Event Notification Report for August 29, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/28/2006 - 08/29/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
42823428264281242813
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42823
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: ADAMS STEEL
Region: 4
City: ANAHEIM State: CA
County: LOS ANGELES
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGOR
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Licensee: ADAMS STEEL
Region: 4
City: ANAHEIM State: CA
County: LOS ANGELES
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGOR
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 08/31/2006
Notification Time: 20:29 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2006
Event Time: 13:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2006
Notification Time: 20:29 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2006
Event Time: 13:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/31/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INAPPROPRIATE DISPOSAL OF SOURCE
The State provided the following information via email:
"A truck carrying waste materials from Adams Steel in Anaheim set off the radiation alarm at the Simi Valley Landfill on 8/29/06. The landfill monitor reading was approximately 600K (bkg 4K). LA County [DELETED] responded to the landfill on 8/30/06 and identified the nuclide as Cs-137, with radiation levels of 13 mR/hr on the side of the truck, 1.2 mR/hr at 3 feet from the side of the truck, and background in the cab of truck. Based on these radiation readings, it appears the source is located approximately 1 foot inside of the truck and is approximately 10 milliCi in activity. A DOT exemption form was completed by LA County and the truck returned to the Adams Steel yard late on 8/30/06, and parked in a remote location. LAC completed their own 5010 (082906) on the response to Simi Valley.
"RHB responded to Adams Steel on 8/31/06, and located an approximate 7 milliCi Cs-137 bare source, located approximately 3 feet from the top of the trailer load and approximately 1 foot in from the side of the trailer. The source was taken by RHB to hold until Adams Steel can arrange for disposal of the source."
California incident #083006
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The State provided the following information via email:
"A truck carrying waste materials from Adams Steel in Anaheim set off the radiation alarm at the Simi Valley Landfill on 8/29/06. The landfill monitor reading was approximately 600K (bkg 4K). LA County [DELETED] responded to the landfill on 8/30/06 and identified the nuclide as Cs-137, with radiation levels of 13 mR/hr on the side of the truck, 1.2 mR/hr at 3 feet from the side of the truck, and background in the cab of truck. Based on these radiation readings, it appears the source is located approximately 1 foot inside of the truck and is approximately 10 milliCi in activity. A DOT exemption form was completed by LA County and the truck returned to the Adams Steel yard late on 8/30/06, and parked in a remote location. LAC completed their own 5010 (082906) on the response to Simi Valley.
"RHB responded to Adams Steel on 8/31/06, and located an approximate 7 milliCi Cs-137 bare source, located approximately 3 feet from the top of the trailer load and approximately 1 foot in from the side of the trailer. The source was taken by RHB to hold until Adams Steel can arrange for disposal of the source."
California incident #083006
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42826
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: TERRA ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 4
City: KIRKLAND State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0246-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Licensee: TERRA ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 4
City: KIRKLAND State: WA
County:
License #: WN-I0246-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 09/01/2006
Notification Time: 13:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2006
Notification Time: 13:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CINDY FLANNERY (NMSS)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CINDY FLANNERY (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE - TEMPORARILY MISSING TROXLER
The State provided the following information via email:
"Washington State DOH was notified of a missing gauge 31 August 2006 by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO).
"A portable gauge (Troxler model 3440, serial number 14393), had been checked out by an authorized gauge user on 29 August for transport to a temporary job-site. The gauge user had secured the gauge in a personal vehicle that day. As of the morning of 31 August, the user had not been heard from or seen since 29 August. Phone calls were made to the user's emergency contact numbers by the company RSO on 29 & 30 August trying to locate the user and gauge. The calls were unsuccessful with locating the person or gauge.
"The licensee had issued the user a corporate cell phone upon hiring. Previous attempts to call the cell phone had failed. On 31 August, attempts to call the cell phone confirmed it was in service. The RSO was able to trace the location of the cell phone via its GPS (global positioning system) feature. Both the job supervisor and RSO went to the cell phone's location and found the vehicle, the gauge & the user. The gauge was locked inside the transport container, and had been locked, at all times, inside the vehicle's trunk. The gauge had been secured and in possession of the user at all times even though the user had been out of touch.
"Corrective actions can be difficult when personnel choose to disregard established policies / procedures. The user was properly trained, approved & had a satisfactory work-history. Corrective actions will include refresher training and discussions with all staff about following state and company rules.
"The incident was successfully concluded due to the powerful GPS resource in the cell phone. Decisive action by the licensee & the employee's job service supervisor allowed for the retrieval of the gauge. Requesting law enforcement involvement was done but played no part in recovery since the gauge was found relatively quickly.
"No known media attention.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: Immediate notification per WAC 246-221-240.
"Isotope and Activity involved: 1 portable gauge, containing 2 sealed sources: one gamma source containing 8 millicuries cesium-137, and one neutron source containing 40 millicuries americium-241 / beryllium."
Washington State event number WA-06-052
The State provided the following information via email:
"Washington State DOH was notified of a missing gauge 31 August 2006 by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO).
"A portable gauge (Troxler model 3440, serial number 14393), had been checked out by an authorized gauge user on 29 August for transport to a temporary job-site. The gauge user had secured the gauge in a personal vehicle that day. As of the morning of 31 August, the user had not been heard from or seen since 29 August. Phone calls were made to the user's emergency contact numbers by the company RSO on 29 & 30 August trying to locate the user and gauge. The calls were unsuccessful with locating the person or gauge.
"The licensee had issued the user a corporate cell phone upon hiring. Previous attempts to call the cell phone had failed. On 31 August, attempts to call the cell phone confirmed it was in service. The RSO was able to trace the location of the cell phone via its GPS (global positioning system) feature. Both the job supervisor and RSO went to the cell phone's location and found the vehicle, the gauge & the user. The gauge was locked inside the transport container, and had been locked, at all times, inside the vehicle's trunk. The gauge had been secured and in possession of the user at all times even though the user had been out of touch.
"Corrective actions can be difficult when personnel choose to disregard established policies / procedures. The user was properly trained, approved & had a satisfactory work-history. Corrective actions will include refresher training and discussions with all staff about following state and company rules.
"The incident was successfully concluded due to the powerful GPS resource in the cell phone. Decisive action by the licensee & the employee's job service supervisor allowed for the retrieval of the gauge. Requesting law enforcement involvement was done but played no part in recovery since the gauge was found relatively quickly.
"No known media attention.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: Immediate notification per WAC 246-221-240.
"Isotope and Activity involved: 1 portable gauge, containing 2 sealed sources: one gamma source containing 8 millicuries cesium-137, and one neutron source containing 40 millicuries americium-241 / beryllium."
Washington State event number WA-06-052
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42812
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: BLACKBURN CONSULTING, INC.
Region: 4
City: AUBURN State: CA
County:
License #: 6589-31
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEN FUREY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: BLACKBURN CONSULTING, INC.
Region: 4
City: AUBURN State: CA
County:
License #: 6589-31
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEN FUREY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/30/2006
Notification Time: 00:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2006
Event Time: 12:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2006
Notification Time: 00:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2006
Event Time: 12:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A POTENTIALLY DAMAGED TROXLER
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"[The] Alternate Radiation Safety Officer called RHB to report their Troxler 3430, serial # 31984 (containing 8 mCi of Cesium-137 and 40 mCi of Americium-241) had just been run over by a water truck on a construction site in Lincoln, CA. [The Alternate RSO] stated the source rod was still intact. The gauge was taken to the Troxler facility in Rancho Cordova, CA. Troxler performed a leak test with negative results. The gauge is to be sent to Troxler headquarters in Research Triangle Park, NC for repair or eventual disposal."
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"[The] Alternate Radiation Safety Officer called RHB to report their Troxler 3430, serial # 31984 (containing 8 mCi of Cesium-137 and 40 mCi of Americium-241) had just been run over by a water truck on a construction site in Lincoln, CA. [The Alternate RSO] stated the source rod was still intact. The gauge was taken to the Troxler facility in Rancho Cordova, CA. Troxler performed a leak test with negative results. The gauge is to be sent to Troxler headquarters in Research Triangle Park, NC for repair or eventual disposal."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42813
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: T. BOLAND
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: T. BOLAND
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/30/2006
Notification Time: 02:52 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2006
Event Time: 22:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2006
Notification Time: 02:52 [ET]
Event Date: 08/29/2006
Event Time: 22:25 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC OIL LEAK
"On 8/29/06 at 2225 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 3 initiated a Manual reactor SCRAM due to EHC (Electro-Hydraulic Control) System Reservoir level lowering due to a EHC system leak. The leak was from #2 Main Turbine Control Valve. All Systems responded as required to the manual SCRAM signal. No ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) initiations occurred as a result of the manual SCRAM signal. Groups 2 (floor drains, etc.), 3 (Reactor Water Cleanup), 6 (Ventilation), & 8 (TIPs) PCIS isolations occurred at + 2 [inches] as expected as a result of the manual SCRAM with all systems isolating as required. The EHC leak rate lowered to approximately zero upon turbine trip. No indications existed of main steam relief valves (MSRVs) opening. Bypass valves controlled reactor pressure due to EHC system staying in service. Repair of the EHC leak is in progress.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System'; 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event that results in an actuation of the specified systems'. This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)."
Reactor Power was reduced to 78% before the reactor was manually scrammed and all rods fully inserted. The EHC oil is being cleaned up and the oil does not pose a fire threat. All ECCS and the EDGs are fully operable if needed and the electrical grid is stable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
"On 8/29/06 at 2225 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 3 initiated a Manual reactor SCRAM due to EHC (Electro-Hydraulic Control) System Reservoir level lowering due to a EHC system leak. The leak was from #2 Main Turbine Control Valve. All Systems responded as required to the manual SCRAM signal. No ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) initiations occurred as a result of the manual SCRAM signal. Groups 2 (floor drains, etc.), 3 (Reactor Water Cleanup), 6 (Ventilation), & 8 (TIPs) PCIS isolations occurred at + 2 [inches] as expected as a result of the manual SCRAM with all systems isolating as required. The EHC leak rate lowered to approximately zero upon turbine trip. No indications existed of main steam relief valves (MSRVs) opening. Bypass valves controlled reactor pressure due to EHC system staying in service. Repair of the EHC leak is in progress.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System'; 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event that results in an actuation of the specified systems'. This event also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)."
Reactor Power was reduced to 78% before the reactor was manually scrammed and all rods fully inserted. The EHC oil is being cleaned up and the oil does not pose a fire threat. All ECCS and the EDGs are fully operable if needed and the electrical grid is stable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.