Event Notification Report for January 10, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/09/2007 - 01/10/2007
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43086
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRAD HARDT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRAD HARDT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/10/2007
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2007
Event Time: 12:35 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2007
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2007
Event Time: 12:35 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF OFFSITE LANDLINE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY DUE TO CUT FIBER OPTIC CABLE
"On 01/10/2007 at 1235 CST, the Unit 1 control room was notified that the offsite fiber cable from Palacios to Port Lavaca was cut at approximately 1155 hours by a building contractor just out of Palacios on Texas Highway 35. Verizon dispatched a crew to repair. Estimated time for repair is about 4 hours.
"Offsite communications is lost from both Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms including the state and county ring down lines, the NRC ring down line and the ability to transfer information from the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) to offsite agencies. Satellite phones remain available.
"At 1258 CST, the NRC Operations Center was notified via satellite communications of alternate phone numbers to contact the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms. This is a follow-up to make the notification of this event to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified of this issue."
* * * UPDATED AT 1830 EST ON 01/10/07 FROM CHRIS VAN FLEET TO S. SANDIN * * *
All offsite lines have been restored as of 1716 CST on 01/10/07. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg).
"On 01/10/2007 at 1235 CST, the Unit 1 control room was notified that the offsite fiber cable from Palacios to Port Lavaca was cut at approximately 1155 hours by a building contractor just out of Palacios on Texas Highway 35. Verizon dispatched a crew to repair. Estimated time for repair is about 4 hours.
"Offsite communications is lost from both Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms including the state and county ring down lines, the NRC ring down line and the ability to transfer information from the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) to offsite agencies. Satellite phones remain available.
"At 1258 CST, the NRC Operations Center was notified via satellite communications of alternate phone numbers to contact the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms. This is a follow-up to make the notification of this event to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified of this issue."
* * * UPDATED AT 1830 EST ON 01/10/07 FROM CHRIS VAN FLEET TO S. SANDIN * * *
All offsite lines have been restored as of 1716 CST on 01/10/07. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43088
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SCHREIFELS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SCHREIFELS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 01/10/2007
Notification Time: 19:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2007
Event Time: 15:28 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2007
Notification Time: 19:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2007
Event Time: 15:28 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/10/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
HO NIEH (NRR)
THOMAS BLOUNT (IRD)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
HO NIEH (NRR)
THOMAS BLOUNT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 87 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR SCRAM WITH STUCK OPEN MAIN TURBINE CONTROL VALVES
"At 1528 hours Central Time, a RPS trip occurred, all rods fully inserted. Turbine valve testing was in progress. A group 1 isolation occurred with all MSIVs closing. A partial group 2 occurred due to low reactor water level. All safety systems (valves) operated correctly. Currently reactor pressure/cooldown in progress using HPCI in pressure control, normal condensate and feedwater in service for reactor water level control. Investigation of cause is in progress."
Group isolations resulted from low pressure and low reactor water level. During the transient and subsequent cooldown, Operators manually opened the main steam relief valves to maintain pressure control in accordance with the plant EOPs. HPCI was manually started to maintain reactor level. The group 2 isolation has been reset. The group 1 isolation (MSIVs) will not be reset until after the main turbine control valves are shut. The plant is being cooled down to initiate RHR cooling and is in the normal shutdown electrical lineup.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1528 hours Central Time, a RPS trip occurred, all rods fully inserted. Turbine valve testing was in progress. A group 1 isolation occurred with all MSIVs closing. A partial group 2 occurred due to low reactor water level. All safety systems (valves) operated correctly. Currently reactor pressure/cooldown in progress using HPCI in pressure control, normal condensate and feedwater in service for reactor water level control. Investigation of cause is in progress."
Group isolations resulted from low pressure and low reactor water level. During the transient and subsequent cooldown, Operators manually opened the main steam relief valves to maintain pressure control in accordance with the plant EOPs. HPCI was manually started to maintain reactor level. The group 2 isolation has been reset. The group 1 isolation (MSIVs) will not be reset until after the main turbine control valves are shut. The plant is being cooled down to initiate RHR cooling and is in the normal shutdown electrical lineup.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 43104
Rep Org: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: PRUDHOE BAY State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LARRY RUSSELL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: PRUDHOE BAY State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LARRY RUSSELL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/16/2007
Notification Time: 17:54 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2007
Event Time: 09:00 [YST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2007
Notification Time: 17:54 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2007
Event Time: 09:00 [YST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4)
SCOTT FLANDERS (NMSS)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4)
SCOTT FLANDERS (NMSS)
RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA MALFUNCTION
During an equipment checkout prior to use, the ball of the drive cable broke during hookup of the pigtail to the drive cable. The source was locked in the safe position and no exposure was realized due to this incident. The radiography camera is an INC IR100 Model 32 (Serial # 4813) with a 65.8 curie Ir-192 source (serial # J590). The camera will be sent to the manufacturer for inspection and evaluation of the failure.
During an equipment checkout prior to use, the ball of the drive cable broke during hookup of the pigtail to the drive cable. The source was locked in the safe position and no exposure was realized due to this incident. The radiography camera is an INC IR100 Model 32 (Serial # 4813) with a 65.8 curie Ir-192 source (serial # J590). The camera will be sent to the manufacturer for inspection and evaluation of the failure.