Event Notification Report for September 28, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/27/2006 - 09/28/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
42866
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 42866
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: BILLY WALLACE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: BILLY WALLACE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/29/2006
Notification Time: 14:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2006
Event Time: 18:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2006
Notification Time: 14:41 [ET]
Event Date: 09/28/2006
Event Time: 18:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
DAVID AYRES (R2)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
FAILURE OF AUTOCLAVE HIGH CYLINDER PRESSURE SYSTEM
"At 1802 CDT on 09/28/06, the Plant Shift-Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a failure of the C-333A Autoclave 3 South High Cylinder Pressure System (HCPS). During a normal cylinder heating cycle the operator noted that the cylinder pressure, as read on a local digital pressure indicator and on a digital recorder in the Operations Monitoring Room (OMR), unexpectedly fell from a steady 65 psia to a negative value on both instruments. A 14 ton cylinder containing 0.4019% U235 assay uranium hexafluoride had been heating (TSR Mode 5) for approximately 2.2 hours when the failure occurred. The PSS declared the HCPS inoperable and TSR LCO 2.2.4.14B actions were implemented to place the autoclave in Mode 2, 'Autoclave Open and Out-of-Service'. The HCPS is a TSR system designed to minimize the potential of primary system integrity failure (cylinder rupture) during a pressure increase event by tripping the steam supply to the autoclave prior to reaching the Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) of the cylinder.
"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident, b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.
There was no release of radioactive material.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1802 CDT on 09/28/06, the Plant Shift-Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a failure of the C-333A Autoclave 3 South High Cylinder Pressure System (HCPS). During a normal cylinder heating cycle the operator noted that the cylinder pressure, as read on a local digital pressure indicator and on a digital recorder in the Operations Monitoring Room (OMR), unexpectedly fell from a steady 65 psia to a negative value on both instruments. A 14 ton cylinder containing 0.4019% U235 assay uranium hexafluoride had been heating (TSR Mode 5) for approximately 2.2 hours when the failure occurred. The PSS declared the HCPS inoperable and TSR LCO 2.2.4.14B actions were implemented to place the autoclave in Mode 2, 'Autoclave Open and Out-of-Service'. The HCPS is a TSR system designed to minimize the potential of primary system integrity failure (cylinder rupture) during a pressure increase event by tripping the steam supply to the autoclave prior to reaching the Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) of the cylinder.
"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident, b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.
There was no release of radioactive material.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.