Event Notification Report for September 07, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/06/2006 - 09/07/2006
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42860
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: MIKE MASON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: MIKE MASON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 09/25/2006
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2006
Event Time: 07:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2006
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2006
Event Time: 07:50 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/25/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ZACH DUNHAM (R4)
ZACH DUNHAM (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"On September 7, 2006 at about 0750 CDT, an invalid actuation of B train Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) occurred during maintenance on ESFAS relay K110 B. The following B train Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) relays de-energized: K101, K102, K103, K108 and K109.
"The event is reportable per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as a 60 day notification and is being reported to the NRC by phone within 60 days.
"The invalid actuations did not occur when the systems had already been properly removed from service nor after the safety function had already been completed.
"The 32B buss de-energized which resulted in loss of pressurizer heaters Bank B and Containment Fan Coolers B and D actuated by shifting to slow speed. There was no actual Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) system flows actuated.
"All of the affected equipment functioned as designed when the relays deenergized
"The NRC Senior Resident was informed of the event."
"On September 7, 2006 at about 0750 CDT, an invalid actuation of B train Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) occurred during maintenance on ESFAS relay K110 B. The following B train Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) relays de-energized: K101, K102, K103, K108 and K109.
"The event is reportable per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as a 60 day notification and is being reported to the NRC by phone within 60 days.
"The invalid actuations did not occur when the systems had already been properly removed from service nor after the safety function had already been completed.
"The 32B buss de-energized which resulted in loss of pressurizer heaters Bank B and Containment Fan Coolers B and D actuated by shifting to slow speed. There was no actual Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) system flows actuated.
"All of the affected equipment functioned as designed when the relays deenergized
"The NRC Senior Resident was informed of the event."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42833
Rep Org: OR DEPT OF HEALTH RAD PROTECTION
Licensee: ASTARIS, LLC
Region: 4
City: McMINNVILLE State: OR
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SIEBERT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: ASTARIS, LLC
Region: 4
City: McMINNVILLE State: OR
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEVIN SIEBERT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/07/2006
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/07/2006
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/07/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R4)
WILLIAM RULAND (NMSS)
ILTAB (via email)
REBECCA NEASE (R4)
WILLIAM RULAND (NMSS)
ILTAB (via email)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A TEXAS NUCLEAR GAUGE FOUND IN A SHIPMENT OF SCRAP STEEL
Cascade Steel located in McMinnville, OR received a rail shipment of scrap steel which triggered a portal alarm. During the investigation, a Texas Nuclear Gauge Model 5193, S/N B1207, containing 500 mCuries Cs-137, dated October 1978, was recovered. Thermomeasure Electronics, formerly Texas Nuclear, was contacted and confirmed that the last owner on record was Astaris of Pocatello, ID which may be out-of-business. Thermomeasure Electronics collected and disposed of sources at this location in 2002. Thermomeasure Electronic records identify the source S/N is MA5033 and that a total of eight (8) devices and one (1) gauge associated with Astaris are unaccounted for.
The State of Oregon is enroute to the Cascade Steel facility to recover the source.
Cascade Steel located in McMinnville, OR received a rail shipment of scrap steel which triggered a portal alarm. During the investigation, a Texas Nuclear Gauge Model 5193, S/N B1207, containing 500 mCuries Cs-137, dated October 1978, was recovered. Thermomeasure Electronics, formerly Texas Nuclear, was contacted and confirmed that the last owner on record was Astaris of Pocatello, ID which may be out-of-business. Thermomeasure Electronics collected and disposed of sources at this location in 2002. Thermomeasure Electronic records identify the source S/N is MA5033 and that a total of eight (8) devices and one (1) gauge associated with Astaris are unaccounted for.
The State of Oregon is enroute to the Cascade Steel facility to recover the source.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42834
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN TIEFENTHAL
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN TIEFENTHAL
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 09/07/2006
Notification Time: 23:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2006
Event Time: 21:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/07/2006
Notification Time: 23:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/07/2006
Event Time: 21:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/07/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWING SPURIOUS OPENING OF A REACTOR TRIP BREAKER
"On September 7, 2006 at 2157 hours, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 was operating at 100% when an automatic reactor trip occurred following a spurious opening of the 'B' Reactor Trip Breaker. The first-out indication for the reactor trip was turbine trip due to reactor trip.
Control room personnel entered Emergency Operating Procedure E-0, 'Response to Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.' Safety systems and equipment functioned as designed following the automatic reactor trip. Reactor pressure and temperature have been stabilized following the reactor trip without requiring a Safety Injection. The plant was stabilized in Mode 3 utilizing the normal heat sink (main condenser) with steam generator levels restored to post shutdown values by the Auxiliary Feedwater System. All normal and emergency busses are energized from offsite power.
"The cause of the reactor trip is being investigated."
All rods fully inserted, all ESF systems remain operable, and the electrical grid is stable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to issue a press release.
"On September 7, 2006 at 2157 hours, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 was operating at 100% when an automatic reactor trip occurred following a spurious opening of the 'B' Reactor Trip Breaker. The first-out indication for the reactor trip was turbine trip due to reactor trip.
Control room personnel entered Emergency Operating Procedure E-0, 'Response to Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.' Safety systems and equipment functioned as designed following the automatic reactor trip. Reactor pressure and temperature have been stabilized following the reactor trip without requiring a Safety Injection. The plant was stabilized in Mode 3 utilizing the normal heat sink (main condenser) with steam generator levels restored to post shutdown values by the Auxiliary Feedwater System. All normal and emergency busses are energized from offsite power.
"The cause of the reactor trip is being investigated."
All rods fully inserted, all ESF systems remain operable, and the electrical grid is stable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to issue a press release.