 hours on 2/24/2007, core alterations were halted due to indications that the grid was becoming unstable. Freezing rain had been in progress all day. At 1757 hours an electrical transient occurred as some of the offsite lines coming into the switchyard were lost. The 'B' Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus was lost. A full RPS trip occurred from loss of the 'B' RPS bus and too few inputs to the 'A' RPS trip logic. The loss of 'B' RPS power resulted in Groups 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 isolations. The Group 4 isolation caused a loss of decay heat removal capability (RHR Shutdown Cooling isolated). The 'A' Standby Diesel Generator auto started, but the 1A3 essential bus remained powered from offsite sources. The 'B' SBDG was already running. The 1A4 bus also remained powered from offsite sources. At 1820 hours, a degraded voltage trip signal was received resulting in both emergency diesel generators picking up their respective buses.
"At present, the essential buses 1A3 and 1A4 are being carried by the emergency diesel generators. Only one of the six lines supplying offsite power to the site is available. Both non-essential buses are being powered from the one offsite line. The emergency buses will remain on the emergency diesel generators until additional offsite lines can be restored. RHR Shutdown Cooling was restored at 1826 hours."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local officials.
"Immediate notifications are being made for the following events:
1) Valid RPS non-critical actuation: 8 hour notification per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)
2) Group 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 isolations: 8 hour notification per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)
3) Loss of decay heat removal (RHR Shutdown Cooling) isolated: 8 hour notification per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A)
4) Auto start of 'A' Standby Diesel Generator and subsequent pick up of essential buses by both 'A' and 'B' Standby Diesel Generators: 8 hour notification per 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Just prior to the event the plant was in Mode 5 with core alterations in progress and the 'B' Standby Diesel Generator being run manually for post maintenance testing. At 1756 hours on 2/24/2007, core alterations were halted due to indications that the grid was becoming unstable. Freezing rain had been in progress all day. At 1757 hours an electrical transient occurred as some of the offsite lines coming into the switchyard were lost. The 'B' Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus was lost. A full RPS trip occurred from loss of the 'B' RPS bus and too few inputs to the 'A' RPS trip logic. The loss of 'B' RPS power resulted in Groups 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 isolations. The Group 4 isolation caused a loss of decay heat removal capability (RHR Shutdown Cooling isolated). The 'A' Standby Diesel Generator auto started, but the 1A3 essential bus remained powered from offsite sources. The 'B' SBDG was already running. The 1A4 bus also remained powered from offsite sources. At 1820 hours, a degraded voltage trip signal was received resulting in both emergency diesel generators picking up their respective buses.
"At present, the essential buses 1A3 and 1A4 are being carried by the emergency diesel generators. Only one of the six lines supplying offsite power to the site is available. Both non-essential buses are being powered from the one offsite line. The emergency buses will remain on the emergency diesel generators until additional offsite lines can be restored. RHR Shutdown Cooling was restored at 1826 hours."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and local officials.