Event Notification Report for August 17, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/16/2006 - 08/17/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
42781427824278342785
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42781
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: RICH LOWERY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: RICH LOWERY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/17/2006
Notification Time: 11:22 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2006
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2006
Notification Time: 11:22 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2006
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PHONE LINES OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"Phone line maintenance is occurring today 8/17/06. Maintenance starting at 0900 and is planned until 1600 hours. Line maintenance may impact ENS, HPN, and ERDS capabilities. An 8 hour notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) is being made due to expected failures during line interruptions. Affected communications will be verified subsequent to completion of line maintenance."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1725 ON 8/17/06 * * *
The ENS and HPN lines were tested and declared operable at 16:55 CDT. The ERDS line was verified operable at 17:25 by sending plant data to the NRC. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Blair Spitzberg) notified.
"Phone line maintenance is occurring today 8/17/06. Maintenance starting at 0900 and is planned until 1600 hours. Line maintenance may impact ENS, HPN, and ERDS capabilities. An 8 hour notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) is being made due to expected failures during line interruptions. Affected communications will be verified subsequent to completion of line maintenance."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1725 ON 8/17/06 * * *
The ENS and HPN lines were tested and declared operable at 16:55 CDT. The ERDS line was verified operable at 17:25 by sending plant data to the NRC. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Blair Spitzberg) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42782
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM BUNNING
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM BUNNING
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/17/2006
Notification Time: 17:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2006
Event Time: 10:44 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2006
Notification Time: 17:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2006
Event Time: 10:44 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
MAIN TURBINE BYPASS VALVES INOPERABLE
"At 1044 on August 17, 2006, operators received main control room annunciator alarm 'CONDENSER
VACUUM LOW' and status lights 'COND VACUUM TRIP' and 'COND VACUUM LOW.' All other indications
for main condenser vacuum indicated normal ~ 26.6 [inches Hg]. In response to the alarm, initial troubleshooting
determined that the main turbine bypass system was inoperable. This was due to concluding that with the low
condenser signal present, the bypass valves were prohibited from opening upon demand. Therefore at 1110,
Technical Specifications 3.7.6, 'Main Turbine Bypass System,' Condition 'A' was entered.
"This is reportable as an 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as 'Any event or condition
that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems
that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"The devices that cause the annunciator are 1PY-ES063 and 1PY-ES066. A visual inspection of the device
cards revealed that on the 1PY-ES066 card the 'DC CURRENT ALARM' upper and lower lights were lit.
These same lights were not lit on the 1PY-ES063.
"At 1212 on August 17,2006, a lead was lifted to remove the low vacuum inhibit input from 1PY-ES066 for the
bypass valves. The main control room alarm cleared and the low vacuum light went out as expected. At 1215
the low vacuum inhibit was reset restoring the bypass valves to operable."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1044 on August 17, 2006, operators received main control room annunciator alarm 'CONDENSER
VACUUM LOW' and status lights 'COND VACUUM TRIP' and 'COND VACUUM LOW.' All other indications
for main condenser vacuum indicated normal ~ 26.6 [inches Hg]. In response to the alarm, initial troubleshooting
determined that the main turbine bypass system was inoperable. This was due to concluding that with the low
condenser signal present, the bypass valves were prohibited from opening upon demand. Therefore at 1110,
Technical Specifications 3.7.6, 'Main Turbine Bypass System,' Condition 'A' was entered.
"This is reportable as an 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as 'Any event or condition
that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems
that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"The devices that cause the annunciator are 1PY-ES063 and 1PY-ES066. A visual inspection of the device
cards revealed that on the 1PY-ES066 card the 'DC CURRENT ALARM' upper and lower lights were lit.
These same lights were not lit on the 1PY-ES063.
"At 1212 on August 17,2006, a lead was lifted to remove the low vacuum inhibit input from 1PY-ES066 for the
bypass valves. The main control room alarm cleared and the low vacuum light went out as expected. At 1215
the low vacuum inhibit was reset restoring the bypass valves to operable."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42783
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF YEAGER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF YEAGER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 08/18/2006
Notification Time: 01:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2006
Event Time: 19:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2006
Notification Time: 01:00 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2006
Event Time: 19:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE DUE TO UNDERSIZED BREAKER CONTROL TRANSFORMERS
"At 1900 hrs on 8/17/06, all four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were declared INOPERABLE. The inoperability is a result of undersized control transformers for each of the Emergency Diesel Generator Service Water (DGSW) Pumps. The concern is that the DGSW pump contactors will not receive adequate voltage at the starters to ensure the starters pickup under degraded voltage conditions. A 2 hour Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) was entered per LCO 3.8.1 to restore both EDGs in one division to OPERABLE status. At 2100 hours on 8/17/06 the two hour time requirement expired and a 12 hour LCO to place the plant in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) was entered.
"At 0042 hrs on 8/18/06, compensatory measures have been put in place to restore operability to both division 2 EDGs. The compensatory measures include placing the local control switch for both division 2 DGSW Pumps in run. Placing the local control switches in run ensures sufficient voltage will be available at the starters to ensure the starters pickup following a loss of offsite power, load shed, and restoration of power to the applicable busses. With operability restored to division 2 EDGs, the new expiration time for the LCO has been revised to 72 hours based on discovery of one or both EDGs in one division inoperable concurrent with CTG 11-1 [station blackout Combustion Turbine Generator 11-1] not available. After 72 hours, if operability is not restored to either CTG 11-1 or both division 1 EDGs, the plant will be required to enter Mode 3 within the following 12 hours.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72.(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove Residual Heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC resident inspector has been notified."
The licensee stated that the current 72 hour LCO will expire at 1900 EDT 08/20/06.
"At 1900 hrs on 8/17/06, all four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were declared INOPERABLE. The inoperability is a result of undersized control transformers for each of the Emergency Diesel Generator Service Water (DGSW) Pumps. The concern is that the DGSW pump contactors will not receive adequate voltage at the starters to ensure the starters pickup under degraded voltage conditions. A 2 hour Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) was entered per LCO 3.8.1 to restore both EDGs in one division to OPERABLE status. At 2100 hours on 8/17/06 the two hour time requirement expired and a 12 hour LCO to place the plant in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) was entered.
"At 0042 hrs on 8/18/06, compensatory measures have been put in place to restore operability to both division 2 EDGs. The compensatory measures include placing the local control switch for both division 2 DGSW Pumps in run. Placing the local control switches in run ensures sufficient voltage will be available at the starters to ensure the starters pickup following a loss of offsite power, load shed, and restoration of power to the applicable busses. With operability restored to division 2 EDGs, the new expiration time for the LCO has been revised to 72 hours based on discovery of one or both EDGs in one division inoperable concurrent with CTG 11-1 [station blackout Combustion Turbine Generator 11-1] not available. After 72 hours, if operability is not restored to either CTG 11-1 or both division 1 EDGs, the plant will be required to enter Mode 3 within the following 12 hours.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72.(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) Remove Residual Heat; (C) Control the release of radioactive material; or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC resident inspector has been notified."
The licensee stated that the current 72 hour LCO will expire at 1900 EDT 08/20/06.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42785
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: RANEY GEOTECHNICAL
Region: 4
City: OROVILLE State: CA
County:
License #: 3497-57
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEN FUREY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: RANEY GEOTECHNICAL
Region: 4
City: OROVILLE State: CA
County:
License #: 3497-57
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEN FUREY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/18/2006
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2006
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
ILTAB (VIA EMAIL)
MEXICO (FAX)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
ILTAB (VIA EMAIL)
MEXICO (FAX)
AGREEMENT STATE - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"A Troxler 3430, serial # 35800 was stolen out of the back of a pickup truck parked at the RSO's residence on the evening of 8/17/06. The lock securing the gauge was cut. The gauge was found three blocks away from the RSO's residence on the morning of 8/18/06 in a ditch. A leak test of the gauge is being performed this same date. An inspection of Raney Geotechnical will be performed on 8/22/06."
A Troxler 3430 typically contains:
8 mCuries Cs-137
40 mCuries Am-241:Be
* * * UPDATE FROM K. FUREY TO P. SNYDER AT 1532 ON 8/25/06 * * *
The State provided information stating that the original incident happened between 9pm and 6am the evening of August 17, 2006 and confirmed that the gauge contained 8 mCi of Cesium 137 and 40 mCi of Americium 241.
Notified R4DO (T. Pruet) and NMSS EO (C. Reamer).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"A Troxler 3430, serial # 35800 was stolen out of the back of a pickup truck parked at the RSO's residence on the evening of 8/17/06. The lock securing the gauge was cut. The gauge was found three blocks away from the RSO's residence on the morning of 8/18/06 in a ditch. A leak test of the gauge is being performed this same date. An inspection of Raney Geotechnical will be performed on 8/22/06."
A Troxler 3430 typically contains:
8 mCuries Cs-137
40 mCuries Am-241:Be
* * * UPDATE FROM K. FUREY TO P. SNYDER AT 1532 ON 8/25/06 * * *
The State provided information stating that the original incident happened between 9pm and 6am the evening of August 17, 2006 and confirmed that the gauge contained 8 mCi of Cesium 137 and 40 mCi of Americium 241.
Notified R4DO (T. Pruet) and NMSS EO (C. Reamer).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.