Event Notification Report for October 07, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/06/2006 - 10/07/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
42882428834288442885428864288742888428894289042891
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42882
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JANET NOVAK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JANET NOVAK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 10/07/2006
Notification Time: 03:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 01:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2006
Notification Time: 03:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 01:51 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1)
PAUL KROHN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
SCAFFOLD PREVENTS MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE CLOSURE
Temporary scaffolding was constructed near the loop-1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) on 8/30/2006 while the Unit was in Mode 1. On 10/7/2006 surveillance testing on the MSIVs was conducted in Mode 3 and the loop-1 MSIV failed to fully stroke closed. It was determined that temporary scaffolding was interfering with full valve travel. The scaffolding was removed and the surveillance test verified full valve motion.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify state and local officials.
Temporary scaffolding was constructed near the loop-1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) on 8/30/2006 while the Unit was in Mode 1. On 10/7/2006 surveillance testing on the MSIVs was conducted in Mode 3 and the loop-1 MSIV failed to fully stroke closed. It was determined that temporary scaffolding was interfering with full valve travel. The scaffolding was removed and the surveillance test verified full valve motion.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify state and local officials.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42883
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: J. E. THOMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: J. E. THOMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/07/2006
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 06:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2006
Notification Time: 11:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 06:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1)
PAUL KROHN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE
"A division 2 Primary Containment Isolation Instrument System component inoperable required the manual isolation of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) outboard Primary Containment Isolation valves (PCIV). This isolation was required by T/S action 3.3.2.b.1.
"This report made pursuant to 10CFR 50,72 (b)(3)(v)(D) for the inability of single train system to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
At approximately midnight on 10/7/06, Control Room Operators received a Div 2 Steam Leak Detection Trouble Alarm. Troubleshooting identified the failure as associated with the GE NUMAC drawer where temperature inputs are processed. The applicable 14-day T/S LCO Action Statement requires completion of repairs within 6 hours or isolation of HPCI 1 hour later. HPCI was isolated at 0657 EDT. There was no I&C work in progress at the time of the failure. Repair parts are available and onsite.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION RECEIVED FROM EDWARD DENNIN TO JOE O'HARA AT 1500 ON 12/04/06 * * *
"This is a retraction of the event notification made on 10/07/06 at 11:05 hours. This event (#42883) was initially reported as a safety system functional failure under the requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to a manual closure of the HPCI steam line outboard primary containment isolation valve (PCIV). The PCIV was closed to support the maintenance on an inoperable steam leak detection (SLD) channel and to satisfy the Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation action statement.
"The event was initiated at 00:06 hours by a trouble alarm due to a 'self test fault' condition on the Division 2 SLD instrument channel. Troubleshooting determined that the instrument channel was inoperable. TS 3.3.2 Action 'b.1' requires the channel to be restored to operable status within 6 hours. Since this action could not be completed Table 3.3.2-1 Action 23 was applicable. Action 23 required the affected system isolation valves to be closed within one hour and the system (HPCI) to be declared inoperable. This action was completed at 06:57 hours.
"Two modules were replaced in the SLD instrument chassis. The instrument channel was tested satisfactorily and returned to service, Unit 2 HPCI was restored to operable status at 23:48 hours.
"The system was removed from service as part of a planned evolution to conduct maintenance in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's Technical Specifications. The system was secured for the purpose of conducting maintenance on an inoperable SLD instrument channel and completing the TS action. The failed instrument did not adversely affect the HPCI system's capability of performing its safety function. HPCI remained capable of automatic initiation until the PCIV was manually closed to support maintenance by completing the TS actions.
"A condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of the HPCI safety function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO(Sykes).
"A division 2 Primary Containment Isolation Instrument System component inoperable required the manual isolation of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) outboard Primary Containment Isolation valves (PCIV). This isolation was required by T/S action 3.3.2.b.1.
"This report made pursuant to 10CFR 50,72 (b)(3)(v)(D) for the inability of single train system to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
At approximately midnight on 10/7/06, Control Room Operators received a Div 2 Steam Leak Detection Trouble Alarm. Troubleshooting identified the failure as associated with the GE NUMAC drawer where temperature inputs are processed. The applicable 14-day T/S LCO Action Statement requires completion of repairs within 6 hours or isolation of HPCI 1 hour later. HPCI was isolated at 0657 EDT. There was no I&C work in progress at the time of the failure. Repair parts are available and onsite.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION RECEIVED FROM EDWARD DENNIN TO JOE O'HARA AT 1500 ON 12/04/06 * * *
"This is a retraction of the event notification made on 10/07/06 at 11:05 hours. This event (#42883) was initially reported as a safety system functional failure under the requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable due to a manual closure of the HPCI steam line outboard primary containment isolation valve (PCIV). The PCIV was closed to support the maintenance on an inoperable steam leak detection (SLD) channel and to satisfy the Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation action statement.
"The event was initiated at 00:06 hours by a trouble alarm due to a 'self test fault' condition on the Division 2 SLD instrument channel. Troubleshooting determined that the instrument channel was inoperable. TS 3.3.2 Action 'b.1' requires the channel to be restored to operable status within 6 hours. Since this action could not be completed Table 3.3.2-1 Action 23 was applicable. Action 23 required the affected system isolation valves to be closed within one hour and the system (HPCI) to be declared inoperable. This action was completed at 06:57 hours.
"Two modules were replaced in the SLD instrument chassis. The instrument channel was tested satisfactorily and returned to service, Unit 2 HPCI was restored to operable status at 23:48 hours.
"The system was removed from service as part of a planned evolution to conduct maintenance in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's Technical Specifications. The system was secured for the purpose of conducting maintenance on an inoperable SLD instrument channel and completing the TS action. The failed instrument did not adversely affect the HPCI system's capability of performing its safety function. HPCI remained capable of automatic initiation until the PCIV was manually closed to support maintenance by completing the TS actions.
"A condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of the HPCI safety function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO(Sykes).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42884
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID KARST
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID KARST
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/07/2006
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 07:53 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2006
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 07:53 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3)
PATTY PELKE (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
FITNESS FOR DUTY - CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR
A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol. The supervisor's access to the plant has been denied while a review of this matter is performed. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol. The supervisor's access to the plant has been denied while a review of this matter is performed. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42885
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS FREDETTE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS FREDETTE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/07/2006
Notification Time: 14:31 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 13:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2006
Notification Time: 14:31 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 13:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
ANTHONY MCMURTRAY (EP)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
ANTHONY MCMURTRAY (EP)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SITE ACCESS ROAD FLOODED
"At 1340 on 10/7/06; normal road access to Surry Power Station became flooded and impassable due to sustained heavy rainstorms. This flooding compromised the Surry off-site response capability.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (e.g., offsite response capability)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1340 on 10/7/06; normal road access to Surry Power Station became flooded and impassable due to sustained heavy rainstorms. This flooding compromised the Surry off-site response capability.
"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (e.g., offsite response capability)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42886
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN GUNN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JOHN GUNN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/07/2006
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 11:40 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2006
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 11:40 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
GREG PICK (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
AXIAL INDICATIONS IDENTIFIED ON PRESSURE BOUNDRY
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On October 7, 2006, at approximately 11:40 Mountain Standard Time (MST), Engineering personnel performing preplanned in-service examination of the reactor vessel head vent piping notified the Unit 2 Control Room that two axial indications had been discovered. The indications are located on the inner diameter surface of the pipe adjacent to the J-weld to the reactor head and are part of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary. The indications are characterized as axial, estimated 0.020 to 0.030 inches deep, and approximately 0.2 inches long. The indications do not appear to be through wall and there is no evidence of RCS pressure boundary leakage.
"Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 permits no RCS pressure boundary leakage and there is no evidence of pressure boundary leakage. Nevertheless, the indications are being conservatively identified as abnormal degradation of the RCS pressure boundary and will necessitate taking corrective action to restore the barrier's capability. Therefore, the ENS notification of this event is in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). Unit 2 is currently shutdown for its 13th refueling outage and is in Mode 6.
"No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the time of discovery that contributed to this condition. There were no failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable and no failures of components with multiple functions were involved. The event did not result In the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"An investigation of this event will be conducted in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On October 7, 2006, at approximately 11:40 Mountain Standard Time (MST), Engineering personnel performing preplanned in-service examination of the reactor vessel head vent piping notified the Unit 2 Control Room that two axial indications had been discovered. The indications are located on the inner diameter surface of the pipe adjacent to the J-weld to the reactor head and are part of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary. The indications are characterized as axial, estimated 0.020 to 0.030 inches deep, and approximately 0.2 inches long. The indications do not appear to be through wall and there is no evidence of RCS pressure boundary leakage.
"Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 permits no RCS pressure boundary leakage and there is no evidence of pressure boundary leakage. Nevertheless, the indications are being conservatively identified as abnormal degradation of the RCS pressure boundary and will necessitate taking corrective action to restore the barrier's capability. Therefore, the ENS notification of this event is in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). Unit 2 is currently shutdown for its 13th refueling outage and is in Mode 6.
"No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the time of discovery that contributed to this condition. There were no failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable and no failures of components with multiple functions were involved. The event did not result In the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"An investigation of this event will be conducted in accordance with the PVNGS corrective action program."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42887
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE BERG
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE BERG
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/07/2006
Notification Time: 18:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 18:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2006
Notification Time: 18:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 18:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2006
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
THEODORE QUAY (NRR)
MIKE WEBER (NRR)
MARC DAPAS (R1)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
THEODORE QUAY (NRR)
MIKE WEBER (NRR)
MARC DAPAS (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 22 | Power Operation | 22 | Power Operation |
UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY
During testing, a small crack (3"- 4" axial crack) was identified on a return line to the torus for both HPCI and RCIC (steam driven ECCS systems). The valve upstream of the leak has been closed, however, the leak is still unisolable between that valve and the torus. This plant condition does not threaten public safety.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, as well as State and local agencies.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ROBERT STEIGERWALD TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0555 EDT ON 10/08/06 * * *
"This is a follow up notification to EN# 42887. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Terminated the Unusual Event at 0513 [EDT] on 10/08/06. Unit 2 is currently shutdown in Mode 4."
In Mode 4, Primary Containment is no longer required. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and Local agencies.
Notified R1DO (Krohn), R1 (Dapas), NRREO (Quay), NRR (Dyer, Weber), IRD (Blount), DHS (Gray), FEMA (Dunker).
During testing, a small crack (3"- 4" axial crack) was identified on a return line to the torus for both HPCI and RCIC (steam driven ECCS systems). The valve upstream of the leak has been closed, however, the leak is still unisolable between that valve and the torus. This plant condition does not threaten public safety.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, as well as State and local agencies.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY ROBERT STEIGERWALD TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0555 EDT ON 10/08/06 * * *
"This is a follow up notification to EN# 42887. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Terminated the Unusual Event at 0513 [EDT] on 10/08/06. Unit 2 is currently shutdown in Mode 4."
In Mode 4, Primary Containment is no longer required. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State and Local agencies.
Notified R1DO (Krohn), R1 (Dapas), NRREO (Quay), NRR (Dyer, Weber), IRD (Blount), DHS (Gray), FEMA (Dunker).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42888
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT PORTLOCK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT PORTLOCK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/07/2006
Notification Time: 18:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 18:01 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2006
Notification Time: 18:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 18:01 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/16/2006
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2DO)
THEODORE QUAY (NRR)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
MIKE WEBER (NRR)
V. MCREE (R2)
THOMAS DECKER (R2DO)
THEODORE QUAY (NRR)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
MIKE WEBER (NRR)
V. MCREE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO UNUSUAL NOISE IN TURBINE BUILDING
The main turbine cross-under safety relief valves lifted for no known reason and blew siding off the side of the Unit 2 Turbine building. This siding hit the feeder lines to the A & C Reserve Station Service Transformers (RSSTs). The operator manually scrammed the plant due to swings in steam generator level and unusual noise coming from the turbine building . Unit 2 shutdown currently de-energized A & C Reserve Station Transformers, which effects D & E transfer buses. This also effects 1J bus, which is de-energized, and 1H & 2J buses which are energized with #1 diesel and #3 diesel.
Decay heat removal is being performed thru the SG PORV's and auxiliary feedwater system, with forced cooling from the "B" RCP. Safety related systems are available if required.
Notified USDA (A. Jimenez) in addition to the other agencies already identified.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, as well as State and local agencies.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/8/2006 AT 05:45 FROM MIKE CHRIS TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The site terminated the Alert at 05:40 due to having the "A" RSST in service with bus 1J being powered from its normal power supply. No damage was found from the displaced siding with the exception of the "C" RSST (which should be repaired around noon). The "C" RSST is currently tagged out for maintenance.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local governments.
Notified: R2DO (Decker), R4DO (Pick), NRR (Dyer, Weber, Quay), IRD (Blount, Wilson), R2 (McCree), DHS (Gray), FEMA (Dunker), DOE (Steve Bailey), EPA (Allison), USDA (Dean Giles), and HHS (Lt. Smith).
* * * RETRACTION ON 10/16/06 AT 1724 FROM L. WHEELER TO M. ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"At 1827 hours on 10/07/06, an Emergency Notification System (ENS) notification was made for an Alert declaration at Surry Power station. The steam discharge from the turbine system safety valves that had lifted caused pieces of siding from the turbine building to dislodge and come in contact with two phases of the overhead bus for the 'A' and 'C' reserve station service transformers (RSST). The basis for the declaration was the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Tab K-11: 'Notification of missile impact causing damage to safety-related equipment or structures'. Upon further review, the RSSTs were determined not to be safely-related equipment. Therefore, the conditions for an Alert emergency did not exist and the notification is being retracted. A notification will be made to the Virginia Department of Emergency Management. This is being reported In accordance with 10 CFR50.72, (b) (2) (xi).
"As noted in EN# 42890, conditions for a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) did exist at the time of the Alert notification."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Henson).
The main turbine cross-under safety relief valves lifted for no known reason and blew siding off the side of the Unit 2 Turbine building. This siding hit the feeder lines to the A & C Reserve Station Service Transformers (RSSTs). The operator manually scrammed the plant due to swings in steam generator level and unusual noise coming from the turbine building . Unit 2 shutdown currently de-energized A & C Reserve Station Transformers, which effects D & E transfer buses. This also effects 1J bus, which is de-energized, and 1H & 2J buses which are energized with #1 diesel and #3 diesel.
Decay heat removal is being performed thru the SG PORV's and auxiliary feedwater system, with forced cooling from the "B" RCP. Safety related systems are available if required.
Notified USDA (A. Jimenez) in addition to the other agencies already identified.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, as well as State and local agencies.
* * * UPDATE ON 10/8/2006 AT 05:45 FROM MIKE CHRIS TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The site terminated the Alert at 05:40 due to having the "A" RSST in service with bus 1J being powered from its normal power supply. No damage was found from the displaced siding with the exception of the "C" RSST (which should be repaired around noon). The "C" RSST is currently tagged out for maintenance.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local governments.
Notified: R2DO (Decker), R4DO (Pick), NRR (Dyer, Weber, Quay), IRD (Blount, Wilson), R2 (McCree), DHS (Gray), FEMA (Dunker), DOE (Steve Bailey), EPA (Allison), USDA (Dean Giles), and HHS (Lt. Smith).
* * * RETRACTION ON 10/16/06 AT 1724 FROM L. WHEELER TO M. ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"At 1827 hours on 10/07/06, an Emergency Notification System (ENS) notification was made for an Alert declaration at Surry Power station. The steam discharge from the turbine system safety valves that had lifted caused pieces of siding from the turbine building to dislodge and come in contact with two phases of the overhead bus for the 'A' and 'C' reserve station service transformers (RSST). The basis for the declaration was the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Tab K-11: 'Notification of missile impact causing damage to safety-related equipment or structures'. Upon further review, the RSSTs were determined not to be safely-related equipment. Therefore, the conditions for an Alert emergency did not exist and the notification is being retracted. A notification will be made to the Virginia Department of Emergency Management. This is being reported In accordance with 10 CFR50.72, (b) (2) (xi).
"As noted in EN# 42890, conditions for a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) did exist at the time of the Alert notification."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Henson).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42889
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT STEIGERWALD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT STEIGERWALD
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 10/07/2006
Notification Time: 23:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 17:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2006
Notification Time: 23:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 17:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1)
PAUL KROHN (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 22 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY
"At 17:50, on 10/07/2006, the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station identified a crack approximately 4 inches long on a Unit 2, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) test line, as the line penetrates the Suppression Pool of Primary Containment. The degraded piping represents a loss of primary containment integrity, placing one of the principle safety barriers in a 'Seriously Degraded' condition as defined by 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A). This condition required a Reactor Shutdown per the plants Technical Specifications (TS) [TS 3.6.1.1]. Unit 2 was manually scrammed, at 20:16, in order to shutdown the reactor and place the unit in Mode 3 per the Technical Specifications. The TS required shutdown is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). The unplanned reactor scram is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The reactor scram and resultant Emergency Safety Feature actuations were completed as required. In addition, the loss of primary containment integrity represents a condition that 'could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a structure required to control the release of radioactive material' and/or 'mitigate the consequences of an accident.' This is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D). Unit 2 is currently shutdown, Mode 3, with an RPV cooldown in progress, with plans to Enter Mode 4 by 02:00 on 10/08/06."
All control rods fully inserted on the Manual Reactor Scram. The reactor is currently being fed from the condensate system with decay heat being removed to the condenser via the MSL drains. The electric plant is in a normal shutdown lineup.
See EN # 42887 for related NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT.
Additional 10 CFR Section not listed above:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 17:50, on 10/07/2006, the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station identified a crack approximately 4 inches long on a Unit 2, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) test line, as the line penetrates the Suppression Pool of Primary Containment. The degraded piping represents a loss of primary containment integrity, placing one of the principle safety barriers in a 'Seriously Degraded' condition as defined by 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A). This condition required a Reactor Shutdown per the plants Technical Specifications (TS) [TS 3.6.1.1]. Unit 2 was manually scrammed, at 20:16, in order to shutdown the reactor and place the unit in Mode 3 per the Technical Specifications. The TS required shutdown is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). The unplanned reactor scram is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The reactor scram and resultant Emergency Safety Feature actuations were completed as required. In addition, the loss of primary containment integrity represents a condition that 'could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of a structure required to control the release of radioactive material' and/or 'mitigate the consequences of an accident.' This is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D). Unit 2 is currently shutdown, Mode 3, with an RPV cooldown in progress, with plans to Enter Mode 4 by 02:00 on 10/08/06."
All control rods fully inserted on the Manual Reactor Scram. The reactor is currently being fed from the condensate system with decay heat being removed to the condenser via the MSL drains. The electric plant is in a normal shutdown lineup.
See EN # 42887 for related NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT.
Additional 10 CFR Section not listed above:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42890
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID HERRING
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID HERRING
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 10/08/2006
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 17:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2006
Notification Time: 10:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 17:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THEODORE QUAY (NRR)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THEODORE QUAY (NRR)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 75 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT-EMERGENCY CONDITION - UNUSUAL EVENT
"At 09:20 [EDT] on 10/8/06, it was discovered that a NOUE had not been declared on 10/7/06 as required by Surry EPIP-1.01, EAL Tab H-3. At 17:11 [EDT] on 10/7/06 Surry Power Station experienced a loss of offsite power to unit 1 Transfer Buses (both D & F), therefore in accordance with tab H-3, a Notification of Unusual Event [NOUE] should have been declared. Subsequent to this event, an Alert was declared [on Unit 2] at 18:01 [EDT] due to tab K-11 and the Alert was exited at 05:40 [EDT] on 10/8/06. This notification is for the discovery of an undeclared event that exceeded an Emergency Action Level (EAL) as specified in EPIP-1.01."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. See EN # 42888 for details regarding Alert declared on Unit 2.
"At 09:20 [EDT] on 10/8/06, it was discovered that a NOUE had not been declared on 10/7/06 as required by Surry EPIP-1.01, EAL Tab H-3. At 17:11 [EDT] on 10/7/06 Surry Power Station experienced a loss of offsite power to unit 1 Transfer Buses (both D & F), therefore in accordance with tab H-3, a Notification of Unusual Event [NOUE] should have been declared. Subsequent to this event, an Alert was declared [on Unit 2] at 18:01 [EDT] due to tab K-11 and the Alert was exited at 05:40 [EDT] on 10/8/06. This notification is for the discovery of an undeclared event that exceeded an Emergency Action Level (EAL) as specified in EPIP-1.01."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. See EN # 42888 for details regarding Alert declared on Unit 2.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42891
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SCHLUMBERGER INC.
Region: 4
City: State: CA
County: KERN
License #: 0144-15
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARBARA HAMRICK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: SCHLUMBERGER INC.
Region: 4
City: State: CA
County: KERN
License #: 0144-15
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARBARA HAMRICK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/08/2006
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 09:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2006
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2006
Event Time: 09:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
GREG PICK (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - WELL LOGGING SOURCE DAMAGED
The NRC received the following information from the State of California via e-mail:
"At about 945 am October 6, 2006, [Deleted] from Schlumberger's Houston office contacted the RHB South ICE RM office to notify RHB that a well-logging tool with two sources (1.7 Ci Cs-137 and 16 Ci Am-Be) had become stuck the day before yesterday near the bottom of the hole. They worked over the last two days, 'fishing' for the sources, and recovered the Am-Be source when the tool broke. Neither of the sources have been compromised. They have not yet determined that the remaining source must be abandoned, but expect to make that determination over the weekend, and requested approval to abandon it, if additional retrieval attempts fail. Approval was granted, and Schlumberger was provided an emergency contact number to provide information over the weekend, if any health and safety concerns arise (e.g., if the source is compromised). The well is in Kern Co., CA at Chevron USA, well no. Amber 235 in the Midway-Sunset Field (Section 26, Township 31-S, Range 22-E).
"At 9:30 PDT on October 7, 2006, [Deleted] called again to report that they had reason to believe the Cesium-137 source had ruptured down-hole. Chevron had commenced a cut and thread fishing operation for the stuck logging tool late Wednesday evening, October 4th. On the first trip into the hole the logging tool was engaged into the grapple, when the rig started to pull out of the hole the drill pipe was stuck, the drill pipe would not move up or down. The decision was made to gently reverse rotate the pipe in an attempt to free the logging tool from the grapple. Once the tool was released from the grapple, the drill pipe was pulled out of the hole and the fishing assembly removed and replaced with wash over pipe. During the second trip in the hole with the wash over pipe the tool was engaged and part of the tool came out of the hole. This part of the tool contained the 592 GBq Am241Be source. The 63 GBq Cs-137 source remained down hole in another tool. Several more trips were made with the wash over pipe in an attempt to recover the remaining tools. It was during an attempt with the wash over pipe when Schlumberger personnel who were monitoring the mud returns notice a substantial increase on their survey meter from 0.4 mrem/hr to 7.0 mrem/hr. Since an increase such as this could indicate a potentially ruptured source all operations and circulation were immediately stopped with all personnel removed from the rig and the immediate area.
"At this time the area around the rig, mud pit and shale shaker were cordoned off. Schlumberger personnel are conducting further surveys of all personnel and the area at this time. RHB is continuing to follow up with the licensee on this."
The state also reported that Schlumberger is sending additional people to the site to conduct further surveys and determine their future course of action. The state was notified of the event on 10/7/06 at 2130.
CA Report Number: 100706
The NRC received the following information from the State of California via e-mail:
"At about 945 am October 6, 2006, [Deleted] from Schlumberger's Houston office contacted the RHB South ICE RM office to notify RHB that a well-logging tool with two sources (1.7 Ci Cs-137 and 16 Ci Am-Be) had become stuck the day before yesterday near the bottom of the hole. They worked over the last two days, 'fishing' for the sources, and recovered the Am-Be source when the tool broke. Neither of the sources have been compromised. They have not yet determined that the remaining source must be abandoned, but expect to make that determination over the weekend, and requested approval to abandon it, if additional retrieval attempts fail. Approval was granted, and Schlumberger was provided an emergency contact number to provide information over the weekend, if any health and safety concerns arise (e.g., if the source is compromised). The well is in Kern Co., CA at Chevron USA, well no. Amber 235 in the Midway-Sunset Field (Section 26, Township 31-S, Range 22-E).
"At 9:30 PDT on October 7, 2006, [Deleted] called again to report that they had reason to believe the Cesium-137 source had ruptured down-hole. Chevron had commenced a cut and thread fishing operation for the stuck logging tool late Wednesday evening, October 4th. On the first trip into the hole the logging tool was engaged into the grapple, when the rig started to pull out of the hole the drill pipe was stuck, the drill pipe would not move up or down. The decision was made to gently reverse rotate the pipe in an attempt to free the logging tool from the grapple. Once the tool was released from the grapple, the drill pipe was pulled out of the hole and the fishing assembly removed and replaced with wash over pipe. During the second trip in the hole with the wash over pipe the tool was engaged and part of the tool came out of the hole. This part of the tool contained the 592 GBq Am241Be source. The 63 GBq Cs-137 source remained down hole in another tool. Several more trips were made with the wash over pipe in an attempt to recover the remaining tools. It was during an attempt with the wash over pipe when Schlumberger personnel who were monitoring the mud returns notice a substantial increase on their survey meter from 0.4 mrem/hr to 7.0 mrem/hr. Since an increase such as this could indicate a potentially ruptured source all operations and circulation were immediately stopped with all personnel removed from the rig and the immediate area.
"At this time the area around the rig, mud pit and shale shaker were cordoned off. Schlumberger personnel are conducting further surveys of all personnel and the area at this time. RHB is continuing to follow up with the licensee on this."
The state also reported that Schlumberger is sending additional people to the site to conduct further surveys and determine their future course of action. The state was notified of the event on 10/7/06 at 2130.
CA Report Number: 100706