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Event Notification Report for January 23, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/22/2007 - 01/23/2007

EVENT NUMBERS
431144311543116

Power Reactor
Event Number: 43114
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3     State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DWAYNE SCHMIT
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 01/23/2007
Notification Time: 14:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2007
Event Time: 13:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Startup 0 Startup
Event Text
PRESS RELEASE ISSUED

"The purpose of this notification is to inform the NRC that Nuclear Management Company (NMC) will be issuing a press release approximately two hours (CST) after this notification to the NRC on January 23, 2007, concerning an event previously reported to the NRC on January 10, 2007, via EN# 43088. The event in question involved an automatic reactor scram at 3:26 PM on January 10, 2007. As reported in that notification, all safety systems operated correctly. The scram occurred following the unexpected opening of the main turbine control valves. There was no release of radioactivity during the event. The purpose of the press release is to provide information to the media and the public regarding the results of NMC's investigation as to the cause of the January 10 event and the status of remedial actions."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify State and Local authorities.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 43115
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2     State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY PRUETT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 01/23/2007
Notification Time: 14:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2007
Event Time: 12:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE FAILURE

"An automatic reactor scram occurred resulting from loop #2 steam generator low level. The main feedwater regulating valve 2-FCV-3-48 failed closed when the air supply line to the valve severed. A significant leak had been identified and efforts to repair had been initiated. All systems responded as designed. The plant is stable on Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) and steam generator cooling [to the condenser via steam dump valve] while repairs to the failed air line are planned."

All control rods fully inserted into the core. No steam generator or pressurizer relief valves lifted during the transient. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 43116
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2     State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID MCAGY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 01/23/2007
Notification Time: 16:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/23/2007
Event Time: 15:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/23/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
UNANALYZED CONDITION

"Crystal River 3 has determined that an existing condition in the Decay Heat (DH) System is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), an Unanalyzed Condition. Two valves in question are in series in the DH System drop leg from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). They are Appendix R High-Low pressure interface valves, where 3 phase hot shorts from another power cable must be considered. A review of cable routing concluded that one of the valve's power cables and one of the valve's control power cables do not meet required separation criteria. There is a low probability that both could open due to hot shorts under normal operating RCS pressure and temperature conditions, therefore a rupture of the downstream piping in the Reactor Building or Auxiliary Building is possible. The postulated event is a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) in the Auxiliary Building, which is an unanalyzed condition. This condition is similar to the one reported in EN# 43098 on 01/12/2007. Cables in question are for the same valves, however, they are in a different area of the plant."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.