Event Notification Report for November 19, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/18/2006 - 11/19/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
43097
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43097
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: EDWARD McMUTCHEN, Jr
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: EDWARD McMUTCHEN, Jr
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 01/12/2007
Notification Time: 15:33 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2006
Event Time: 20:28 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2007
Notification Time: 15:33 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2006
Event Time: 20:28 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID ACTUATION OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM
"This telephone report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event or condition caused by an invalid signal that resulted in an automatic actuation on November 19, 2006 at 2028 CST of the following Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups:
* Group 2, Primary Containment isolations (partial) including Shutdown Cooling (SDC) valve isolation with no loss of SDC function.
* Group 6, Secondary Containment isolation, and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room Emergency Filtration System (complete).
"The systems above functioned as designed. Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus 'B' had lost power from its Motor Generator (MG) and was found de-energized which caused the actuations. Power was restored to the RPS bus 'B' from auxiliary power, and plant systems were recovered.
"In addition to the actuations reported above, the following actuations also occurred and functioned as designed.
* RPS half-scram on B channel (no rods moved);
* Half-group isolations of the following PCIS Groups;
* Group 1, Main Steam Isolation Valves (valves were already shut),
* Group 3, Reactor Water Clean-up (one valve shut),
* Group 7, Recirculation Loop Sample Lines (valves were already shut),
"The cause of the invalid signal was 'B' RPS MG set high voltage condition produced by a faulty voltage adjust potentiometer in the voltage regulator. This caused a protective relay to trip the RPS MG exciter field which caused the subsequent low voltage and loss of the 'B' RPS bus."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This telephone report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event or condition caused by an invalid signal that resulted in an automatic actuation on November 19, 2006 at 2028 CST of the following Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups:
* Group 2, Primary Containment isolations (partial) including Shutdown Cooling (SDC) valve isolation with no loss of SDC function.
* Group 6, Secondary Containment isolation, and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment System and Control Room Emergency Filtration System (complete).
"The systems above functioned as designed. Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus 'B' had lost power from its Motor Generator (MG) and was found de-energized which caused the actuations. Power was restored to the RPS bus 'B' from auxiliary power, and plant systems were recovered.
"In addition to the actuations reported above, the following actuations also occurred and functioned as designed.
* RPS half-scram on B channel (no rods moved);
* Half-group isolations of the following PCIS Groups;
* Group 1, Main Steam Isolation Valves (valves were already shut),
* Group 3, Reactor Water Clean-up (one valve shut),
* Group 7, Recirculation Loop Sample Lines (valves were already shut),
"The cause of the invalid signal was 'B' RPS MG set high voltage condition produced by a faulty voltage adjust potentiometer in the voltage regulator. This caused a protective relay to trip the RPS MG exciter field which caused the subsequent low voltage and loss of the 'B' RPS bus."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.