Event Notification Report for August 02, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/01/2006 - 08/02/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
42749427504275142752
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42749
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NICK LIZZO
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NICK LIZZO
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 08/02/2006
Notification Time: 04:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2006
Event Time: 00:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2006
Notification Time: 04:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2006
Event Time: 00:06 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
PAT FINNEY (R1)
PAT FINNEY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF ALL OFF SITE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIRENS
"On August 2, 2006 at approximately 0006 hours, the Emergency Planning Department determined that all of the 156 sirens in the Indian Point Energy Center, Emergency Planning Zone were unavailable due to, an inability to activate the sirens through the computer operating system. In accordance with the Indian Point reporting criteria, the loss of 16 or more sirens that cannot be returned to service in one hour, constitutes a major loss of the offsite notification capability that requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The Emergency Plan has route alerting and public radio announcement available as necessary to notify the public in lieu of the non-operational sirens.
"The condition was recorded in the IPEC Corrective Action Program as CR# 1P2-2006-04625 and actions have been initiated to investigate and correct the condition.
"Troubleshooting continues. The cause of failure is still unknown at this time."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local agencies of this event.
* * * UPDATE ON 08/02/06 AT 1417 EDT FROM BRIAN ROKES TO MIKE RIPLEY * * *
"Update to the initial notification provided at 0449 hours on August 2, 2006, regarding the inability to activate the 156 sirens of the Indian Point Entergy Center (IPEC) offsite Emergency Notification System (ENS) through its computer operating system. The capability to activate the IPEC ENS was returned to service at 0635 hours. The total time the ENS sirens were unavailable was approximately 6 1/2 hours. During the event, route alerting and public radio announcement was available as necessary to notify the public. Troubleshooting identified two problems; a hardware problem with drive failures, and a problem with the computer system where the Oracle database control file synchronism failed. These failures resulted in the inability of the ENS computer system to connect to the Oracle database which prevented ENS from being activated. The computer drives were replaced and operating system data file error corrected. Troubleshooting is continuing to identify the cause. The IPEC Corrective Action Program recorded the event as CR-IP2-2006-04625 and will identify any additional corrective actions to prevent recurrence."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local agencies of this event.
Notified R1 DO (P. Finney), DRP (N. Mamish) and OPA (D. McIntyre).
"On August 2, 2006 at approximately 0006 hours, the Emergency Planning Department determined that all of the 156 sirens in the Indian Point Energy Center, Emergency Planning Zone were unavailable due to, an inability to activate the sirens through the computer operating system. In accordance with the Indian Point reporting criteria, the loss of 16 or more sirens that cannot be returned to service in one hour, constitutes a major loss of the offsite notification capability that requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The Emergency Plan has route alerting and public radio announcement available as necessary to notify the public in lieu of the non-operational sirens.
"The condition was recorded in the IPEC Corrective Action Program as CR# 1P2-2006-04625 and actions have been initiated to investigate and correct the condition.
"Troubleshooting continues. The cause of failure is still unknown at this time."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local agencies of this event.
* * * UPDATE ON 08/02/06 AT 1417 EDT FROM BRIAN ROKES TO MIKE RIPLEY * * *
"Update to the initial notification provided at 0449 hours on August 2, 2006, regarding the inability to activate the 156 sirens of the Indian Point Entergy Center (IPEC) offsite Emergency Notification System (ENS) through its computer operating system. The capability to activate the IPEC ENS was returned to service at 0635 hours. The total time the ENS sirens were unavailable was approximately 6 1/2 hours. During the event, route alerting and public radio announcement was available as necessary to notify the public. Troubleshooting identified two problems; a hardware problem with drive failures, and a problem with the computer system where the Oracle database control file synchronism failed. These failures resulted in the inability of the ENS computer system to connect to the Oracle database which prevented ENS from being activated. The computer drives were replaced and operating system data file error corrected. Troubleshooting is continuing to identify the cause. The IPEC Corrective Action Program recorded the event as CR-IP2-2006-04625 and will identify any additional corrective actions to prevent recurrence."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local agencies of this event.
Notified R1 DO (P. Finney), DRP (N. Mamish) and OPA (D. McIntyre).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42750
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: R. HAIFLET
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: R. HAIFLET
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 08/02/2006
Notification Time: 08:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2006
Event Time: 05:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2006
Notification Time: 08:30 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2006
Event Time: 05:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
PAT FINNEY (R1)
MELVYN LEACH (IRD)
MJ ROSS-LEE (NRR)
PAT FINNEY (R1)
MELVYN LEACH (IRD)
MJ ROSS-LEE (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MOTOR VEHICLE FATALITY OF PLANT EMPLOYEE
"On Wednesday, August 2, 2006, at approximately 0545 EDT, a motor vehicle accident occurred at the entrance to the Owner Controlled Area that resulted in the fatality of a plant employee. The employee was reporting to work. Local law enforcement and emergency medical personnel were called and responded to the scene.
"An investigation by local law enforcement and plant security is ongoing.
"No formal press release is anticipated.
"This event presented no risk to public health and safety."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this report by the licensee.
"On Wednesday, August 2, 2006, at approximately 0545 EDT, a motor vehicle accident occurred at the entrance to the Owner Controlled Area that resulted in the fatality of a plant employee. The employee was reporting to work. Local law enforcement and emergency medical personnel were called and responded to the scene.
"An investigation by local law enforcement and plant security is ongoing.
"No formal press release is anticipated.
"This event presented no risk to public health and safety."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this report by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42751
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUG GOMEZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUG GOMEZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 08/02/2006
Notification Time: 18:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2006
Event Time: 11:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2006
Notification Time: 18:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2006
Event Time: 11:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
PAT FINNEY (R1)
PAT FINNEY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POST CONTINGENCY LOW VOLTAGE ALARM
"The Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) Energy Control Center (ECC) notified Ginna Operations that the Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm was received for the off site power system. Ginna Operations entered procedure O-6.9, operating Limits for Ginna Station Transmission, and declared the offsite power inoperable per ITS 3.8.1[72 hour LCO]. Per NUREG-1022, section 3.2.7, if either offsite power or onsite emergency power is unavailable to the plant, it is reportable per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) regardless of whether the other system is available.
"The RG&E Energy Control Center (ECC) monitors 115 Kv voltage using their State Estimation and Contingency Analysis System. The State Estimation portion of the system evaluates real time system power flow and voltages on the 115 and 345 Kv transmission systems. The Contingency Analysis portion analyzes the voltage effect of a Ginna main generator trip concurrent with worst case accident loading. If the Station 13A voltage would drop below the minimum required voltage for offsite power alignment a Ginna Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm occurs.
"If the main generator should trip, then the absence of a Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm on the RG&E State Estimation and Contingency Analysis System will ensure that the subsequent offsite 115kV system voltage transient will not result in Ginna Station experiencing an under voltage condition on the 480V Safeguard Busses.
"The RG&E ECC notified Ginna operations that the Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm cleared at 1408 EDST on 08/02/2006 and the LCO for ITS 3.8.1 was exited at 1704 after observation of grid stability. The plant was maintained at 100% steady state conditions throughout the event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM KYLE GARNISH TO W. GOTT AT 1430 ON 08/03/06 * * *
"This is an additional notification for EN #42751 that was reported on 8/2/06 for offsite power being declared inoperable. A subsequent investigation revealed that offsite power was also inoperable on 7/17/2006 from 1427 to 1448 and on 8/1/2006 from 1022 to 1843 for which a notification was not completed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO P. Finney
* * * RETRACTION OF JULY 17, 2006 PORTION OF EVENT FROM D. DEAN TO MACKINNON ON 12/20/06 AT 1435 EST * * *
"The purpose of this report is to retract one of the events discussed in ENS report #42751 (August 2 and 3, 2006). The ENS report covered three separate off site power related events which occurred on July 17, 2006, August 1, 2006 and August 2, 2006. For each of the events, both sources of off-site power were declared inoperable following notification to R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant that the calculated post contingency off-site system voltage was below the required value necessary to ensure that off-site power would remain available following a design basis accident.
"Since the ENS report, an engineering analysis of the July 17, 2006 event has been completed. The analysis determined that the off site power system was actually operable at all times on July 17, 2006, The 'post contingency low voltage alarm (PCLVA)' computer model that is being utilized by Rochester Gas & Electric to calculate the post contingency off site system voltage is inherently conservative in that many of the automatic voltage regulators associated with the other generating units are assumed to be in the manual mode. The computer simulation that resulted in the alarm was repeated and by 'turning on' the voltage regulators for four of the nearby generator units, the post contingency voltage improved to above the alarm set point. The four voltage regulators that were turned on in the computer simulation were confirmed to be in the automatic mode on July 17, 2006. As such, the July 17, 2006 event is being retracted.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
NRC R1DO (Ray Powell) notified.
"The Rochester Gas and Electric (RG&E) Energy Control Center (ECC) notified Ginna Operations that the Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm was received for the off site power system. Ginna Operations entered procedure O-6.9, operating Limits for Ginna Station Transmission, and declared the offsite power inoperable per ITS 3.8.1[72 hour LCO]. Per NUREG-1022, section 3.2.7, if either offsite power or onsite emergency power is unavailable to the plant, it is reportable per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) regardless of whether the other system is available.
"The RG&E Energy Control Center (ECC) monitors 115 Kv voltage using their State Estimation and Contingency Analysis System. The State Estimation portion of the system evaluates real time system power flow and voltages on the 115 and 345 Kv transmission systems. The Contingency Analysis portion analyzes the voltage effect of a Ginna main generator trip concurrent with worst case accident loading. If the Station 13A voltage would drop below the minimum required voltage for offsite power alignment a Ginna Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm occurs.
"If the main generator should trip, then the absence of a Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm on the RG&E State Estimation and Contingency Analysis System will ensure that the subsequent offsite 115kV system voltage transient will not result in Ginna Station experiencing an under voltage condition on the 480V Safeguard Busses.
"The RG&E ECC notified Ginna operations that the Post Contingency Low Voltage Alarm cleared at 1408 EDST on 08/02/2006 and the LCO for ITS 3.8.1 was exited at 1704 after observation of grid stability. The plant was maintained at 100% steady state conditions throughout the event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM KYLE GARNISH TO W. GOTT AT 1430 ON 08/03/06 * * *
"This is an additional notification for EN #42751 that was reported on 8/2/06 for offsite power being declared inoperable. A subsequent investigation revealed that offsite power was also inoperable on 7/17/2006 from 1427 to 1448 and on 8/1/2006 from 1022 to 1843 for which a notification was not completed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO P. Finney
* * * RETRACTION OF JULY 17, 2006 PORTION OF EVENT FROM D. DEAN TO MACKINNON ON 12/20/06 AT 1435 EST * * *
"The purpose of this report is to retract one of the events discussed in ENS report #42751 (August 2 and 3, 2006). The ENS report covered three separate off site power related events which occurred on July 17, 2006, August 1, 2006 and August 2, 2006. For each of the events, both sources of off-site power were declared inoperable following notification to R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant that the calculated post contingency off-site system voltage was below the required value necessary to ensure that off-site power would remain available following a design basis accident.
"Since the ENS report, an engineering analysis of the July 17, 2006 event has been completed. The analysis determined that the off site power system was actually operable at all times on July 17, 2006, The 'post contingency low voltage alarm (PCLVA)' computer model that is being utilized by Rochester Gas & Electric to calculate the post contingency off site system voltage is inherently conservative in that many of the automatic voltage regulators associated with the other generating units are assumed to be in the manual mode. The computer simulation that resulted in the alarm was repeated and by 'turning on' the voltage regulators for four of the nearby generator units, the post contingency voltage improved to above the alarm set point. The four voltage regulators that were turned on in the computer simulation were confirmed to be in the automatic mode on July 17, 2006. As such, the July 17, 2006 event is being retracted.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
NRC R1DO (Ray Powell) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42752
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: A. T. HALL
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: A. T. HALL
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 08/02/2006
Notification Time: 18:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2006
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2006
Notification Time: 18:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2006
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
BEN SANDLER (ILTAB)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
BEN SANDLER (ILTAB)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL DISPOSED FROM OWNER CONTROLLED AREA
"[On] 08/02/06 at 1600 hrs. EST, Plant Security officers discovered a canister marked: 'Flammable Contains Phosphorus Notify Military or Law Enforcement if Found,' on plant owner-controlled property, outside the protected area. St. Lucie County Sheriffs Office (SLCSO) was contacted for determination of hazard posed. According to Plant Security supervision, the canister did not, and does not pose a threat to plant personnel, the public, or plant operations. SLCSO has asked other local experts to examine the canister and arrange for satisfactory disposal."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"[On] 08/02/06 at 1600 hrs. EST, Plant Security officers discovered a canister marked: 'Flammable Contains Phosphorus Notify Military or Law Enforcement if Found,' on plant owner-controlled property, outside the protected area. St. Lucie County Sheriffs Office (SLCSO) was contacted for determination of hazard posed. According to Plant Security supervision, the canister did not, and does not pose a threat to plant personnel, the public, or plant operations. SLCSO has asked other local experts to examine the canister and arrange for satisfactory disposal."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.