Event Notification Report for November 06, 2006

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DURING TURBINE TESTING

"On 6 November 2006 at 0110 an automatic reactor scram was received. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.' The plant also received Group 2, 3 and 4 isolations from the low level signal as reactor water dropped due to the reactor scram. The isolations are being reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A), 'any event or condition that results actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section.' The scram is believed to be the result of a turbine trip but is currently being investigated further. Main Turbine surveillance testing was in progress at the time but it is not known if the testing caused the turbine trip and subsequent Reactor Scram. Reactor pressure is currently being controlled by the turbine bypass valves and steamline drains. No actuations of Safety Relief Valves were required or occurred. Both Reactor Recirculation pumps tripped as part of RPT. The 'B' Recirc pump has been restarted. Reactor level dropped following the scram resulting in the isolations but was recovered and is currently being maintained by the normal feedwater systems. All isolations went to completion and have been reset at this time. The plant electrical buses transferred without incident and are currently in a normal shutdown alignment.

"The current plan is to remain in Mode 3 while investigations determine the cause of the turbine trip and reactor scram."

All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Currently the plant is using offsite power but diesel generators are available. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ONE AND POSSIBLY FIVE OTHER CLASS "C" FUEL ASSEMBLIES WERE SINGLED OUT AS HAVING THE POTENTIAL OF HAVING FLAWS ABOVE THE HAIRLINE CRACK OR PINHOLE LEAK CRITERIA.

This event is a 24 hour notification per Technical Specification 2.2.1.

Based upon the differences in the definition of damaged fuel presented in RSAP-0112, and the commitments made in various licensing documents, it was determined that a potential existed that damaged assemblies may have been placed in a fuel canister licensed only for intact assemblies. A potential problem exists with fuel assemblies, which had been categorized as class "C" assemblies in the RSAP-0112 inspection results, and therefore would not have had any restrictions on the type of canister to be placed. Class "C" assemblies were those assemblies not meeting the requirements of F2 for gross cladding defects, did not have cracks which exceeded dimensional of approx. 0.34 inches across and 0.7 inches high.

Based on further review of the RSAP-0112 inspection results, six fuel assemblies were upgraded as potentially damaged fuel assemblies because the written inspection reports indicated the existence of a crack or missing cladding greater than the class "C" limit.

With the exception of assembly 2G6, the video portion of the tape is not 100% conclusive that a crack greater than a hairline exists on the other five fuel assemblies. Based upon the images available of assembly 2G6, the crack on this assembly was scaled to be approx. 0.04 inches wide by 0.25 inches long. The film quality of the remaining 5 assemblies is not sufficient to provide such detailed scaling but is estimated for discussion purposes.

NRC Project Manager (Randy Hall) was notified of this by the licensee.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING LOST/UNACCOUNTED FOR STATIC ELIMINATORS

The State of Minnesota received the following notification from Seagate Technology via letter dated November 6, 2006:

"Subject: Loss of Anti-static Nuclear Ionizing Devices [General License Material]

"The following anti-static nuclear ionizing devices described below were due for return to the vendor, but could not be found after an extensive search including a written communication requesting assistance from associated work areas across our site.

"The devices are:

"NRD brand Model P-2063-1200, Nuclear Ionizer Fan Element, 31.5 millicuries of Polonium-210 per device

"Serial Numbers A2ER777 thru A2ER785 [nine total], manufactured 9/22/2005."

* * * UPDATE ON 12/11/2006 AT 1013 FROM CRAIG VERKE TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The sources were found on 12/7/2006 in a locked storage cabinet. The sources will be returned to the distributor.

Notified the R3DO (Lara), NMSS (Morell), Sandler [ILTAB]

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.