Event Notification Report for July 17, 2006

ALABAMA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF FOUND MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"On the morning of July 17, 2006, the Alabama Office of Radiation Control was contacted by Madison County Emergency Management Agency concerning a container found in the middle of a street in Huntsville, Alabama. The incident was originally reported by a passerby to the Huntsville Police Department. The Huntsville Police Department, Huntsville Fire and Rescue Department, and Huntsville HAZMAT unit responded to the call. Also, local news media was at the scene. The item was determined to be a CPN Model MC-3 moisture density gauge (Serial No. M350402559) containing 10 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 50 millicuries of Americium-241/Beryllium. An investigation found that the device was the property of OMI, Inc. of Huntsville, Alabama. OMI Inc. has an Alabama Radioactive Material License No. 1171 to possess and use the device. The licensee was notified by the Alabama Office of Radiation Control of the found gauge and they returned to the scene to pick it up. Preliminary findings indicate that the licensee failed to secure the device by two independent means in the back of the pickup truck and failed to properly block and brace the device during transport. It does not appear that the device suffered any significant damage but the licensee was advised to perform a leak test of the device before placing the unit back in service."

Alabama Event 06-36.

WASHINGTON AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

"The licensee reported that a Troxler portable moisture/density gauge, model 3430, serial number 25598, was stolen between 4:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. today. The gauge was in a 1987 Toyota Camry when the car itself was stolen from the residence of an employee living in Renton, Washington. The gauge was in the trunk of the car at the time of the theft. The licensee reported that the trunk was locked, the transport box was locked and the gauge was locked. The licensee did not have a required second outer level of security in place to keep an unauthorized individual from removing the locked box with the gauge. The licensee did not keep the gauge stored at the licensed storage location as required by license condition. The user retrieved the gauge Sunday night (July 16, 2006) from the licensed storage location located several miles north of his residence for use today at a temporary jobsite several miles south of his residence. The theft was reported to the Renton Police Department (police report #4626) and was assigned Case #06-7698. " Washington Event Report # WA-06-050

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED VIA EMAIL FROM ARDEN SCROGGS TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1232 EST ON 01/17/07 * * *

"[State of Washington, Radioactive Materials Section] received a written report on January 11, 2007, from Professional Service Industries, Inc., (PSI) that the portable moisture/density gauge had been found and recovered on August 22, 2006. The gauge was discovered in the front yard of a residence in Kent, Washington. This is approximately 1 mile from where the vehicle had been stolen. The King County, Washington, Sheriff's Department was notified of the find by the resident at the Kent location. The Sheriff's Office notified PSI of the find. PSI went to the residence, inspected the gauge and determined that it was undamaged. The source rod was locked in the shielded position but the transportation box appeared to have been opened because the locking hasp had been broken. The gauge was placed back into secure storage at a PSI licensed storage location. The gauge was later leak tested [in August 2006]. The test was negative.

"Corrective actions included:
1) The gauge user was required to provide the department with a written report of events that lead to the gauge becoming uncontrolled gauge. In the report the gauge user gave reasons for violating license requirements,
2) The user was required to attend a re-training session that included maintaining proper security for portable gauges. The user was required to make written confirmation of the requirements, and
3) The user was required to assist in providing similar training to other PSI gauge users. During that training session, the gauge user gave a lessons learned summary of the incident."

Notified R4DO (Campbell) and NMSS EO (Burgess). Notified ILTAB (via email) and Canada (via fax).


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION FLOW BELOW LIMITS

"During review of instrumentation calibration, it was determined that a faulty flow instrument was used for determination of CREFS (Control Room Emergency Filtration System) flow. Due to the error of the flow instrumentation previous test results were deemed to be high outside acceptance criteria. These tests were performed in October of 2005. The CREFS was declared inoperable and preparation was made to rerun the surveillance. At 1900 the surveillance was completed. The results of the surveillance determined that CREFS flow was below the allowable limit. The minimum flow for CREFS is a requirement for post DBA dose calculation for Control Room personnel. With minimum flow not maintained, the Control Room post accident dose calculations may be violated.

"CREFS remains inoperable pending adjustments of ventilation dampers and successful performance of surveillance testing.

"Resident inspector has been notified."

The licensee has entered Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Condition A, which is a 7 day LCO.

* * * UPDATE AT 1725 EDT ON 7/27/06 FROM DAVID VAN DER KAMP TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification #42711 which reported a loss of safety function due to the unplanned inoperability of the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS). CREFS was declared inoperable due to flow below the acceptance criteria required per surveillance testing. Upon further evaluation, CNS has determined that CREFS satisfies the Technical Specifications (TS) surveillance requirements and that the safety function was not lost.

"The surveillance procedure acceptance criteria for CREFS minimum flow is not required by the TS and is not a direct indicator of system operability. The procedure has been revised to remove the minimum flow acceptance criteria. It has been determined that CREFS, at the flow conditions documented on July 17, 2006 and during a past surveillance in 2005, satisfied TS and USAR requirements and was capable of performing its safety function."

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).

EMERGENCY EVACUATION SIREN FAILURES DUE TO THUNDERSTORMS

"Greater than 25% of the emergency sirens have failed due to a severe thunderstorm in the area."

The licensee stated that 30 sirens had failed and that restoration activities were currently in progress. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM J. KOEPLIN TO M. RIPLEY 0503 ET 07/18/06 * * *

As of 2317 CDT 07/18/06, the number of inoperable sirens fell below 25% of all sirens with 23 failed sirens not restored to service. Restoration activities remain in progress. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3 DO (Cameron)

MEDIA INQUIRY REGARDING BWXT REORGANIZATION

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THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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"This concurrent report is being made to the NRC as a result of a 'media inquiry only' statements that were released to the following organizations: WDBJ 7, WSET 13, and The News & Advance. All of these entities are local news agencies in the Central Virginia area. The press release that was provided is attached. The media inquiry is the result of a recent press release concerning BWXT's reorganization.

Licensee Press Release Text:

"(Lynchburg, Va) - BWX Technologies, Inc. (BWXT) recently announced the consolidation of its two nuclear manufacturing facilities, the Nuclear Products Division (NPD, Lynchburg, Va.) and the Nuclear Equipment Division (NED, Barberton, Ohio and Mount Vernon, Ind.), into one organization named the Nuclear Operations Division (NOD). The consolidation is designed to facilitate stronger efficiencies in management and overhead functions in executing the work BWXT performs in manufacturing nuclear components for the U.S. Department of Energy. The restructuring also positions BWXT to be more cost competitive in emerging nuclear markets.

"As a result of the consolidation, BWXT will reduce its salaried workforce at NPD, NED and BWXT Services, Inc, by approximately 100 people during the months of August and September 2006.

"To help mitigate any need for an involuntary reduction, a Voluntary Reduction in Force (VRIF) program, which includes an enhanced severance package, has been offered to all salaried employees at the three sites."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/13/08 BY J.KOZAL * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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