Event Notification Report for June 30, 2006

MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE STUCK DURING TESTING

"[On June 30, 2006 the licensee initiated] a plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications. [The licensee] discovered during surveillance testing, that the Unit 1 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV-3370B) for the B-loop, would not return to the fully open condition after the partial stroke test. The valve appeared to stroke smoothly to the test position. Trouble shooting of the condition has not determined the exact cause however it appears that there is possible binding."

The licensee has tried reasonable methods to free the valve but was unable to do so. The licensee declared the MSIV inoperable. The plant's Technical Specifications require a shutdown within 72 hours with one MSIV inoperable.

The licensee has no other safety significant limiting conditions for operation in effect. The safety related electrical buses are powered from offsite power and the grid is stable in the area.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

24 HOUR LICENSE CONDITION REPORT - MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE INOPERABLE GREATER THAN 4 HOURS

"FPL Energy Seabrook has discovered a condition that was prohibited by the Technical Specifications. This report is being made pursuant to License Condition 2.G of the Seabrook Station Operating License.

"On July 3 at 0615, it was determined that a MSIV had been inoperable for a period of time longer than allowed by the Technical Specifications. On June 30 at 1949, an alarm was received indicating a problem with the MSIV. A troubleshooting and repair plan was developed and the MSIV repaired on July 1 at 1559.

"Subsequent examination of the failed control module found that it was nonfunctional and that the MSIV had been inoperable since receipt of the alarm on June 30 at 1949. Since the Technical Specification allowed outage time for an inoperable MSVI is 4 hours, the MSIV being inoperable for approximately 20 hours constitutes a violation of the Technical Specifications.

"The Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

LOW LEVELS OF TRITIUM FOUND ALONG PLANT DISCHARGE LINE

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), 4-hour Non-Emergency Report due to a press release being issued by Callaway Plant reporting that its monitoring program recently detected small amounts of tritium and other radionuclides along the plant discharge pipeline. The concentrations of radioactive material in water sampled from manholes on the discharge line range from less than 1% to about 20% of the NRC effluent release concentration limits. This radioactive material is contained on plant owned property.

"All known wells in the vicinity of the plant, as well as drinking water at the plant and in the nearby town of Portland, have been tested and shown to have no detectable radionuclides above background. Further testing of drinking water supplies and in areas around the discharge line is taking place to assure that no migration of the contaminated water occurs. Sampling results of the monitoring program have been provided to the NRC and the Missouri Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and a plan to remediate the contaminated manholes will be coordinated with the DNR.

"No Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) and no federal effluent limits have been exceeded. Callaway Plant has not identified any health or safety risk to the public or onsite personnel. The DNR, Missouri Department of Health and Social Services, and local County Officials have been notified of the press release."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and other State and local agencies are being notified via the press release.

NON-CREDIBLE SECURITY THREAT MADE AGAINST PLANT

"Notified by Security Shift Supervisor of a report by the Ashtabula County Sheriff that a 92 year old individual has been checked into the Ashtabula Clinic at 14:57 EDT, claiming to have an explosive device at his Kingsville home and at the Perry Power Plant. This is being considered as a non-credible security threat, based on his never having access to the site, ONI-P56-2 is not applicable, based on this report and assessment. Law enforcement officers are obtaining a warrant to access his home to investigate. The FBI and Lake County Sheriff's offices have been notified by the Security Shift Supervisor. This is an off site report from the Perry Plant to a government agency about the status of the Perry Plant."

The Lake County Sheriff's office completed their search of individual's residence and found no bombs or related material.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

PART 21 - DEFECTIVE PAPERLESS DATA ACQUISATION RECORDERS

"On May 3, 2006, Progress Energy (CP&L) Brunswick Nuclear Plant notified Thermo Electron that, during preventive maintenance on a Safety Related CSVC recorder, the rechargeable backup battery was found to have separated. Progress Energy also indicated that a similar failure had been found on a Non-Safety Related recorder prior to this incident. Neither recorder had failed while in service. Both are believed to have been in service approximately six (6) years with the original backup batteries installed.

"Progress Energy requested that Thermo Electron evaluate the failures to determine a recommended course of action and determine whether or not a Part 21 Notification was appropriate. Thermo Electron organized an engineering team to immediately begin an investigation of the failures. Thermo engineers solicited the services of the battery manufacturer in their investigation.

"The backup battery installed on the CSVC is a NiCad sealed package. As the batteries age, the potential exists whereby if the batteries were fully discharged, which could occur during an outage or a shut down condition, a reverse charging situation may occur when the recorders are brought back on-line. If a reverse charging condition occur, the byproduct is hydrogen gas which could be sufficient to cause the battery to split open. This is not a normal condition, but could occur in batteries that have been in service for a number of years. There is no apparent hazardous condition within the recorder as a result of this failure and the recorder would continue to function properly while under power.

"There have been no failures reported in any nuclear safety-related application of CSVC recorders while in operating mode. Should the battery fail, it will not cause the recorder to present or record any erroneous data. However, should a recorder lose power after such a battery failure has occurred, the system configuration would be lost.

"Corrective Action : Thermo Electron has determined that a recommended replacement interval for the rechargeable battery should be documented to prevent the potential for this condition to occur in the future. The battery packs as originally installed on the CSVC are no longer available. A replacement has been identified which has been tested and verified to be suitable for the backup battery application. This replacement does not compromise the original qualifications of the CSVC recorder. The battery pack (Thermo Part Number 1063-0200-001, Revision A) should be available for purchase within thirty (30) days. Thermo Electron recommends that utilities with CSVC recorders that have been in service greater than three (3) years with original batteries installed consider replacing the batteries at the next maintenance interval. The recommended replacement cycle for the replacement battery pack shall be three (3) years from the date the recorder is placed in service or the battery was replaced.

"Utilities have the option of purchasing batteries for replacement at their facility or returning the CSVC recorders to Thermo Electron for battery replacement. Customers may contact Thermo Electron for spare parts or to request return for service."

* * * UPDATED BY SNYDER ON 7/03/06 * * *

Updated to correct typographical errors.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF SEVEN Pd-103 PROSTATE IMPLANT SEEDS

"At 1853 hrs CST on June 30, 2006, University of Minnesota Medical Center, Fairview Riverside Hospital notified the Minnesota Department of Health that seven Palladium-103 seeds had been lost.

"At approximately 1500 hrs on June 30, 2005, the licensee completed a seed implant for prostate cancer. At the completion of that procedure, a scrub tech removed the tray from the area. The physicist reported 39 unused seeds ten of which were most probably on a partially used ribbon. (The licensee was using a MIC applicator.) When the nuclear medicine technologist inventoried the sources, only 29 were present. The facility located two seeds in a sink and a third in the drain of that sink. The Radiation Safety Officer believes that the seven lost sources are in the sewer system.

"Each seed is 1.2 mCi of Palladium-103."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

COMMON CAUSE DEGRADATION TO RHR SERVICE WATER PUMP MOTOR COOLING COILS

"At 2337 of 06/30/2006, it was determined that 3 out of 4 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pumps were inoperable due to a common cause. Each of the 3 affected RHRSW pumps contained motor cooling coils that had experienced flow induced erosion which had significantly reduced the wall thickness of the cooling coil material. In some cases, the thinning was sufficient to cause through wall leakage of water into the upper motor bearing oil reservoir and subsequently displace oil out of the reservoir. Currently, 2 of the 3 affected RHRSW pumps have been removed from service for repairs. 1 of those pumps is expected to be returned to service shortly. The 3rd affected pump remains available for use, but has been conservatively declared inoperable based on Engineering evaluation that indicates a common cause failure mechanism likely exists, based on common fabrication methods used for all RHRSW pump motor cooling coils. The 4th (unaffected) RHRSW pump remains Operable because its cooling coil was replaced approximately 1 month ago. Under these conditions, sufficient confidence that the affected RHRSW pumps could perform their post LOCA mission does not exist. With only 1 of the 4 RHRSW pumps remaining Operable, the RHRSW System is not capable of performing its safety function. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)."

With 3 out of the 4 RHRSW pumps considered inoperable, the licensee is currently in an 8 hour Tech Spec LCO action statement. However, with expected the return of one of these pumps to operable status within the next hour, the LCO will convert to a 7 day action statement.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.