Event Notification Report for September 06, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/05/2006 - 09/06/2006
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42828
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY PATRICK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY PATRICK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/06/2006
Notification Time: 05:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2006
Event Time: 02:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2006
Notification Time: 05:33 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2006
Event Time: 02:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ON LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM
"Observed degrading condenser pressure. Entered abnormal procedure DB-OP-02518, High Condenser Pressure and reduced reactor power. At <280 Mwe and > 5 inches Hg (mercury) A (absolute) , manually tripped the reactor at approximately 45% power in accordance with procedure. Normal post-trip response. Condenser pressure is slowly recovering. Still trying to determine the source of the condenser air in-leakage.
"Notified Ottawa County Sheriff of main steam safety / atmospheric vent valve operation at 0231 hours per procedure."
All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat is being removed using the turbine bypass valves and the motor driven feed pump. There is no steam generator tube leakage. The atmospheric vent valves / main steam safety valves lifted for a few seconds following the trip and fully reseated after the initial lifting. Plant electrical power if from the grid backfeeding to the station. The electric grid is stable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
"Observed degrading condenser pressure. Entered abnormal procedure DB-OP-02518, High Condenser Pressure and reduced reactor power. At <280 Mwe and > 5 inches Hg (mercury) A (absolute) , manually tripped the reactor at approximately 45% power in accordance with procedure. Normal post-trip response. Condenser pressure is slowly recovering. Still trying to determine the source of the condenser air in-leakage.
"Notified Ottawa County Sheriff of main steam safety / atmospheric vent valve operation at 0231 hours per procedure."
All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat is being removed using the turbine bypass valves and the motor driven feed pump. There is no steam generator tube leakage. The atmospheric vent valves / main steam safety valves lifted for a few seconds following the trip and fully reseated after the initial lifting. Plant electrical power if from the grid backfeeding to the station. The electric grid is stable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42829
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTIN LICHTNER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/06/2006
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2006
Event Time: 10:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2006
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2006
Event Time: 10:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NON LICENSED SUPERVISOR FAILS A RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST
A non- licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A non- licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42831
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUG GOMEZ
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUG GOMEZ
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 09/06/2006
Notification Time: 23:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2006
Event Time: 22:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2006
Notification Time: 23:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2006
Event Time: 22:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HISTORICAL UNANALYZED CONDITION IDENTIFIED
"On September 6, 2006, an unanalyzed condition was identified during the review of a previous issue discovered on April 18, 2005. The current review was being performed in response to NRC inspection questions regarding the previous issue.
"On April 18, 2005, while at 100% power, both trains of standby auxiliary feed water (AFW) flow transmitters were found isolated. The plant had entered Mode 3 on April 8, 2005 for a routine startup after a refueling outage. The transmitters were restored to their normal operational alignment promptly when the condition was identified.
"These two standby AFW trains are in addition to the typical safety-related AFW motor driven pump trains and turbine driven pump train, for a total of five safety-related AFW pump trains at the site. The two standby AFW trains are designed to address a high energy line break (HELB) event which would disable the other three AFW pump trains.
"Both of the flow transmitters perform several functions including control room indication of standby AFW discharge flow and valve control functions for the pump discharge valve and pump recirculation valve.
"With the flow transmitters isolated in both trains of the standby AFW system, an unanalyzed condition existed due to the following: During a postulated HELB, the inoperable flow transmitters would result in the recirculation valve and the pump discharge valve being both full open. Under a steam generator low pressure condition, (as a result of the HELB) with flow through both the open discharge valve and the open recirculation valve, the pump would be in a high flow rate condition until the steam generator level was recovered. The operators would have no indication of flow through the discharge valves and would be operating the system based on steam generator level. During the time assumed for the intact steam generator level recovery, the breaker for the pump motor could be expected to exceed it's time delayed current protection setpoint and trip the motor, preventing delivery of feed water to the steam generator.
"Both trains of the standby AFW system are allowed by Technical Specifications to be concurrently inoperable for a period of up to 7 days. The actual inoperability occurred over 10 days while the flow transmitters were isolated.
"Ginna did not report the event at the time the isolated transmitters were discovered because the transmitters' control function was not recognized to interact in an unanalyzed manner with the resulting unavailable control room indication, concurrent with the low pressure steam generator condition associated with the HELB event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On September 6, 2006, an unanalyzed condition was identified during the review of a previous issue discovered on April 18, 2005. The current review was being performed in response to NRC inspection questions regarding the previous issue.
"On April 18, 2005, while at 100% power, both trains of standby auxiliary feed water (AFW) flow transmitters were found isolated. The plant had entered Mode 3 on April 8, 2005 for a routine startup after a refueling outage. The transmitters were restored to their normal operational alignment promptly when the condition was identified.
"These two standby AFW trains are in addition to the typical safety-related AFW motor driven pump trains and turbine driven pump train, for a total of five safety-related AFW pump trains at the site. The two standby AFW trains are designed to address a high energy line break (HELB) event which would disable the other three AFW pump trains.
"Both of the flow transmitters perform several functions including control room indication of standby AFW discharge flow and valve control functions for the pump discharge valve and pump recirculation valve.
"With the flow transmitters isolated in both trains of the standby AFW system, an unanalyzed condition existed due to the following: During a postulated HELB, the inoperable flow transmitters would result in the recirculation valve and the pump discharge valve being both full open. Under a steam generator low pressure condition, (as a result of the HELB) with flow through both the open discharge valve and the open recirculation valve, the pump would be in a high flow rate condition until the steam generator level was recovered. The operators would have no indication of flow through the discharge valves and would be operating the system based on steam generator level. During the time assumed for the intact steam generator level recovery, the breaker for the pump motor could be expected to exceed it's time delayed current protection setpoint and trip the motor, preventing delivery of feed water to the steam generator.
"Both trains of the standby AFW system are allowed by Technical Specifications to be concurrently inoperable for a period of up to 7 days. The actual inoperability occurred over 10 days while the flow transmitters were isolated.
"Ginna did not report the event at the time the isolated transmitters were discovered because the transmitters' control function was not recognized to interact in an unanalyzed manner with the resulting unavailable control room indication, concurrent with the low pressure steam generator condition associated with the HELB event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.