Event Notification Report for July 06, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/05/2006 - 07/06/2006
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42699
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JAY GAINES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JAY GAINES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/11/2006
Notification Time: 11:28 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2006
Event Time: 16:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2006
Notification Time: 11:28 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2006
Event Time: 16:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
GLENN MEYER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REQUIRED BY NPDES TO STATE OF MARYLAND DUE TO SIGNIFICANT JELLYFISH INFLUX
"On 7/6/06 a significant jelly fish influx required securing 11 Circulating Water Pump on Unit 1 and 26 Circulating Water Pump on Unit 2. Both Units remained at 100 % power,
"On 7/7/06 Unit 1 was downpowered to 41 % due to similar jelly fish influx and subsequently returned to 100 % power.
NPDES permit requires state notification of any significant aquatic impact on the plant.
"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On 7/6/06 a significant jelly fish influx required securing 11 Circulating Water Pump on Unit 1 and 26 Circulating Water Pump on Unit 2. Both Units remained at 100 % power,
"On 7/7/06 Unit 1 was downpowered to 41 % due to similar jelly fish influx and subsequently returned to 100 % power.
NPDES permit requires state notification of any significant aquatic impact on the plant.
"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 42713
Rep Org: US ARMY
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 1
City: FT BRAGG State: NC
County:
License #: 12-0722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GIZICKI
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 1
City: FT BRAGG State: NC
County:
License #: 12-0722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GIZICKI
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/18/2006
Notification Time: 13:58 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2006
Notification Time: 13:58 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
PATTY PELKE (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
PATTY PELKE (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
UNPLANNED TRITIUM CONTAMINATION DURING MAINTENANCE
"On July 6, 2006 a range indicator SSDR no. NR-155-S-116-S containing [four] 0.8 Ci [curies] tritium lamps [3.2 curies total] was broken during a maintenance procedure at Ft. Bragg, NC Special OPS, 3rd Group Direct Support weapons room, Bldg E-1978. The Ft. Bragg RSO was notified on 7 July 2006 of the incident. Improper maintenance procedure was the reason for the breakage of the tritium sealed source. Two persons were involved in the incident. One tritium bioassay was taken of one individual. The second individual did not have a bioassay taken due to the fact he went on TDY [Temporary Duty] before the discovery of the accident. Leak test of the broken range indicator showed removable contamination of 0.95 microcuries. An area survey of the weapons room by the Ft. Bragg RSO showed a maximum contamination of 0.3 micro curies (64,944 dpm). The Ft. Bragg RSO closed and secured the arms room from re-entry of personnel. The Ft Bragg RSO performed decontamination of the weapons room and brought the tritium removable contamination below regulatory concerns (<10,000 dpm). The licensee was notified of the incident on July 12, 2006."
"On July 6, 2006 a range indicator SSDR no. NR-155-S-116-S containing [four] 0.8 Ci [curies] tritium lamps [3.2 curies total] was broken during a maintenance procedure at Ft. Bragg, NC Special OPS, 3rd Group Direct Support weapons room, Bldg E-1978. The Ft. Bragg RSO was notified on 7 July 2006 of the incident. Improper maintenance procedure was the reason for the breakage of the tritium sealed source. Two persons were involved in the incident. One tritium bioassay was taken of one individual. The second individual did not have a bioassay taken due to the fact he went on TDY [Temporary Duty] before the discovery of the accident. Leak test of the broken range indicator showed removable contamination of 0.95 microcuries. An area survey of the weapons room by the Ft. Bragg RSO showed a maximum contamination of 0.3 micro curies (64,944 dpm). The Ft. Bragg RSO closed and secured the arms room from re-entry of personnel. The Ft Bragg RSO performed decontamination of the weapons room and brought the tritium removable contamination below regulatory concerns (<10,000 dpm). The licensee was notified of the incident on July 12, 2006."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42687
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PHIL SANTINI
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PHIL SANTINI
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 07/06/2006
Notification Time: 04:25 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2006
Event Time: 03:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2006
Notification Time: 04:25 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2006
Event Time: 03:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR TRIP DUE TO GENERATOR DIFFERENTIAL
"Indian Point Unit 3 tripped on Generator Differential (Direct Generator Trip). Current conditions are stable, mode 3 operation with all automatic actions occurring properly. Steam Generators levels are stable on aux. feed water.
"Unit 2 was unaffected by the trip."
All control rods inserted fully and decay heat is being removed via steam dump to the condenser. All required safety related systems are working properly and the electrical buses and diesel generators are in their normal alignment.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0938 ON 07/06/08 B. ROKES TO W. GOTT * * *
"The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated and the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump started as designed due to the reactor trip. The actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System was the result of Steam Generator shrink/swell effect due to the reactor trip at full power. The actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is an eight-hour non-emergency event reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (P. Henderson)
"Indian Point Unit 3 tripped on Generator Differential (Direct Generator Trip). Current conditions are stable, mode 3 operation with all automatic actions occurring properly. Steam Generators levels are stable on aux. feed water.
"Unit 2 was unaffected by the trip."
All control rods inserted fully and decay heat is being removed via steam dump to the condenser. All required safety related systems are working properly and the electrical buses and diesel generators are in their normal alignment.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0938 ON 07/06/08 B. ROKES TO W. GOTT * * *
"The Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated and the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump started as designed due to the reactor trip. The actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System was the result of Steam Generator shrink/swell effect due to the reactor trip at full power. The actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System is an eight-hour non-emergency event reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (P. Henderson)