Event Notification Report for January 24, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/23/2007 - 01/24/2007
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43120
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 4
City: TACOMA State: WA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN C. SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 4
City: TACOMA State: WA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN C. SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/25/2007
Notification Time: 19:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/24/2007
Event Time: 12:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2007
Notification Time: 19:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/24/2007
Event Time: 12:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
MICHAEL HAY (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT FROM WASHINGTON - RADIATION MONITORS AT A RECYCLING FACILITY DETECTED RADIOACTIVITY COMING FROM AN INCOMING LOAD OF SCRAP METAL
This event was received via e-mail from the Washington State Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection.
"Licensee: Unknown & under investigation.
"City and State: Tacoma, Washington
"License Number: Unknown & under investigation.
"Type of License: Unknown & under investigation.
"Date and time of Event: Washington DOH responded to event site 24 January 2007, ~ 11:30 am).
"Location of Event: Tacoma, Washington
"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health (DOH) on-site investigation; media attention):
"WA DOH was notified on 24 January 2007 that radiation monitors at Schnitzer Steel (a metal recycling facility) detected radioactive sources in a load of scrap. The readings referenced by a Schnitzer's representative seemed unusually high so WA DOH staff were immediately sent to do a site investigation. Numerous meter & wipe surveys by WA DOH & Schnitzer's health physics consultant identified no site or source contamination. Four items of various materials, configurations and sizes were separated from the load. Some pieces had been wrapped in sheet lead. WA DOH staff measured from 0.6 to 80 mr/hr with an open beta window, ion-chamber survey meter. A waste disposal company had also been called to assure control of the materials for disposal. The nuclides, origins of the materials, and other details of the event remain under investigation.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: Unknown & under investigation; possibly 10 CFR 20.2201 and WAC 246-221-240 'Reports of stolen, lost or missing radiation sources.'
"Isotope and Activity involved: Unknown & under investigation.
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time).
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time).
"Disposition/recovery: Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time). Orphan unknown radioactive sources are secured and not a radiation hazard.
"Leak test? Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time).
"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number) NA
"Release of activity? Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time). Numerous meter & wipe surveys identified no contamination.
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: NA
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: NA
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: NA
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: NA
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? NA
"Was written report provided to patient? NA
"Was referring physician notified? NA
"Consultant used? Yes."
Washington State Report Number WA-07-005
* * * UPDATE ON 04/24/07 AT 1500 EDT VIA E-MAIL FROM ARDEN C. SCROGGS TO MACKINNON * * *
Status: Updated and Closed
"Licensee: Unable to determine after extensive investigation. There are many rumors of possible origin, including military. The military asserted that they did not lose control of these items, there is no proof of military origin, and they have established radiation safety programs / procedures / training to prevent these items from being released into the public domain. Even if these items had been used by the military years ago, does not mean that the military last possessed them and released them to the public. Many natural radium items continue to circulate through the public domain through no fault of the military / manufacturers."
License Number: Unable to determine after extensive investigation.
Type of License: Unable to determine after extensive investigation.
"WA DOH was notified on 24 January 2007 that radiation monitors at Schnitzer Steel (a metal recycling facility) detected radioactive sources in a load of scrap. The readings referenced by a Schnitzer's representative seemed unusually high so WA DOH staff was immediately sent on 24 January 2007 to do a site investigation. Numerous meter & wipe surveys by WA DOH & Schnitzer's health physics consultant identified no site or source contamination, and only minor contamination inside the yard box that contained the various items.
"Schnizter deserves recognition for their detectors & staff that flagged & separated the unknown abandoned radioactive materials on their way to the shredder feed. It would have been a terrible mess and a serious health hazard if they had reached the shredder. A waste disposal company worked closely with WA DOH to immediately secure the abandoned unknown radioactive materials, to ensure absence of contamination, assess the nuclide and activities, and to promptly arrange for proper disposal.
"Four distinct groups of unknown, abandoned radioactive materials, of various configurations and sizes were separated from the load. The estimated total maximum activity was 81 microcuries natural radium (radium-226). There were four distinct groups: group 1, a black coil, ~ 36 microcuries (~ 40 milliR / hr max @ ~ 1 inch, beta window closed); group 2, a hook & cable & 4 guides & cylinder ~ 4 microcuries (~ 400 microrem / hr max @ ~ 1 inch, 4 guides the highest); group 3, a folded steel sheet ~ 1 microcurie (~ 28 microrem / hr max @ ~ 1 inch); & group 4, a large sandwich of asbestos / wood / thick & heavy metal, ~ 40 microcuries (~ 44 microrem / hr max @ ~ 1 inch). All activities were overestimated due to the complicated nature of the materials and inability to directly access the sandwich and the folded sheet interiors. The radium coil was wrapped in sheet lead by Schnitzer Steel staff when separated from the non-radioactive scrap.
"The coil has been recognized as one used by military decades ago; but it is not believed to have come recently from a military site. In 1977 all radium items were removed from military use, & all remaining radium items (mainly museum items) are inventoried & tracked by the military (at levels as low as 1 microcurie). Sad news is that many items still remain in public domain (we routinely receive calls / requests for help with such items). Per military scrap metal recycling contract conditions, all military scrap metal sent to recycling is separated from the other non-metal building scrap / debris, so the sandwich would not have left the military site as a sandwich; all metal would have been separated from the non-metal. All metal shipments leaving the military sites are surveyed by their military rad detectors / radiation safety staff. All military staff interviewed had an awareness of asbestos, would recognize that the asbestos needed proper sampling & handling & disposal, & would stop a shipment containing asbestos & follow their procedures to contact their hazmat asbestos abatement team.
"The many manufacturers / vendors / service reps / users / radiation professionals contacted were unable to identify these items. The general reply is that radium is not an application used in this country, & has not been for many decades. The orphans look industrial in nature, & the presence of asbestos / acoustical board / heavy metal plates / wood suggests a high-temperature use, possibly steel / metal processing. It is possible that the sandwich radium sources were used with a fill level gauge. However, radium has not been used by most manufacturers in the US, & the last time it was used was decades ago. It is possible that these are not items that originated in the United States; that is consistent with the blatant disregard for proper asbestos handling. There is a small comfort in that current vendors / users are not tossing this mess. It is troubling that there is no definite answer as to origin / generator, & that the owner / generator possibly knowingly shipped these radioactive / asbestos items to a recycling center. It appears that someone knew they were removing the non-radioactive construction sections from around the radioactive sources section. Someone must have known that they were folding the steel plate to cover/ surround the source buried inside the fold. Someone also disregarded the proper asbestos disposal procedures. This indicates a willful disregard for the asbestos / radiation safety regulations, or a lack of awareness that they exist.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: Yes, per WAC 246-221-240 Reports of stolen, lost or missing radiation sources . Notification is required immediately for 100 microcuries or more of lost, stolen or missing radium-226. Notification is required within 30 days for 1 microcurie or more of radium-226 that is still lost, stolen or missing. It is unclear whether federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 CFR 20.2201 Reports of theft or loss of licensed material applies, because natural radium is not considered licensed material and is not regulated until very recently.
"Isotope and Activity involved: Natural radium (radium-226), 81 microcuries total maximum estimate. Actual activity probably less due to conservative overestimating.
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Extensive investigation identified no overexposures. Prompt identification & action by Schnitzer staff prevented the unknown abandoned radioactive / asbestos materials from entering the shredder feed. It would have been a terrible mess & a serious health hazard if they had reached the shredder.
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): Extensive investigation identified no licensee /owner / generator.
"Disposition/recovery: These abandoned unknown radioactive materials were immediately secured and not a radiation hazard. These abandoned radioactive materials were properly disposed of via a licensed radioactive waste disposal vendor on 28 February 2007.
"Leak test? Wipe tests of the abandoned unknown radioactive materials confirmed absence of contamination in public areas of the site, and identified slightly elevated contamination in the yard box (maximum 98 disintegrations per minute per ~ 1,000 square centimeters composite wipe), and on the abandoned radioactive materials (maximum 784 disintegrations per minute per wipe). Because wipe & meter surveys identified contamination levels below regulatory limits (WAC 246-232-140, Schedule D) and not considered a health risk, the Department of Health did not have the site decontaminated. Per its commitment to ALARA, Schnitzer also arranged for proper disposal of the slightly contaminated yard box.
"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number) NA
"Release of activity? Numerous meter & wipe surveys confirmed absence of contamination in public areas of the site, and identified slightly elevated contamination in the yard box, and on the abandoned radioactive materials (please see Leak tests above).
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: NA
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: NA
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: NA
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: NA
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? NA
"Was written report provided to patient? NA
"Was referring physician notified? NA
"Consultant used? Yes."
FSME (Greg Morell) & R4DO (Linda Smith) notified. E-mailed to ILTAB.
This event was received via e-mail from the Washington State Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection.
"Licensee: Unknown & under investigation.
"City and State: Tacoma, Washington
"License Number: Unknown & under investigation.
"Type of License: Unknown & under investigation.
"Date and time of Event: Washington DOH responded to event site 24 January 2007, ~ 11:30 am).
"Location of Event: Tacoma, Washington
"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health (DOH) on-site investigation; media attention):
"WA DOH was notified on 24 January 2007 that radiation monitors at Schnitzer Steel (a metal recycling facility) detected radioactive sources in a load of scrap. The readings referenced by a Schnitzer's representative seemed unusually high so WA DOH staff were immediately sent to do a site investigation. Numerous meter & wipe surveys by WA DOH & Schnitzer's health physics consultant identified no site or source contamination. Four items of various materials, configurations and sizes were separated from the load. Some pieces had been wrapped in sheet lead. WA DOH staff measured from 0.6 to 80 mr/hr with an open beta window, ion-chamber survey meter. A waste disposal company had also been called to assure control of the materials for disposal. The nuclides, origins of the materials, and other details of the event remain under investigation.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: Unknown & under investigation; possibly 10 CFR 20.2201 and WAC 246-221-240 'Reports of stolen, lost or missing radiation sources.'
"Isotope and Activity involved: Unknown & under investigation.
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time).
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time).
"Disposition/recovery: Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time). Orphan unknown radioactive sources are secured and not a radiation hazard.
"Leak test? Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time).
"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number) NA
"Release of activity? Unknown & under investigation (none known at this time). Numerous meter & wipe surveys identified no contamination.
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: NA
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: NA
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: NA
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: NA
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? NA
"Was written report provided to patient? NA
"Was referring physician notified? NA
"Consultant used? Yes."
Washington State Report Number WA-07-005
* * * UPDATE ON 04/24/07 AT 1500 EDT VIA E-MAIL FROM ARDEN C. SCROGGS TO MACKINNON * * *
Status: Updated and Closed
"Licensee: Unable to determine after extensive investigation. There are many rumors of possible origin, including military. The military asserted that they did not lose control of these items, there is no proof of military origin, and they have established radiation safety programs / procedures / training to prevent these items from being released into the public domain. Even if these items had been used by the military years ago, does not mean that the military last possessed them and released them to the public. Many natural radium items continue to circulate through the public domain through no fault of the military / manufacturers."
License Number: Unable to determine after extensive investigation.
Type of License: Unable to determine after extensive investigation.
"WA DOH was notified on 24 January 2007 that radiation monitors at Schnitzer Steel (a metal recycling facility) detected radioactive sources in a load of scrap. The readings referenced by a Schnitzer's representative seemed unusually high so WA DOH staff was immediately sent on 24 January 2007 to do a site investigation. Numerous meter & wipe surveys by WA DOH & Schnitzer's health physics consultant identified no site or source contamination, and only minor contamination inside the yard box that contained the various items.
"Schnizter deserves recognition for their detectors & staff that flagged & separated the unknown abandoned radioactive materials on their way to the shredder feed. It would have been a terrible mess and a serious health hazard if they had reached the shredder. A waste disposal company worked closely with WA DOH to immediately secure the abandoned unknown radioactive materials, to ensure absence of contamination, assess the nuclide and activities, and to promptly arrange for proper disposal.
"Four distinct groups of unknown, abandoned radioactive materials, of various configurations and sizes were separated from the load. The estimated total maximum activity was 81 microcuries natural radium (radium-226). There were four distinct groups: group 1, a black coil, ~ 36 microcuries (~ 40 milliR / hr max @ ~ 1 inch, beta window closed); group 2, a hook & cable & 4 guides & cylinder ~ 4 microcuries (~ 400 microrem / hr max @ ~ 1 inch, 4 guides the highest); group 3, a folded steel sheet ~ 1 microcurie (~ 28 microrem / hr max @ ~ 1 inch); & group 4, a large sandwich of asbestos / wood / thick & heavy metal, ~ 40 microcuries (~ 44 microrem / hr max @ ~ 1 inch). All activities were overestimated due to the complicated nature of the materials and inability to directly access the sandwich and the folded sheet interiors. The radium coil was wrapped in sheet lead by Schnitzer Steel staff when separated from the non-radioactive scrap.
"The coil has been recognized as one used by military decades ago; but it is not believed to have come recently from a military site. In 1977 all radium items were removed from military use, & all remaining radium items (mainly museum items) are inventoried & tracked by the military (at levels as low as 1 microcurie). Sad news is that many items still remain in public domain (we routinely receive calls / requests for help with such items). Per military scrap metal recycling contract conditions, all military scrap metal sent to recycling is separated from the other non-metal building scrap / debris, so the sandwich would not have left the military site as a sandwich; all metal would have been separated from the non-metal. All metal shipments leaving the military sites are surveyed by their military rad detectors / radiation safety staff. All military staff interviewed had an awareness of asbestos, would recognize that the asbestos needed proper sampling & handling & disposal, & would stop a shipment containing asbestos & follow their procedures to contact their hazmat asbestos abatement team.
"The many manufacturers / vendors / service reps / users / radiation professionals contacted were unable to identify these items. The general reply is that radium is not an application used in this country, & has not been for many decades. The orphans look industrial in nature, & the presence of asbestos / acoustical board / heavy metal plates / wood suggests a high-temperature use, possibly steel / metal processing. It is possible that the sandwich radium sources were used with a fill level gauge. However, radium has not been used by most manufacturers in the US, & the last time it was used was decades ago. It is possible that these are not items that originated in the United States; that is consistent with the blatant disregard for proper asbestos handling. There is a small comfort in that current vendors / users are not tossing this mess. It is troubling that there is no definite answer as to origin / generator, & that the owner / generator possibly knowingly shipped these radioactive / asbestos items to a recycling center. It appears that someone knew they were removing the non-radioactive construction sections from around the radioactive sources section. Someone must have known that they were folding the steel plate to cover/ surround the source buried inside the fold. Someone also disregarded the proper asbestos disposal procedures. This indicates a willful disregard for the asbestos / radiation safety regulations, or a lack of awareness that they exist.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: Yes, per WAC 246-221-240 Reports of stolen, lost or missing radiation sources . Notification is required immediately for 100 microcuries or more of lost, stolen or missing radium-226. Notification is required within 30 days for 1 microcurie or more of radium-226 that is still lost, stolen or missing. It is unclear whether federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 CFR 20.2201 Reports of theft or loss of licensed material applies, because natural radium is not considered licensed material and is not regulated until very recently.
"Isotope and Activity involved: Natural radium (radium-226), 81 microcuries total maximum estimate. Actual activity probably less due to conservative overestimating.
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Extensive investigation identified no overexposures. Prompt identification & action by Schnitzer staff prevented the unknown abandoned radioactive / asbestos materials from entering the shredder feed. It would have been a terrible mess & a serious health hazard if they had reached the shredder.
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): Extensive investigation identified no licensee /owner / generator.
"Disposition/recovery: These abandoned unknown radioactive materials were immediately secured and not a radiation hazard. These abandoned radioactive materials were properly disposed of via a licensed radioactive waste disposal vendor on 28 February 2007.
"Leak test? Wipe tests of the abandoned unknown radioactive materials confirmed absence of contamination in public areas of the site, and identified slightly elevated contamination in the yard box (maximum 98 disintegrations per minute per ~ 1,000 square centimeters composite wipe), and on the abandoned radioactive materials (maximum 784 disintegrations per minute per wipe). Because wipe & meter surveys identified contamination levels below regulatory limits (WAC 246-232-140, Schedule D) and not considered a health risk, the Department of Health did not have the site decontaminated. Per its commitment to ALARA, Schnitzer also arranged for proper disposal of the slightly contaminated yard box.
"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number) NA
"Release of activity? Numerous meter & wipe surveys confirmed absence of contamination in public areas of the site, and identified slightly elevated contamination in the yard box, and on the abandoned radioactive materials (please see Leak tests above).
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: NA
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: NA
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: NA
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: NA
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? NA
"Was written report provided to patient? NA
"Was referring physician notified? NA
"Consultant used? Yes."
FSME (Greg Morell) & R4DO (Linda Smith) notified. E-mailed to ILTAB.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43118
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ELLIS VANN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ELLIS VANN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 01/24/2007
Notification Time: 18:08 [ET]
Event Date: 01/24/2007
Event Time: 09:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2007
Notification Time: 18:08 [ET]
Event Date: 01/24/2007
Event Time: 09:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
MISSING PIPE CLAMP BOLT FOUND ON HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM
"During a RFO-20 pre-outage inspection of HPCl Injection Line Pipe Support EBB-5-SR-9, it was noted that one of the two pipe clamp bolts (i.e. stud, nuts, and spacer) was missing. This rendered HPCl and Primary Containment inoperable. Technical Specifications 3.5.1 Condition F for HPCl inoperable, and 3.6.1.1 Condition A for Primary Containment inoperable, were entered. Since Primary Containment operability was not restored within one hour, Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 Condition B to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours and Mode 4 in 36 hours was entered.
"At 1649 the pipe clamp was restored, HPCl and Primary Containment were declared operable, and Technical Specifications 3.5.1 Condition F and 3.6.1.1 Conditions A and B were exited.
"This event is reportable as an 8 hour event under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Any event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Any event or condition that alone at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During a RFO-20 pre-outage inspection of HPCl Injection Line Pipe Support EBB-5-SR-9, it was noted that one of the two pipe clamp bolts (i.e. stud, nuts, and spacer) was missing. This rendered HPCl and Primary Containment inoperable. Technical Specifications 3.5.1 Condition F for HPCl inoperable, and 3.6.1.1 Condition A for Primary Containment inoperable, were entered. Since Primary Containment operability was not restored within one hour, Technical Specification 3.6.1.1 Condition B to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours and Mode 4 in 36 hours was entered.
"At 1649 the pipe clamp was restored, HPCl and Primary Containment were declared operable, and Technical Specifications 3.5.1 Condition F and 3.6.1.1 Conditions A and B were exited.
"This event is reportable as an 8 hour event under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Any event or condition that results in: (A) The condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Any event or condition that alone at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.