Event Notification Report for October 23, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/22/2006 - 10/23/2006
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42932
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SMITH EMERY
Region: 4
City: STOCKTON State: CA
County:
License #: 3789-38
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: SMITH EMERY
Region: 4
City: STOCKTON State: CA
County:
License #: 3789-38
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: K. PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/24/2006
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2006
Event Time: 02:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2006
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2006
Event Time: 02:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State provided the following information via e-mail:
"At 2:30 a.m. a Smith Emery employee was taking backscatter measurements on Highway 99 North in Stockton, California just south of the Fremont off ramp. One lane was restricted to traffic while the Smith Emery employee took backscatter measurements to determine asphalt density. Shortly thereafter a semi-tractor and trailer crossed the barriers into the restricted lane and ran over the CPN MC3 gauge (#m37107963). The gauge outer case was destroyed and the source rod was broken off and carried away from the gauge down the road. The source rod contained 10 mCi of cesium 137. The 50 mCi americium source remained affixed to the portion of the gauge case that was intact. The licensee quickly notified the California Department of Emergency Services, who notified the Radiological Health Branch. Following the incident, the licensee restricted access to the area where the gauge was ran over and awaited the RSO to arrive. The RSO arrived around 6:30 am and with assistance from the Stockton FD, determined the gauge sources were intact and placed them in their transport case to transport to CPN, the gauge manufacturer. CPN leak tested the sources and there was no leakage or contamination found.
"CA Assignment number 102306"
The State provided the following information via e-mail:
"At 2:30 a.m. a Smith Emery employee was taking backscatter measurements on Highway 99 North in Stockton, California just south of the Fremont off ramp. One lane was restricted to traffic while the Smith Emery employee took backscatter measurements to determine asphalt density. Shortly thereafter a semi-tractor and trailer crossed the barriers into the restricted lane and ran over the CPN MC3 gauge (#m37107963). The gauge outer case was destroyed and the source rod was broken off and carried away from the gauge down the road. The source rod contained 10 mCi of cesium 137. The 50 mCi americium source remained affixed to the portion of the gauge case that was intact. The licensee quickly notified the California Department of Emergency Services, who notified the Radiological Health Branch. Following the incident, the licensee restricted access to the area where the gauge was ran over and awaited the RSO to arrive. The RSO arrived around 6:30 am and with assistance from the Stockton FD, determined the gauge sources were intact and placed them in their transport case to transport to CPN, the gauge manufacturer. CPN leak tested the sources and there was no leakage or contamination found.
"CA Assignment number 102306"
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 42936
Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LINK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 10/26/2006
Notification Time: 21:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2006
Event Time: 10:50 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2006
Notification Time: 21:09 [ET]
Event Date: 10/23/2006
Event Time: 10:50 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION PART 70 APP A (b)(3) - ACUTE CHEMICAL EXPOSURE
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION PART 70 APP A (b)(3) - ACUTE CHEMICAL EXPOSURE
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
WORKERS EXPOSED TO HYDROGEN FLORIDE RELEASE
"On 10/23/06 at approximately 1050 hours, during a routine area walk-down of Dry Conversion Facility (DCF) 4th level an operator noticed the pungent/repulsive smell of hydrogen fluoride (HF) vapor near the L-3 UF6 to UO2 conversion vessel and back-up filter vessels. [Note: The odor threshold for HF is approximately 0.042 ppm.] He immediately exited the area, placed it on respiratory protection required status and then notified a Health and Safety Technician (HST).
"The operator donned respiratory protection equipment and 'Dragered' the suspect area for HF vapor and the results were positive. The HST also pulled samples for airborne radioactivity and none were observed. The operator notified the DCF control room and shutdown of the affected was initiated.
"This report is being made because it has the potential for meeting the following two 10 CFR 70 Appendix A, 24 hour reporting Criteria.
"1. Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the ISA and which results in an accident sequence with high consequence that is not at least highly unlikely, or an accident sequence with intermediate consequence that is not at least unlikely.
"The location of the HF leak was in a Dry Conversion UF6 to UO2 conversion vessel. This major component is in the powder production process system. However, the boundary of UF6 Vaporization process system ends at the conversion vessel inlet. Accident sequence 810-5 for UF6 Vaporization process system, as reported in the ISA Summary, clearly bounds the conditions associated with this event. The protections listed in this accident sequence are also applicable to this event. However, this condition is not specifically covered in the accident evaluation of the powder production process system. Because this condition was not specifically evaluated in the powder production process system accident evaluation, it is not clear that this reportability criterion does not apply.
"3. An acute chemical exposure to an individual from licensed material or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material that could:
a. Lead to irreversible or other serious, long lasting health effects to a worker
b. Cause mild transient health effects to any Individual located outside of the controlled area.
"Based on the low odor detection threshold for HF and the operator's response to immediately leave the area until protective equipment had been donned, the subsequent measured HF concentrations, estimated exposure time and the physical evidence of the individual exposed to HF, long lasting serious health effects are not expected.
"All other conversion units were shut down at approximately 1300 on 10/26/2006 to further evaluate the other unit's conditions although no leakage of HF or radioactivity has occurred."
"On 10/23/06 at approximately 1050 hours, during a routine area walk-down of Dry Conversion Facility (DCF) 4th level an operator noticed the pungent/repulsive smell of hydrogen fluoride (HF) vapor near the L-3 UF6 to UO2 conversion vessel and back-up filter vessels. [Note: The odor threshold for HF is approximately 0.042 ppm.] He immediately exited the area, placed it on respiratory protection required status and then notified a Health and Safety Technician (HST).
"The operator donned respiratory protection equipment and 'Dragered' the suspect area for HF vapor and the results were positive. The HST also pulled samples for airborne radioactivity and none were observed. The operator notified the DCF control room and shutdown of the affected was initiated.
"This report is being made because it has the potential for meeting the following two 10 CFR 70 Appendix A, 24 hour reporting Criteria.
"1. Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the ISA and which results in an accident sequence with high consequence that is not at least highly unlikely, or an accident sequence with intermediate consequence that is not at least unlikely.
"The location of the HF leak was in a Dry Conversion UF6 to UO2 conversion vessel. This major component is in the powder production process system. However, the boundary of UF6 Vaporization process system ends at the conversion vessel inlet. Accident sequence 810-5 for UF6 Vaporization process system, as reported in the ISA Summary, clearly bounds the conditions associated with this event. The protections listed in this accident sequence are also applicable to this event. However, this condition is not specifically covered in the accident evaluation of the powder production process system. Because this condition was not specifically evaluated in the powder production process system accident evaluation, it is not clear that this reportability criterion does not apply.
"3. An acute chemical exposure to an individual from licensed material or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material that could:
a. Lead to irreversible or other serious, long lasting health effects to a worker
b. Cause mild transient health effects to any Individual located outside of the controlled area.
"Based on the low odor detection threshold for HF and the operator's response to immediately leave the area until protective equipment had been donned, the subsequent measured HF concentrations, estimated exposure time and the physical evidence of the individual exposed to HF, long lasting serious health effects are not expected.
"All other conversion units were shut down at approximately 1300 on 10/26/2006 to further evaluate the other unit's conditions although no leakage of HF or radioactivity has occurred."