Event Notification Report for July 01, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/30/2006 - 07/01/2006
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 42686
Rep Org: ADVANTAGE ENGINEERING
Licensee: ADVANTAGE ENGINEERING
Region: 1
City: MECHANICSBURG State: PA
County:
License #: 37-30704
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN SCHAUBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: ADVANTAGE ENGINEERING
Region: 1
City: MECHANICSBURG State: PA
County:
License #: 37-30704
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN SCHAUBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 07/05/2006
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2006
Event Time: 14:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/2006
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2006
Event Time: 14:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/05/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
A Troxler Model 3411 moisture density gauge was damaged when it was run over by a bulldozer at the Rydal-Waters construction site on Brooke Road in Abington Township, Montgomery County, PA. The gauge was left unattended and uncontrolled while the gauge operator went to retrieve a vehicle to transport the gauge. While left unattended, the gauge was run over by a bulldozer resulting in the gauge being broken and the instrument case being damaged. The sources remained in place in their rods. The rods were placed back inside the gauge, and the gauge was placed back inside its case. Soil surveys resulted in no spread of contamination. Radiation levels taken were not abnormal. There are two sealed sources inside the gauge Cs-137, serial number 40-8387, 5.4 millicuries and Am-241/Be, serial number 47-6341, 38.8 millicuries.
The licensee notified NRC (Sattar Lodhi, Region I ), Troxler, and local authorities: Abington Township Emergency Responders and Montgomery County Emergency Management. The gauge has been removed from the Rydal-Waters site to Advantage Engineering's Allentown, PA. office. Troxler is leak testing the gauge and evaluating a transportation plan to return the gauge to Troxler's corporate location.
A Troxler Model 3411 moisture density gauge was damaged when it was run over by a bulldozer at the Rydal-Waters construction site on Brooke Road in Abington Township, Montgomery County, PA. The gauge was left unattended and uncontrolled while the gauge operator went to retrieve a vehicle to transport the gauge. While left unattended, the gauge was run over by a bulldozer resulting in the gauge being broken and the instrument case being damaged. The sources remained in place in their rods. The rods were placed back inside the gauge, and the gauge was placed back inside its case. Soil surveys resulted in no spread of contamination. Radiation levels taken were not abnormal. There are two sealed sources inside the gauge Cs-137, serial number 40-8387, 5.4 millicuries and Am-241/Be, serial number 47-6341, 38.8 millicuries.
The licensee notified NRC (Sattar Lodhi, Region I ), Troxler, and local authorities: Abington Township Emergency Responders and Montgomery County Emergency Management. The gauge has been removed from the Rydal-Waters site to Advantage Engineering's Allentown, PA. office. Troxler is leak testing the gauge and evaluating a transportation plan to return the gauge to Troxler's corporate location.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42681
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JAMES BLAZEK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JAMES BLAZEK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/02/2006
Notification Time: 01:23 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2006
Event Time: 19:28 [MST]
Last Update Date: 07/02/2006
Notification Time: 01:23 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2006
Event Time: 19:28 [MST]
Last Update Date: 07/02/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWING LARGE LEAK IN CONDENSATE SYSTEM
"On July 1, 2006, at approximately 19:28 MST Palo Verde Unit 3 experienced a manual reactor trip from approximately 100% rated thermal power due to a large leak in the condensate system. The sight glass for the 'A' condensate demin vessel blew out of the vessel creating an approximate 6 inch diameter hole. Several thousand gallons of condensate were discharged to the Turbine Building and the environment. Radiation Protection has sampled the condensate water and have verified no activity is present. Unit 3 was at normal operating temperature and pressure prior to the trip. The 'A' Main feedwater pump tripped on low suction pressure and a Reactor Power Cutback Signal was received. Condenser hotwell levels continued to decrease. When the main control board annunciator for the 'B' Main Feedwater Pump Trip Circuit Energized was received the reactor was manually tripped. All CEAs fully inserted into the reactor core. The event was diagnosed as an uncomplicated reactor trip. No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. Safety related buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. The offsite power grid is stable. No significant LCOs have been entered as a result of this event. There was no loss of normal heat removal capabilities, or loss of any safety functions associated with this event. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event. No primary or secondary safety valves lifted during the event. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.
"Unit 3 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3. There is no estimated time and date for the Unit 3 restart at the time this call is being made."
AFW is being used to feed the steam generators and is discharging steam to the main condenser. The licensee stated that the leak has been secured and that there is no significant standing water in the turbine building lower levels. All the water has drained into sumps or out doors. There does not appear to be any electrical or personnel safety hazards as a result of the water leak.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** UPDATE FROM RAY BUZZARD TO JOHN KNOKE AT 17:28 ON 07/03/06 ***
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"This notification is a follow-up to the manually initiated reactor trip event reported on July 1, 2006 (ENS 42681). The notification indicated that the reactor was manually tripped from approximately 100% rated thermal power due to a large leak in the condensate system. Prior to the transient the unit was operating at approximately 100 % rated thermal power, however, the manual trip was actually initiated from approximately 55% rated thermal power following a reactor power cutback caused by the loss of the A train main feedwater pump on low suction pressure.
"In addition, the ENS report stated that Radiation Protection had sampled the condensate water and verified no activity is present. The condensate actually was found to contain tritium at a concentration of 1.22E-5 uCi/ml. The water from the spill flowed to the onsite storm drains, was captured behind dams, and transferred to the onsite retention basins. Samples of resin from the spill were also collected, analyzed by gamma spectroscopy, and found to not contain licensed radioactive material."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Shannon)
"On July 1, 2006, at approximately 19:28 MST Palo Verde Unit 3 experienced a manual reactor trip from approximately 100% rated thermal power due to a large leak in the condensate system. The sight glass for the 'A' condensate demin vessel blew out of the vessel creating an approximate 6 inch diameter hole. Several thousand gallons of condensate were discharged to the Turbine Building and the environment. Radiation Protection has sampled the condensate water and have verified no activity is present. Unit 3 was at normal operating temperature and pressure prior to the trip. The 'A' Main feedwater pump tripped on low suction pressure and a Reactor Power Cutback Signal was received. Condenser hotwell levels continued to decrease. When the main control board annunciator for the 'B' Main Feedwater Pump Trip Circuit Energized was received the reactor was manually tripped. All CEAs fully inserted into the reactor core. The event was diagnosed as an uncomplicated reactor trip. No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. Safety related buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. The offsite power grid is stable. No significant LCOs have been entered as a result of this event. There was no loss of normal heat removal capabilities, or loss of any safety functions associated with this event. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event. No primary or secondary safety valves lifted during the event. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.
"Unit 3 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3. There is no estimated time and date for the Unit 3 restart at the time this call is being made."
AFW is being used to feed the steam generators and is discharging steam to the main condenser. The licensee stated that the leak has been secured and that there is no significant standing water in the turbine building lower levels. All the water has drained into sumps or out doors. There does not appear to be any electrical or personnel safety hazards as a result of the water leak.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** UPDATE FROM RAY BUZZARD TO JOHN KNOKE AT 17:28 ON 07/03/06 ***
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"This notification is a follow-up to the manually initiated reactor trip event reported on July 1, 2006 (ENS 42681). The notification indicated that the reactor was manually tripped from approximately 100% rated thermal power due to a large leak in the condensate system. Prior to the transient the unit was operating at approximately 100 % rated thermal power, however, the manual trip was actually initiated from approximately 55% rated thermal power following a reactor power cutback caused by the loss of the A train main feedwater pump on low suction pressure.
"In addition, the ENS report stated that Radiation Protection had sampled the condensate water and verified no activity is present. The condensate actually was found to contain tritium at a concentration of 1.22E-5 uCi/ml. The water from the spill flowed to the onsite storm drains, was captured behind dams, and transferred to the onsite retention basins. Samples of resin from the spill were also collected, analyzed by gamma spectroscopy, and found to not contain licensed radioactive material."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Shannon)
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43211
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: DIAGEO
Region: 1
City: BALTIMORE State: MD
County:
License #: GENERAL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: DIAGEO
Region: 1
City: BALTIMORE State: MD
County:
License #: GENERAL
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/05/2007
Notification Time: 08:00 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2007
Notification Time: 08:00 [ET]
Event Date: 07/01/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL
JOHN CARUSO (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
ILTAB VIA E-MAIL
AGREEMENT STATE - MISSING AMERICIUM-241 SOURCE
The following information was provided by the State of Maryland via facsimile:
Diageo is a State of Maryland general licensee for a 100 millicurie Am-241 radioactive material gauge used to measure the fill height of beverages bottled at the facility. Diageo provided a report in writing to the State on 1/8/07 that the source was missing.
"The source and its source holder were discovered missing from an Industrial Dynamics Company (IDC) Model FT-50 device by the company around June 2006. Diageo and IDC conducted an extensive search of the facility and did not locate the source. The State conducted an investigation of the incident on 2/16/07 and no root cause of the loss/theft could be identified. Visual search and surveys were conducted in facility inventory areas. Interviews with IDC confirmed that only IDC or other qualified specific licensees are allowed to remove the source holder from the unit. IDC states that they did not remove the source from the device. Diageo states that their personnel did not remove the source. Potential waste stream routes from the facility are being investigated. Diageo states that they cannot identify any mechanism whereby the source could have gotten into the company waste stream. Diageo failed to report the incident to local law enforcement."
During the State investigation the following issues were identified: "failure to maintain inventory records; failure to conduct leak tests; failure to perform operational test at required frequencies; and non-operational source indicators lights. Maryland has reported the case to local FBI."
The State has notified Region 1 (White and Janda) about this event.
The State Report number is MD070004
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The following information was provided by the State of Maryland via facsimile:
Diageo is a State of Maryland general licensee for a 100 millicurie Am-241 radioactive material gauge used to measure the fill height of beverages bottled at the facility. Diageo provided a report in writing to the State on 1/8/07 that the source was missing.
"The source and its source holder were discovered missing from an Industrial Dynamics Company (IDC) Model FT-50 device by the company around June 2006. Diageo and IDC conducted an extensive search of the facility and did not locate the source. The State conducted an investigation of the incident on 2/16/07 and no root cause of the loss/theft could be identified. Visual search and surveys were conducted in facility inventory areas. Interviews with IDC confirmed that only IDC or other qualified specific licensees are allowed to remove the source holder from the unit. IDC states that they did not remove the source from the device. Diageo states that their personnel did not remove the source. Potential waste stream routes from the facility are being investigated. Diageo states that they cannot identify any mechanism whereby the source could have gotten into the company waste stream. Diageo failed to report the incident to local law enforcement."
During the State investigation the following issues were identified: "failure to maintain inventory records; failure to conduct leak tests; failure to perform operational test at required frequencies; and non-operational source indicators lights. Maryland has reported the case to local FBI."
The State has notified Region 1 (White and Janda) about this event.
The State Report number is MD070004
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.