Event Notification Report for October 30, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/29/2006 - 10/30/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
42948429494294743041
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42948
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KELLI VOELSING
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KELLI VOELSING
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 10/30/2006
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2006
Event Time: 07:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2006
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2006
Event Time: 07:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE
"At approximately 0721, Eastern Standard Time, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Control Room was informed that the offsite emergency sirens were inoperable. This event requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was informed. The State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone were notified and were standing by to implement mobile route alerting if needed, as detailed in the Emergency Plan. Tone Alert Radios for notification of residents within the 5-mile emergency planning zone were also available and operable.
"The most probable cause was a controller malfunction at the microwave tower. This controller was reset at 0600. A successful system interrogation was initiated and restored operability of all sirens following the controller reset. Operability of the offsite emergency sirens was restored at 0922 following two successful silent tests. The State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone were notified of system restoration by 1035. The cause of the controller malfunction and required corrective action will be determined in accordance with HNP's Corrective Action Program."
"At approximately 0721, Eastern Standard Time, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Control Room was informed that the offsite emergency sirens were inoperable. This event requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was informed. The State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone were notified and were standing by to implement mobile route alerting if needed, as detailed in the Emergency Plan. Tone Alert Radios for notification of residents within the 5-mile emergency planning zone were also available and operable.
"The most probable cause was a controller malfunction at the microwave tower. This controller was reset at 0600. A successful system interrogation was initiated and restored operability of all sirens following the controller reset. Operability of the offsite emergency sirens was restored at 0922 following two successful silent tests. The State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone were notified of system restoration by 1035. The cause of the controller malfunction and required corrective action will be determined in accordance with HNP's Corrective Action Program."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42949
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: RICHARD HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: RICHARD HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 10/30/2006
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2006
Event Time: 13:04 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2006
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2006
Event Time: 13:04 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2006
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
M.J. ROSS-LEE (NRR)
JIM DYER (NRR)
BARNES (DHS)
DALE POWERS (R4)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
M.J. ROSS-LEE (NRR)
JIM DYER (NRR)
BARNES (DHS)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 67 | Power Operation | 67 | Power Operation |
ALERT DECLARATION DUE TO ELECTRICAL FIRE AFFECTING ONE ESF TRAIN
At 1304 CT on 10/30/06, the licensee declared an Alert due to a fire in a breaker compartment in safety-related 480 VAC Bus 2B-53. The bus feeder breaker tripped open, resulting in the loss of some safety equipment, including one train of emergency feedwater. The fire was immediately extinguished.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (D. HAWKINS) TO W. GOTT AT 1950 EST ON 10/30/06 * * *
"ANO-2 Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 action compliance is in progress which includes plans to commence plant shutdown starting at approximately 1908 hours [CT]. Parallel repair efforts are underway to restore the necessary portions of 2B-53 power to allow exiting the Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 LCO's."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4 DO (D. Powers) and R4 IRC (Kennedy).
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (D. HAWKINS) TO W. GOTT AT 2046 EST ON 10/30/06 * * *
"At 1925 hours [CT] on 10/30/06, Shutdown of Unit 2 to Hot Standby was commenced in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 Action D. This notification satisfies the requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4 DO (D. Powers) and R4 IRC (Kennedy).
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (D. HAWKINS) TO W. GOTT AT 2110 EST ON 10/30/06 * * *
"At 1925 hours [CT], Shutdown of Unit 2 was commenced in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. The termination criteria of OP-1903.010, Section 6.3 have been met and the Alert has been terminated [at 2000 CST].
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4 DO (D. Powers), R4 IRC (Kennedy), NRR EO (Lubinski), NSIR (Leach, Blount, Wilson), HQ PAO (Brenner), Comm TA's (Lee, Brown, Skeen, Hatchett, Piccone), EDO Staff (Lamb - message), DHS SWO (Bozzo), FEMA (Casto), DOE (Foote), NRC (McCrossen), USDA (Giles), HHS (Harris)
At 1304 CT on 10/30/06, the licensee declared an Alert due to a fire in a breaker compartment in safety-related 480 VAC Bus 2B-53. The bus feeder breaker tripped open, resulting in the loss of some safety equipment, including one train of emergency feedwater. The fire was immediately extinguished.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (D. HAWKINS) TO W. GOTT AT 1950 EST ON 10/30/06 * * *
"ANO-2 Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 action compliance is in progress which includes plans to commence plant shutdown starting at approximately 1908 hours [CT]. Parallel repair efforts are underway to restore the necessary portions of 2B-53 power to allow exiting the Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 LCO's."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4 DO (D. Powers) and R4 IRC (Kennedy).
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (D. HAWKINS) TO W. GOTT AT 2046 EST ON 10/30/06 * * *
"At 1925 hours [CT] on 10/30/06, Shutdown of Unit 2 to Hot Standby was commenced in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.3.1 Action D. This notification satisfies the requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4 DO (D. Powers) and R4 IRC (Kennedy).
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (D. HAWKINS) TO W. GOTT AT 2110 EST ON 10/30/06 * * *
"At 1925 hours [CT], Shutdown of Unit 2 was commenced in accordance with Technical Specification 3.6.3.1. The termination criteria of OP-1903.010, Section 6.3 have been met and the Alert has been terminated [at 2000 CST].
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4 DO (D. Powers), R4 IRC (Kennedy), NRR EO (Lubinski), NSIR (Leach, Blount, Wilson), HQ PAO (Brenner), Comm TA's (Lee, Brown, Skeen, Hatchett, Piccone), EDO Staff (Lamb - message), DHS SWO (Bozzo), FEMA (Casto), DOE (Foote), NRC (McCrossen), USDA (Giles), HHS (Harris)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42947
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JERRY RISTE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JERRY RISTE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 10/30/2006
Notification Time: 11:56 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2006
Event Time: 08:48 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2006
Notification Time: 11:56 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2006
Event Time: 08:48 [CST]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
MARK RING (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 92 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR TRIP
"During power operation, at 92% rated power, an automatic reactor trip occurred. The reactor protection signal that caused the reactor trip was steam generator 'B' steam flow greater than feedwater flow coincident with low water level on steam generator 'B.' The cause of the plant transient that led to the reactor trip was a loss of Instrument Bus 1 (Red Channel). Instrument Bus 1 unexpectedly deenergized during the performance of maintenance on the inverter (BRA-111) that feeds Instrument Bus 1.
"Following the reactor trip, the auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started, as designed, due to a low level in the steam generators.
"After the trip, non-safety related 4160 Volt AC Bus 4 de-energized and secondary plant feedwater heater 15B relief valve lifted. The cause of the loss of Bus 4 and 158 feedwater heater relief lifting Is under Investigation.
"The plant is currently stable and in the hot shutdown (HSD) mode. Power was restored to Instrument Bus 1 at 1018.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical because of the automatic reactor trip and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed below because of the actions of the RPS and the automatic start of the AFW pumps."
All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed by feeding the steam generators with AFW and steaming to the Condenser Dump.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM T. BUNKELMAN TO W. GOTT AT 1332 EST ON 10/30/06 * * *
"Due to the loss of Bus 4, the running Circulating Water Pump was lost resulting in a loss of normal heat sink to the condenser. The standby Circulating Water Pump was started at 1002 CST and the condenser heat sink was restored."
Until the condenser steam dump was restored, the plant was steaming through the steam generator PORVs (atmospheric steam dumps). There is no steam generator tube leakage.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (M. Phillips)
"During power operation, at 92% rated power, an automatic reactor trip occurred. The reactor protection signal that caused the reactor trip was steam generator 'B' steam flow greater than feedwater flow coincident with low water level on steam generator 'B.' The cause of the plant transient that led to the reactor trip was a loss of Instrument Bus 1 (Red Channel). Instrument Bus 1 unexpectedly deenergized during the performance of maintenance on the inverter (BRA-111) that feeds Instrument Bus 1.
"Following the reactor trip, the auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started, as designed, due to a low level in the steam generators.
"After the trip, non-safety related 4160 Volt AC Bus 4 de-energized and secondary plant feedwater heater 15B relief valve lifted. The cause of the loss of Bus 4 and 158 feedwater heater relief lifting Is under Investigation.
"The plant is currently stable and in the hot shutdown (HSD) mode. Power was restored to Instrument Bus 1 at 1018.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical because of the automatic reactor trip and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed below because of the actions of the RPS and the automatic start of the AFW pumps."
All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed by feeding the steam generators with AFW and steaming to the Condenser Dump.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM T. BUNKELMAN TO W. GOTT AT 1332 EST ON 10/30/06 * * *
"Due to the loss of Bus 4, the running Circulating Water Pump was lost resulting in a loss of normal heat sink to the condenser. The standby Circulating Water Pump was started at 1002 CST and the condenser heat sink was restored."
Until the condenser steam dump was restored, the plant was steaming through the steam generator PORVs (atmospheric steam dumps). There is no steam generator tube leakage.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (M. Phillips)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43041
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAVIER SANCHEZ
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAVIER SANCHEZ
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 12/09/2006
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2006
Event Time: 05:37 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2006
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/30/2006
Event Time: 05:37 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/09/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
INADVERTENT OPENING OF TWO ISOLATION VALVES
"This telephone notification to report an invalid actuation is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), which states, 'In the case of an invalid actuation reported under Sec. 50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. The specific reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), states, 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B).' For this report, the affected system was the Unit 2 Train B Containment Spray System.
"On October 30, 2006 at approximately 0600 hours, a Main Control Room (MCR) Senior Reactor Operator identified during a panel walk-down that the containment spray header isolation valve, 2CS007B, and the containment spray eductor NaOH tank suction isolation valve, 2CS019B, were open. This was an unexpected condition, which prompted Operations to investigate. A review of the Alarm computer points revealed that the valves opened at 0537 hours. The investigation determined that the most probable cause of this occurrence was attributed to, during the performance of maintenance inside of the 2PA10J panel, an Electrical Maintenance Department technician inadvertently making contact with the manual latch causing the actuation of the K643B slave relay that led to repositioning of the out-of-position valves.
"The following information provides the required details outlined in NUREG 1022 Revision 2:
"(a) The relay actuation for the 2B Containment Spray valves was not a valid ESF actuation. The actuation was the result of an inadvertent bump of the K643B relay and not the result of a valid ESF signal from the reactor protection system.
"(b) This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"(c) The specific train and system that actuated was 2B Containment Spray.
"(d) The train actuation was a partial actuation for three containment spray valves from the K643B slave relay due to an inadvertent bump of the slave relay manual latching mechanism with the following conditions identified:
" 2CS007B, 2B containment spray header isolation valve, changed from closed to open.
"2CS010B, 2B containment spray NaOH eductor inlet isolation valve, is normally open and did not change position, but received an open signal.
"2CS019B, 2B containment spray eductor NaOH tank suction isolation valve, changed from closed to open.
"The 2B containment spray system was in TEST in preparation for changing from Mode 5 to Mode 4.
"(e) The containment spray system did not start because the system was in TEST and the containment spray pumps were in lock out while in Mode 5. The three valves functioned as designed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This telephone notification to report an invalid actuation is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), which states, 'In the case of an invalid actuation reported under Sec. 50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. The specific reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), states, 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B).' For this report, the affected system was the Unit 2 Train B Containment Spray System.
"On October 30, 2006 at approximately 0600 hours, a Main Control Room (MCR) Senior Reactor Operator identified during a panel walk-down that the containment spray header isolation valve, 2CS007B, and the containment spray eductor NaOH tank suction isolation valve, 2CS019B, were open. This was an unexpected condition, which prompted Operations to investigate. A review of the Alarm computer points revealed that the valves opened at 0537 hours. The investigation determined that the most probable cause of this occurrence was attributed to, during the performance of maintenance inside of the 2PA10J panel, an Electrical Maintenance Department technician inadvertently making contact with the manual latch causing the actuation of the K643B slave relay that led to repositioning of the out-of-position valves.
"The following information provides the required details outlined in NUREG 1022 Revision 2:
"(a) The relay actuation for the 2B Containment Spray valves was not a valid ESF actuation. The actuation was the result of an inadvertent bump of the K643B relay and not the result of a valid ESF signal from the reactor protection system.
"(b) This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"(c) The specific train and system that actuated was 2B Containment Spray.
"(d) The train actuation was a partial actuation for three containment spray valves from the K643B slave relay due to an inadvertent bump of the slave relay manual latching mechanism with the following conditions identified:
" 2CS007B, 2B containment spray header isolation valve, changed from closed to open.
"2CS010B, 2B containment spray NaOH eductor inlet isolation valve, is normally open and did not change position, but received an open signal.
"2CS019B, 2B containment spray eductor NaOH tank suction isolation valve, changed from closed to open.
"The 2B containment spray system was in TEST in preparation for changing from Mode 5 to Mode 4.
"(e) The containment spray system did not start because the system was in TEST and the containment spray pumps were in lock out while in Mode 5. The three valves functioned as designed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.