Event Notification Report for January 12, 2007

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

"On January 15, 2007, about 10:00 am, the [California] DHS Duty Officer received a call regarding a stolen Troxler, Model 3430 Moisture/Density Gauge (SN 35954), containing a nominal 8 millicuries Cs-137 and 40 millicuries Am-241. The gauge user went to his home, after work on Friday, January 12, 2007, to have dinner, before returning the gauge to the authorized storage location. The gauge was chained in an open-bed pick-up truck. When the user returned to the truck, between 7:00 - 7:30 pm that evening, the chains had been cut, and the gauge was gone. The user did not report this to the licensee's home office until approximately 9:30 am, Monday, January 15, 2007, at which time, the licensee phoned the police, and notified [CA] DHS. RHB will follow-up with the licensee on this issue."

State report number: 011507

* * * UPDATE FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA TO JOHN KNOKE VIA EMAIL ON 5/20/09 @ 1848 EDT * * *

"Recovered gauge was previously reported stolen on January 15, 2007 from Krazan & Associates (NMED #070031 RH5010 #011507)

"At 0830 on Wednesday, May 20, 2009, the Department received a call from the local metal recycler stating the radiation alarm was set off when an individual brought a truck load of metal to recycle. The item that set off the alarm was a nuclear soil density gauge. The individual stated he had found the gauge in the street at the corner of Highland Avenue and Valencia Avenue in San Bernardino, CA. Information was taken from the driver and the gauge was surveyed and secured in SA Recycling's hazardous waste trailer until the Department could arrive.

"At 0945, the Department arrived on site to survey the gauge and take identifying information from the gauge. The outer plastic housing of the gauge had been broken off, but the metal casing and handle appeared intact. The source rod was retracted and the Cesium 137 source was in the safe shielded position and the Americium 241:Be source metal housing and shielding was also intact. The surface of the gauge was wiped and there was no external contamination found.

"Using a Victoreen, CHP 450 #414, the highest reading found was at the surface of the Americium 241:Be source housing - 18 milliRoentgen per hour (mR/hr) at the surface; 0.68 mR/hr at 1 foot; 0.1 mR/hr at 3 feet; with a background of 0.02 mR/hr. This gauge was a Troxler, model 3430, #35954 with a 40 milliCurie (mCi) Americium 241:Be source #78931 assayed on 8-16-04 and a 8 mCi Cesium 137 source #77-3063 assayed on 10-15-04. We then contacted the manufacturer who identified the gauge as belonging to Krazan & Associates, Ontario, CA. This gauge had been reported stolen on January 15, 2007 (RH5010 #011507, NMED# 070031). The gauge was returned to the Krazan& Associates in Ontario who will send the gauge to the manufacturer for evaluation and repair or disposal as necessary. The Anaheim Police were also notified of the recovery of the gauge."

Notified R4DO (Jones), FSME EO (Chang), ILTAB (via email) and Mexico (via email).


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

TURBINE TRIP/REACTOR TRIP

"At 1039 Kewaunee Power Station experienced a loss of auto stop oil pressure on the main turbine while performing the monthly Turbine Trip Mechanism Test resulting in a reactor trip. No safeguards equipment was out of service at time of trip. Following the trip one of the moisture separators associated with the main turbine had its associated steam inlet valve fail open, which resulted in RCS temperature decreasing to 536 degrees F. This valve was manually isolated and RCS temperature returned to normal 547 degrees F. Normal heat sink via the condenser was available during the event. Investigation is continuing into the cause of the turbine trip.

"This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for actuation of the Reactor Protection System and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System."

All rods fully inserted and no primary or secondary PORV's lifted. There was no injection from any safety systems, other than AFW. Decay heat is being dumped to the condenser via steam dumps. The reactor coolant pressure and temperature are stable.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNANALYZED CONDITION OF DECAY HEAT SYSTEM

"Crystal River Unit 3 has determined that an existing condition in the Decay Heat (DH) System is reportable under 10 CFR.50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B), an Unanalyzed Condition. Two valves in question are in series in the Decay Heat (DH) System drop leg from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). These valves are High-Low pressure interface valves, where three phase hot shorts from another power cable must be considered under Appendix R. A review of cable routing concluded that the two valve's power cables do not meet required Appendix R separation or protection criteria. As such, there is a low probability that both valves could open due to hot shorts under normal operating RCS pressure and temperature conditions, resulting in a rupture of the downstream piping in the Reactor Building or Auxiliary Building. This event could result in a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) in the Auxiliary Building, which is an unanalyzed condition."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

PART 21 - ROSEMOUNT PRESSURE TRANSMITTER MAY NOT BE SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED

"During routine operations on the RNII production floor, it was observed that an incorrect torque wrench was being used at mechanical assembly to tighten the Sensor Module Lock Nut. The incorrect tool was calibrated to a value of 12.5 ft-lb, resulting in undertorquing of the lock nut. The incorrect torque wrench was removed from service and replaced with a tool calibrated to the correct torque value of 35 ft-lb. RNII reworked all affected transmitters that had not yet shipped to the correct torque value.

"Assembly with the incorrect tool could result in certain pressure transmitters having a degraded environmental seal between the sensor module and the electronics housing during or after a seismic event."

The five affected models have been delivered to the Byron and Comanche Peak nuclear stations.