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Event Notification Report for October 24, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/23/2006 - 10/24/2006

EVENT NUMBERS
4292942930

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42929
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: PAT RYAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 10/24/2006
Notification Time: 09:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2006
Event Time: 01:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/10/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 96 Power Operation 96 Power Operation
Event Text
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) DECLARED INOPERABLE FOR APPROX. 3.4 HOURS

"At 0142 on October 24, 2006, while aligning the High Pressure Core Spray system for surveillance testing of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Storage Tank Level instrumentation, 1E22-F015, the Suppression Pool suction valve for the High Pressure Core Spray pump, failed to stroke fully open. High Pressure Core Spray was declared inoperable as a result. This event is considered a loss of a single train system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

The High Pressure Core Spray system was restored to an operable condition at 0506 on October 24, 2006 after the suction valve was successfully stroked open and the HPCS suction source was aligned to the Suppression Pool in accordance with Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.5.1. The cause of the event is currently under investigation."

All other Emergency Core Cooling systems were fully operable during the time period HPCS was inoperable.

The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee.

* * * RETRACTION FROM SIMPSON TO HUFFMAN AT 1534 EST ON 11/10/06 * * *

"Upon further review of this event, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system remained operable. Based upon valve motor operator thrust verification testing data and troubleshooting, the cause of the suppression pool suction valve for the HPCS pump stopping in mid-position was determined to be tripping of the open-direction torque switch prior to the open limit switch setpoint.

"Normally, the condition of the open-direction torque switch has no safety-related consequence since the torque switch is bypassed during design basis events and the valve's motor gearing capability is sufficient to open the valve when the torque switch is bypassed.

"During this event, as directed by the surveillance test procedure, operators placed the HPCS Motor Operated Valve (MOV) test switch to the test position which resulted in the open-direction torque switch not being bypassed (i.e., was in the circuit) during repositioning of the HPCS suppression pool suction valve. Due to placing the HPCS MOV test switch to test, operators entered the action of Operational Requirements Manual section 2.5.2 (Motor Operated Valves Thermal Overload Protection). The action requires operators to return the MOV test switch to normal (removing the torque switch from the circuit) if an emergency condition occurs requiring valve repositioning.

"As operators were opening the HPCS suppression pool suction valve for testing, suction for the HPCS pump was aligned from the RCIC storage tank. When the HPCS suction valve from suppression pool stopped in mid-position, the HPCS suction valve from the RCIC storage tank was still fully open (per design, stays full open until the HPCS suppression pool suction valve is full open). Therefore, if an accident occurred requiring HPCS to initiate and inject water into the reactor pressure vessel during this event suction would have initiated from the RCIC storage tank. The HPCS system can take suction from either the RCIC storage tank or the suppression pool, and a HPCS initiation signal does not automatically swap HPCS pump suction from the RCIC storage tank to the suppression pool or vice versa.

"The operators immediately recognized the HPCS suppression pool suction valve did not fully open. If an accident condition occurred, operators would reposition the HPCS MOV test switch to Normal (to bypass the open torque switch). In the event a condition requiring a HPCS suction transfer to the suppression pool occurred, the suppression pool suction valve would fully open and the RCIC storage tank suction valve would fully close, completing the required suction shift.

"On this basis, the HPCS system was capable of performing its function to mitigate the consequences of an accident and this issue is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."

The NRC Resident was notified of this retraction. R3DO(Cameron) notified.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 42930
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: FLOWSERVE US INC
Region: 1
City: RALEIGH   State: NC
County:
License #: 091-0121-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GRANT MILLS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/24/2006
Notification Time: 15:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/24/2006
Event Time: 04:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BOOTH RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE DISCONNECTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY RECONNECTED

"N.C. Radiation Protection Section was notified on 24 Oct. 2006 by the RSO for Flowserve US Inc. of a booth radiography source disconnect. The sealed source involved is reported as approximately 4.3 Curies of Ir-192. Discovery of the disconnect and subsequent actions were made in accordance with licensee policy and procedures. The licensee is controlling access to the booth, allowing for a safe and well considered response. The licensee is in contact with the vender of the camera and associated equipment in an effort to determine the best course of action (i.e. source recovery).

"The NC Radiation Protection Section is working in conjunction with the licensee and vender and will continue to update NRC as appropriate.

"The Flowserve Inc. RSO has reported that by following directions from vendor, the source was successfully retrieved and is in the safe, shielded and secure position. He further reports he is immediately replacing all similar equipment and returning the old equipment (including the specific malfunctioning equipment associated with this incident) to the vendor. Both Flowserve and the equipment vendor are planning after action reports to determine root cause if possible.

"North Carolina Ref. NC-06-33."