Event Notification Report for January 20, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/19/2007 - 01/20/2007
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 43108
Rep Org: CONAM INSPECTION
Licensee: CONAM INSPECTION
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #: 12-16559-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB SLACK
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Licensee: CONAM INSPECTION
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #: 12-16559-02
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB SLACK
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 01/20/2007
Notification Time: 13:41 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2007
Event Time: 05:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2007
Notification Time: 13:41 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2007
Event Time: 05:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
SCOTT FLANDERS (NMSS)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
SCOTT FLANDERS (NMSS)
POTENTIAL EXTREMITY DOSE IN EXCESS OF 50 REM
The licensee was performing radiography at the Sunoco refinery in Philadelphia, PA when a radiographer approached the front of a radiography camera thinking that he had retracted the radiography source and manipulated the source holder to another position and returned to the rear of the camera. When the radiographer attempted to expose the source he thought was retracted, he found the source in the exposed position. The radiographer then retracted the source, secured it, and then reported the incident to the Radiation Safety Officer.
The radiographer received a calculated dose of between 44 and 55 Rem to the right hand and fingers due to this event. The length of exposure was approximately 55 sec. The individual was wearing a film badge and dosimeter but no alarming rate dosimeter. Both dosimeters were sent in to be read and determine actual dose received. The radiography camera was a 660 AEA Ir-192 camera with current source strength of 77 Ci. The radiographer has been sent for medical treatment and will continue with treatment until further notice.
The licensee has initiated the following corrective actions: radiographer has been relieved of duty; all work has been stopped at the Sunoco refinery; the licensee will require two individuals at the radiography site to ensure source position and securing of the source.
The licensee was performing radiography at the Sunoco refinery in Philadelphia, PA when a radiographer approached the front of a radiography camera thinking that he had retracted the radiography source and manipulated the source holder to another position and returned to the rear of the camera. When the radiographer attempted to expose the source he thought was retracted, he found the source in the exposed position. The radiographer then retracted the source, secured it, and then reported the incident to the Radiation Safety Officer.
The radiographer received a calculated dose of between 44 and 55 Rem to the right hand and fingers due to this event. The length of exposure was approximately 55 sec. The individual was wearing a film badge and dosimeter but no alarming rate dosimeter. Both dosimeters were sent in to be read and determine actual dose received. The radiography camera was a 660 AEA Ir-192 camera with current source strength of 77 Ci. The radiographer has been sent for medical treatment and will continue with treatment until further notice.
The licensee has initiated the following corrective actions: radiographer has been relieved of duty; all work has been stopped at the Sunoco refinery; the licensee will require two individuals at the radiography site to ensure source position and securing of the source.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43109
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 01/20/2007
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2007
Event Time: 03:38 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2007
Notification Time: 16:38 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2007
Event Time: 03:38 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CREVS AND CRETS INOPERABLE DUE TO 1A AND 2B EDG OOS
The licensee discovered two separate issues that required the 1A EDG and 2B EDG to be declared inoperable. It was discovered that the 1A EDG exhaust fan damper had failed which required the 1A EDG to be declared inoperable and 22A Service Water Heat Exchanger Inlet strainer diversion valve was failed which required the 2B EDG to be declared inoperable.
With both of the EDG's inoperable the licensee declared the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) and the Control Room Emergency Temperature System (CRETS) systems inoperable. This condition placed the licensee in a 2 hour LCO to place the plant in hot shutdown. At 0432 the 1A EDG was restored to operability and the applicable LCO was exited. The condition existed for 56 minutes. Subsequently the repairs were completed on the 22A Service Water Heat Exchanger Inlet strainer diversion valve and the 2B EDG was returned to service.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATED AT 1248 EST ON 2/14/07 FROM JOE GIOFFRE TO S. SANDIN * * *
This notification is retracted based on the following:
"On January 20, 2007, at 16:38 EST, EN 43109 was made by Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of Safety Function'. At that time, a condition was believed to exist which, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of a system function that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Specifically, the onsite emergency power supplies to both trains of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) and Control Room Emergency Temperature System (CRETS) were declared inoperable due to separate issues on the 1A EDG and the 2B EDG.
"After further evaluation, it has been determined that both DG's were operable and, therefore, the CREVS/CRETS safety function was not lost. Significant margin existed to support operability for both DG's. Accordingly, this event is not reportable. EN43109 is, therefore, retracted by this notice."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (White).
The licensee discovered two separate issues that required the 1A EDG and 2B EDG to be declared inoperable. It was discovered that the 1A EDG exhaust fan damper had failed which required the 1A EDG to be declared inoperable and 22A Service Water Heat Exchanger Inlet strainer diversion valve was failed which required the 2B EDG to be declared inoperable.
With both of the EDG's inoperable the licensee declared the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) and the Control Room Emergency Temperature System (CRETS) systems inoperable. This condition placed the licensee in a 2 hour LCO to place the plant in hot shutdown. At 0432 the 1A EDG was restored to operability and the applicable LCO was exited. The condition existed for 56 minutes. Subsequently the repairs were completed on the 22A Service Water Heat Exchanger Inlet strainer diversion valve and the 2B EDG was returned to service.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATED AT 1248 EST ON 2/14/07 FROM JOE GIOFFRE TO S. SANDIN * * *
This notification is retracted based on the following:
"On January 20, 2007, at 16:38 EST, EN 43109 was made by Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of Safety Function'. At that time, a condition was believed to exist which, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of a system function that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Specifically, the onsite emergency power supplies to both trains of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) and Control Room Emergency Temperature System (CRETS) were declared inoperable due to separate issues on the 1A EDG and the 2B EDG.
"After further evaluation, it has been determined that both DG's were operable and, therefore, the CREVS/CRETS safety function was not lost. Significant margin existed to support operability for both DG's. Accordingly, this event is not reportable. EN43109 is, therefore, retracted by this notice."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (White).