Event Notification Report for November 02, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/01/2006 - 11/02/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
42957429584295942960
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42957
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE SHOFFNEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE SHOFFNEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/02/2006
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2006
Event Time: 13:34 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2006
Notification Time: 14:53 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2006
Event Time: 13:34 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP/ REACTOR TRIP DUE TO INVALID LOW CONDENSER VACUUM SIGNAL
"At 1334 on 11-2-06 an Automatic Reactor Trip occurred from 100% power. All systems functioned as required. One safety valve stuck open on both OTSGs. They subsequently re-seated. An employee working on the roof at the time of the trip fell off a ladder and injured his leg. Emergency medical was contacted to assist with the injured worker. Two fire trucks and an ambulance was dispatched to the site to remove the injured worker. The worker was not contaminated. There is no indication of any OTSG tube leaks. Initial investigation indicates the reactor tripped, due to a turbine trip due to an invalid low vacuum signal."
State and local officials will be notified of this event by the licensee.
I&C Techs were performing maintenance on one of the low pressure vacuum switches. An electrical fault fed to the other two low pressure vacuum switches causing a 2 out of 3 signal which resulted in a turbine trip followed by a reactor trip signal, as expected. All rods fully inserted into the core. One safety valve (9 safety valves on each OTSG) on each Once Through Steam Generator stuck open. OTSG "B" safety relief valve was open less than one minute. There are no leaking OTSG tubes. A condensate relief valve located in the turbine building opened/shut - nobody injured. The ICS (Integrated Control System) operated as expected. All emergency core cooling systems and the emergency diesel generators are fully operable plus the electrical grid is stable.
A licensee working on the industrial coolers on top of the industrial building, standing on a ladder, fell off the ladder when OTSG relief valve opened. Licensee either broke or badly sprained his leg.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 11/03/06 AT 1607 EST FROM ADAM MILLER TO MACKINNON * * *
"Post trip evaluation determined that the Main Steam safety valves were not stuck open. The safety valves were operating within their tolerance band. The "B" OTSG Main Steam safety valve reseated with no operator action as steam pressure decreased. The "A" Main Steam safety valve was reseated when operators lowered OTSG pressure in accordance with Plant Operating Procedures. TMI-1 issued a press release on this event at 15:13 on 11/2/06." R1DO (John White) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.
"At 1334 on 11-2-06 an Automatic Reactor Trip occurred from 100% power. All systems functioned as required. One safety valve stuck open on both OTSGs. They subsequently re-seated. An employee working on the roof at the time of the trip fell off a ladder and injured his leg. Emergency medical was contacted to assist with the injured worker. Two fire trucks and an ambulance was dispatched to the site to remove the injured worker. The worker was not contaminated. There is no indication of any OTSG tube leaks. Initial investigation indicates the reactor tripped, due to a turbine trip due to an invalid low vacuum signal."
State and local officials will be notified of this event by the licensee.
I&C Techs were performing maintenance on one of the low pressure vacuum switches. An electrical fault fed to the other two low pressure vacuum switches causing a 2 out of 3 signal which resulted in a turbine trip followed by a reactor trip signal, as expected. All rods fully inserted into the core. One safety valve (9 safety valves on each OTSG) on each Once Through Steam Generator stuck open. OTSG "B" safety relief valve was open less than one minute. There are no leaking OTSG tubes. A condensate relief valve located in the turbine building opened/shut - nobody injured. The ICS (Integrated Control System) operated as expected. All emergency core cooling systems and the emergency diesel generators are fully operable plus the electrical grid is stable.
A licensee working on the industrial coolers on top of the industrial building, standing on a ladder, fell off the ladder when OTSG relief valve opened. Licensee either broke or badly sprained his leg.
The NRC Resident Inspector was informed of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 11/03/06 AT 1607 EST FROM ADAM MILLER TO MACKINNON * * *
"Post trip evaluation determined that the Main Steam safety valves were not stuck open. The safety valves were operating within their tolerance band. The "B" OTSG Main Steam safety valve reseated with no operator action as steam pressure decreased. The "A" Main Steam safety valve was reseated when operators lowered OTSG pressure in accordance with Plant Operating Procedures. TMI-1 issued a press release on this event at 15:13 on 11/2/06." R1DO (John White) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42958
Rep Org: ANDREWS ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING
Licensee: ANDREWS ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING
Region: 3
City: INDIANAPOLIS State: IN
County:
License #: 13-32079-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE REUTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: ANDREWS ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING
Region: 3
City: INDIANAPOLIS State: IN
County:
License #: 13-32079-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE REUTER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/02/2006
Notification Time: 16:24 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2006
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2006
Notification Time: 16:24 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2006
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE.
The outer case and the key pad to a Troxler, Model number 3440, was damaged when a vehicle struck the case. The rod to the gauge still operates properly. The location of the incident occurred at the Newton County landfill near Brook, IN. The RSO will go to the site to take radiation surveys. The serial number of the gauge is 21041. The gauge contains 8 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241/Be.
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE REUTER TO JOE O'HARA ON 11/3/06 AT 1152 * * *
Licensee reported that radiation surveys of the gauge indicated less than 3 milliRem/hr approximately six inches from the device, and the carry case isn't damaged. The licensee has recovered the gauge and will perform a leak test prior to forwarding it to the vendor via FedEx.
Notified R3DO(Monte Phillips) and NMSS ( Sandra Wastler).
The outer case and the key pad to a Troxler, Model number 3440, was damaged when a vehicle struck the case. The rod to the gauge still operates properly. The location of the incident occurred at the Newton County landfill near Brook, IN. The RSO will go to the site to take radiation surveys. The serial number of the gauge is 21041. The gauge contains 8 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241/Be.
* * * UPDATE FROM STEVE REUTER TO JOE O'HARA ON 11/3/06 AT 1152 * * *
Licensee reported that radiation surveys of the gauge indicated less than 3 milliRem/hr approximately six inches from the device, and the carry case isn't damaged. The licensee has recovered the gauge and will perform a leak test prior to forwarding it to the vendor via FedEx.
Notified R3DO(Monte Phillips) and NMSS ( Sandra Wastler).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42959
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MALONE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MALONE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/02/2006
Notification Time: 19:10 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2006
Event Time: 14:36 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2006
Notification Time: 19:10 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2006
Event Time: 14:36 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION (HPSI) PUMPS ALIGNMENT BLOCKS IMPROPERLY INSTALLED
"At 1436 hours on November 2, 2006, with the plant in Mode 3, it was determined that less than 100% of the required Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) flow was available per Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2.D. Therefore, TS LCO 3.0.3 was entered.
"Each High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump (one in each ECCS train) is designed with alignment blocks in its mounting, which ensures pump and motor alignment for the thermal expansion experienced by the pump upon initiation of sump recirculation flow. These alignment blocks ( 2 per pump) were discovered to be improperly installed, or missing altogether. In this condition, the HPSI pump could potentially be rendered inoperable upon initiation of sump recirculation.
"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and (b)(3)(v)(D) as an unanalyzed condition, and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPSI pumps to mitigate the consequences of an accident, respectively."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION FROM MALONE TO HUFFMAN AT 1335 EST ON 11/10/06 * * *
"EN # 42959 reported on November 2, 2006 that both Emergency Core Cooling System Trains were inoperable. The reason for that determination involved the observation that the alignment blocks [keys] associated with the mounting of the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps were either incorrectly installed or were missing. The alignment keys were believed to be necessary to ensure appropriate HPSI pump and motor alignment for the thermal expansion experienced upon initiation of sump recirculation flow. The condition was reported as an unanalyzed condition and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPSI pumps to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Subsequently, further evaluation of the HPSI pump mounting configuration determined that the alignment keys are not required for pump operability. Therefore, there was no unanalyzed condition and no condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPSI pumps to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO(Cameron) notified.
"At 1436 hours on November 2, 2006, with the plant in Mode 3, it was determined that less than 100% of the required Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) flow was available per Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2.D. Therefore, TS LCO 3.0.3 was entered.
"Each High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump (one in each ECCS train) is designed with alignment blocks in its mounting, which ensures pump and motor alignment for the thermal expansion experienced by the pump upon initiation of sump recirculation flow. These alignment blocks ( 2 per pump) were discovered to be improperly installed, or missing altogether. In this condition, the HPSI pump could potentially be rendered inoperable upon initiation of sump recirculation.
"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and (b)(3)(v)(D) as an unanalyzed condition, and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPSI pumps to mitigate the consequences of an accident, respectively."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTION FROM MALONE TO HUFFMAN AT 1335 EST ON 11/10/06 * * *
"EN # 42959 reported on November 2, 2006 that both Emergency Core Cooling System Trains were inoperable. The reason for that determination involved the observation that the alignment blocks [keys] associated with the mounting of the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps were either incorrectly installed or were missing. The alignment keys were believed to be necessary to ensure appropriate HPSI pump and motor alignment for the thermal expansion experienced upon initiation of sump recirculation flow. The condition was reported as an unanalyzed condition and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPSI pumps to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Subsequently, further evaluation of the HPSI pump mounting configuration determined that the alignment keys are not required for pump operability. Therefore, there was no unanalyzed condition and no condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the HPSI pumps to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO(Cameron) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42960
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOEL P. LEVINER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOEL P. LEVINER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/02/2006
Notification Time: 22:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2006
Event Time: 18:53 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2006
Notification Time: 22:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2006
Event Time: 18:53 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN
"On 11/01/06 at approximately 18:23 (EST) Brunswick Unit 2 experienced a loss of the unit's Startup Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) and a loss of reactor forced circulation. Due to the loss of the SAT and subsequent manual reactor scram of Unit 2, a loss of Offsite Power resulted to the Unit 2 power buses. All four site Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) then started as designed.
"On 11/02/06 at approximately 0400 (EST) EDG no. 1 tripped on low lube oil pressure due to high differential pressure on the EDG lube oil strainer. The EDG was not loaded at the time of the trip. Due to the loss of one offsite qualified circuit (Unit 2 SAT) and the loss of one EDG (EDG 1), Unit 1 entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, Condition F, which requires restoration of the inoperable offsite circuit or restoration of the inoperable Diesel Generator within 12 hours. At 1600 on 11/02/06, Brunswick Unit 1 entered TS 3.8.1, Condition H, Required Action H.1 to be in MODE 3 in 12 hours and Required Action H.2 to be in MODE 4 within 36 hours.
"On 11/02/06 at 17:54 EDG 2 was declared inoperable due to being placed in manual for a required loaded run due to having been operated at no load for a period of time. Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 due to having EDG 1, EDG 2, and one offsite qualified circuit (Unit 2 SAT) inoperable. Per Technical Specification 3.0.3, action shall be initiated within one hour to place the unit in Mode 2 within 7 hours, Mode 3 within 13 hours, and Mode 4 within 37 hours. Unit 1 began a Technical Specification Required shutdown at 18:53 and is presently at 99% power.
"On 11/02/06 at 21:30, EDG 2 was declared operable following the loaded run and is presently in standby in the auto mode. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at that time. Unit 1 remains in Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition H at the present time.
"At 21:59, the NRC resident was notified of this event."
"On 11/01/06 at approximately 18:23 (EST) Brunswick Unit 2 experienced a loss of the unit's Startup Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) and a loss of reactor forced circulation. Due to the loss of the SAT and subsequent manual reactor scram of Unit 2, a loss of Offsite Power resulted to the Unit 2 power buses. All four site Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) then started as designed.
"On 11/02/06 at approximately 0400 (EST) EDG no. 1 tripped on low lube oil pressure due to high differential pressure on the EDG lube oil strainer. The EDG was not loaded at the time of the trip. Due to the loss of one offsite qualified circuit (Unit 2 SAT) and the loss of one EDG (EDG 1), Unit 1 entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, Condition F, which requires restoration of the inoperable offsite circuit or restoration of the inoperable Diesel Generator within 12 hours. At 1600 on 11/02/06, Brunswick Unit 1 entered TS 3.8.1, Condition H, Required Action H.1 to be in MODE 3 in 12 hours and Required Action H.2 to be in MODE 4 within 36 hours.
"On 11/02/06 at 17:54 EDG 2 was declared inoperable due to being placed in manual for a required loaded run due to having been operated at no load for a period of time. Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 due to having EDG 1, EDG 2, and one offsite qualified circuit (Unit 2 SAT) inoperable. Per Technical Specification 3.0.3, action shall be initiated within one hour to place the unit in Mode 2 within 7 hours, Mode 3 within 13 hours, and Mode 4 within 37 hours. Unit 1 began a Technical Specification Required shutdown at 18:53 and is presently at 99% power.
"On 11/02/06 at 21:30, EDG 2 was declared operable following the loaded run and is presently in standby in the auto mode. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited at that time. Unit 1 remains in Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition H at the present time.
"At 21:59, the NRC resident was notified of this event."