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Event Notification Report for January 31, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/30/2007 - 01/31/2007

EVENT NUMBERS
4313643154

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43136
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2     State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES HUTTO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 02/01/2007
Notification Time: 00:36 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2007
Event Time: 18:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
POTENTIAL FOR PENETRATION RECIRCULATION FILTRATION SYSTEM OVERLOAD

"Due to a procedure based line-up of the Penetration Recirculation Filtration (PRF) system, it has been discovered that the system is placed in a configuration that could prevent it from performing its safety function. The PRF System filters airborne radioactive particulates from the area of the fuel pool following a fuel handling accident or ECCS pump rooms and penetration area of the Auxiliary Building following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The PRF system is a standby system that upon a receipt of an actuating Engineering Safety Feature Actuation System signal or upon receipt of a high radiation signal or a low air flow signal from the normal spent fuel pool room ventilation system will start the PRF fans and discharge the ventilation air stream through the system's filters.

"The standard operating procedure for the PRF system directs the control room staff to place the system in a 'full recirculation' mode of operation following a design bases LOCA if the system can maintain a proper vacuum inside the PRF boundary. The 'full recirculation' mode of operation isolates the Recirculation fan discharge to the atmosphere and fully opens the Recirculation fan recirculation damper. This mode of operation is only an additional defense in depth measure and is not credited in the accident analysis. In this mode of operation, it has been discovered that a degraded PRF boundary which allows in leakage into the boundary which is less than the maximum allowable operational limits, could place the system in a configuration that might cause the Exhaust fan to trip. The trip is caused by an overload condition at the supply breaker due to the increased flow of the Exhaust fan to the atmosphere. With the Recirculation fan discharge isolated to the atmosphere and the Exhaust fan inoperable, the PRF system may not establish an adequate vacuum in the PRF boundary during a Post LOCA accident, thus not meeting its design function.

"This condition was discovered on Unit 1, A train PRF system. Since the systems are similar between Units 1 and 2, and the procedure guidance is exactly the same for the 'full recirculation' mode of operation, this condition has the potential to affect both units, both trains of PRF.

"Corrective actions have been completed to eliminate this mode of operation from the procedure guidance given to the control room staff for operation. A major contributor to the in leakage into the PRF boundary on Unit 1 has also been repaired which reduced the running load on the Exhaust fan for that train. With the procedure guidance removed, the system should not be placed in a 'full recirculation' mode of operation, thus eliminating the potential for a failure of the designed safety function of the system."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1100 EST ON 2/28/07 FROM LEONARD SMITH TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this event based on the following:

"This is an Update / Retraction of EN#43136IAW NUREG-1022 paragraph 4.2.3

"An eight hour report (EN #43136) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was conservatively reported based on the potential of having the Penetration Room Filtration (PRF) system become inoperable during a LOCA or fuel handling event. It was believed the post accident system alignment could be relying exclusively on the PRF exhaust fan to draw negative pressure on the penetration rooms during post accident conditions. The report was generated when the FNP Unit 1 A-train PRF exhaust fan tripped while the system was being operated in the full recirculation mode, resulting in a loss of the PRF system capability to meet the intended function.

"It was concluded at that time the Post LOCA alignment of PRF could result in a similar condition since procedure guidance would have the operator place the PRF system in the full recirculation mode to enhance the cleanup function. Additional investigation, evaluation, and testing has allowed the staff to determine, due to Penetration Room Boundary (PRB) inleakage, the penetration room pressure would not meet the minimum negative pressure of -.5 in. WC in the Post LOCA alignment while in the full recirculation mode. In that case, the procedure would have the operator promptly realign the system to an acceptable configuration. Appropriate operator action would correct the system degraded condition to one that is acceptable for meeting the intended safety function. The PRF is not a fully automatic design system. Proper operation of the system in accident conditions relies on operation actions.

"In summary, the potential for loss of PRF systems necessary to fulfill the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material or mitigate the consequences of an accident did not exist as a result of this set of conditions and the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) report (EN #43136) is retracted."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Deborah Seymour).


Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 43154
Rep Org: US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL
Licensee: US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL
Region: 1
City: MIAMI   State: FL
County:
License #: 08-17447-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LUKE MCCORMICK
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 02/08/2007
Notification Time: 09:30 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2007
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM RULAND (NMSS)
Event Text
POTENTIAL MISSING SOURCE

On 1/31/07 the licensee shipped a pig which was assumed to contain a training source (CS-137 with a strength of 7 milliCuries) from the Port of Miami location to the Los Angeles, CA location. When the shipment arrived in Los Angeles no source could be found in the pig. The source was verified by both survey and visual inspection to not be present. The officers in Los Angeles notified the RSO and the Port of Miami of the missing source. A search for the source was conducted in Port of Miami and Los Angeles, the source was not located. No pre-shipment survey was performed in Miami; therefore the source could not be verified, by radiation levels on the pig, to have been present when shipped.

During the investigation, several officers involved in the training and that routinely uses the licensee's sources at the Port of Miami, stated that they believe there was never a source in the storage pig. The licensee has contacted the source vendor, International Isotopes, to verify that a source was actually shipped in the pig to Miami. When the licensee attempted to locate the pre-shipment survey, it could not be found.

All other sources in the licensees possession have been accounted for.

The licensee continues to attempt to locate the source and will update the NRC as new information becomes available.



THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source