Event Notification Report for October 28, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/27/2006 - 10/28/2006
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42942
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK SLIVKA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK SLIVKA
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 10/28/2006
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2006
Event Time: 12:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2006
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2006
Event Time: 12:23 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"During plant cooldown/depressurization in Mode 3, an Over Temperature (OT) Delta Temperature reactor trip signal was generated. The reactor Trip Breakers opened as designed (all rods were previously inserted). Additionally, a low Tavg/P-4 Feedwater Isolation Signal was generated and all Bypass Feedwater Regulation Valves closed (open for long-cycle recirculation operation). No Feedwater Isolation Valves were open at the time. All systems performed as designed.
"Actual loop Delta T's (Th - Tc) never exceeded 3.3 degrees F, well below the calculated OT Delta T setpoint. But plant Delta T calculations are based on narrow range Th and Tc instruments with scaling to low limits. When actual plant temperature was lowered to the lower limits of each instrument, calculated Delta T increased to the OT Delta T setpoint causing the reactor trip signal. Existing procedure guidance did not adequately ensure that the reactor trip breakers are open prior to initiating a partial plant cooldown.
"The plant was stabilized. The long-cycle recirculation was re-established and plant cooldown/depressurization was recommenced, as originally planned to 340 degrees F and 925 psig."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/9/2006 AT 12:19 FROM THOMAS G. PETRAK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Alvin W. Vogtle, Unit 1, Operating License no. NPF-68, Event Notification #42942 is retracted. The event reported in the notification which occurred during the Unit 1 cooldown in Mode 3 was not representative of the conditions under which the Over Temperature Delta Temperature (OTDT) setpoint is intended to operate. The setpoint is intended to provide protection while the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2. As the cooldown progressed from Normal Operating Pressure and Temperature (NOPT), eventually the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) hot and cold leg temperature indications reached the low end of their ranges or scales. Further reductions of temperature resulted in artificial indications of core power (delta-T) that cannot be relied upon as a valid input to the OTDT protective function.
"The actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is not considered to be a valid actuation. As such, this is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The Unit 1 Feedwater Isolation caused from the OTDT reactor trip is not a function is listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3)(iv)(B) as a system whose actuation is required to be reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During plant cooldown/depressurization in Mode 3, an Over Temperature (OT) Delta Temperature reactor trip signal was generated. The reactor Trip Breakers opened as designed (all rods were previously inserted). Additionally, a low Tavg/P-4 Feedwater Isolation Signal was generated and all Bypass Feedwater Regulation Valves closed (open for long-cycle recirculation operation). No Feedwater Isolation Valves were open at the time. All systems performed as designed.
"Actual loop Delta T's (Th - Tc) never exceeded 3.3 degrees F, well below the calculated OT Delta T setpoint. But plant Delta T calculations are based on narrow range Th and Tc instruments with scaling to low limits. When actual plant temperature was lowered to the lower limits of each instrument, calculated Delta T increased to the OT Delta T setpoint causing the reactor trip signal. Existing procedure guidance did not adequately ensure that the reactor trip breakers are open prior to initiating a partial plant cooldown.
"The plant was stabilized. The long-cycle recirculation was re-established and plant cooldown/depressurization was recommenced, as originally planned to 340 degrees F and 925 psig."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/9/2006 AT 12:19 FROM THOMAS G. PETRAK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Alvin W. Vogtle, Unit 1, Operating License no. NPF-68, Event Notification #42942 is retracted. The event reported in the notification which occurred during the Unit 1 cooldown in Mode 3 was not representative of the conditions under which the Over Temperature Delta Temperature (OTDT) setpoint is intended to operate. The setpoint is intended to provide protection while the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2. As the cooldown progressed from Normal Operating Pressure and Temperature (NOPT), eventually the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) hot and cold leg temperature indications reached the low end of their ranges or scales. Further reductions of temperature resulted in artificial indications of core power (delta-T) that cannot be relied upon as a valid input to the OTDT protective function.
"The actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is not considered to be a valid actuation. As such, this is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"The Unit 1 Feedwater Isolation caused from the OTDT reactor trip is not a function is listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b) (3)(iv)(B) as a system whose actuation is required to be reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42943
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: RICH LOWERY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: RICH LOWERY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 10/28/2006
Notification Time: 21:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2006
Event Time: 17:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2006
Notification Time: 21:52 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2006
Event Time: 17:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling Shutdown | 0 | Refueling Shutdown |
UNANALYZED CONDITION
"An 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) is being made due to discovery of a previously unanalyzed plant condition. The chemical volume control system (CVCS) charging line is a high energy line susceptible, within design space, to a rupture that could result in pipe whip and an impingement condition. The containment penetration (M-3) for the charging line is directly below the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) header penetrations (M-5 & M-6). Due to this proximity, a failure of the charging line could impact the SI-1503 class HPSI line (M-6) causing damage to the header and rendering it incapable of fulfilling its design function. The two HPSI headers are different class piping with the M-5 penetration being a 2500 psig (SI - 2501 Class) line and the M-6 penetration being a 1500 psig (SI-1503 Class) line. The 2500 psig line is constructed of robust enough piping to not be susceptible to failure, however both HPSI headers are cross connected prior to location of concern. Although both HPSI and CVCS breaks are isolable, operator action would be required to identify and isolate the break location. The possible result of a high energy line break of charging piping could result in all three pipe headers being inoperable until manual action could be taken to isolate leakage on the 1500 psig HPSI line. Plant is currently shutdown for refueling outage with scheduled startup of November 21, 2006."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY ERICK MATZKE TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1119 EST ON 11/07/06 * * *
"Additional review of the stations design and licensing basis has determined that the charging and high pressure safety injection systems are correctly designed to the stations high energy line break criteria for lines inside containment. This situation is not reportable and therefore event notification 42943 is being withdrawn."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Clark)
"An 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) is being made due to discovery of a previously unanalyzed plant condition. The chemical volume control system (CVCS) charging line is a high energy line susceptible, within design space, to a rupture that could result in pipe whip and an impingement condition. The containment penetration (M-3) for the charging line is directly below the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) header penetrations (M-5 & M-6). Due to this proximity, a failure of the charging line could impact the SI-1503 class HPSI line (M-6) causing damage to the header and rendering it incapable of fulfilling its design function. The two HPSI headers are different class piping with the M-5 penetration being a 2500 psig (SI - 2501 Class) line and the M-6 penetration being a 1500 psig (SI-1503 Class) line. The 2500 psig line is constructed of robust enough piping to not be susceptible to failure, however both HPSI headers are cross connected prior to location of concern. Although both HPSI and CVCS breaks are isolable, operator action would be required to identify and isolate the break location. The possible result of a high energy line break of charging piping could result in all three pipe headers being inoperable until manual action could be taken to isolate leakage on the 1500 psig HPSI line. Plant is currently shutdown for refueling outage with scheduled startup of November 21, 2006."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY ERICK MATZKE TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1119 EST ON 11/07/06 * * *
"Additional review of the stations design and licensing basis has determined that the charging and high pressure safety injection systems are correctly designed to the stations high energy line break criteria for lines inside containment. This situation is not reportable and therefore event notification 42943 is being withdrawn."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Clark)