Event Notification Report for June 14, 2006

CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST AND SUBSEQUENTLY FOUND NUCLEAR GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

"On 6/15/06, the RSO at Earth Systems Pacific contacted the RHB-Richmond office to report a nuclear gauge incident that occurred in the evening of 6/14/06. On 6/14/06 one of their moisture density nuclear gauges (CPN, Model MC1DR, S/N M10906353 containing 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241) fell off from a back of a truck onto the highway during transportation. A member of the public picked up the Type A container (with the gauge inside) and transported it into the jobsite. The jobsite personnel immediately contacted the Fire Department. The gauge was then handed over to the Fire Department. The Fire Department inspected the gauge and contacted the licensee. On the same day, the Alternate RSO picked up the gauge from the Fire Department and brought it back to the licensed facility. According to the RSO, the gauge was inside the Type A container during the whole incident and there was no visible damage to the gauge. They have performed a leak test and sent it for analysis. The RSO is expecting a report from the Fire Department. The RHB South RM office is awaiting additional information on the incident, including additional information concerning the Fire Department involved, and will investigate the reason the gauge was apparently unsecured in the licensee's vehicle."

California Report # 061506

STATE NOTIFICATION OF LOW PH RAINWATER DISCHARGE

"427 gallons of rainwater was discharged to the canal [onsite] with a pH of 4.2 which [exceeds] the [National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] permit. This water went through a charcoal bed that contained water which had not been used in a year and a half."

The pH discharge limit is 6. The site notified the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection.

ERDS INOPERABLE

"On June 14, 2006, at 0941 PDT, plant operators declared both Units 1 and 2 Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) inoperable due to the failure to complete scheduled surveillance testing. The in-plant emergency response facility data system (ERFDS) and safety parameter display system (SPDS) are operating as expected, but data transfer could not be accomplished via the digital data transfer to the NRC Event Response Center.

"Plant personnel are actively investigating the cause of the data transfer failure, and will update this notice upon completion of troubleshooting, repair, and successful performance of the surveillance test.

"Plant management, emergency personnel, and the NRC Resident Inspector(s) will be informed of the condition, planned maintenance actions, and resolution of this condition."

* * * UPDATE FROM DAVE BAHNER TO W. GOTT AT 1841 EDT ON 06/16/06

"PG&E restored the ERDS data system to service and satisfactorily completed communication testing with the NRC Incident Response Center." The system was declared operable at 1433 PT.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (A. Gody)

* * * UPDATE FROM MATTHEW COWARD TO HUFFMAN AT 1306 EDT ON 6/23/06 * * *

"The following update is provided to clarify the reason for reporting the failure of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) on June 14, 2006. On June 14, 2006, at 0941 PDT, plant operators declared both Units 1 and 2 ERDS inoperable when it was discovered during surveillance testing that, although the in-plant emergency response facility data system (ERFDS) and safety parameter display system (SPDS) were operating as expected, the data transfer to the NRC Event Response Center could not be accomplished."

This update is to clarify that the ERDS inoperability was discovered during surveillance testing and was not due to a failure to complete scheduled surveillance testing as initially reported. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Graves) notified.

LEAKING DECAY HEAT REMOVAL ISOLATION VALVE BYPASS LINE

"On 2-21-06, during a tour of containment during normal operation at 100% power, a small leak (one (1) to three (3) drops per second) was noted from a 1/2 inch line connected to the decay heat removal (DHR) drop line. It was identified as being a body-bonnet leak on valve 1LP-167 subject to a TS limit of 10 gpm.

"At approximately 1400 hours on 6-14-06 following a shutdown for an unrelated issue, the source was identified as a leak at a weld in a "tee" joint adjacent to 1LP-167. This is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage, subject to a TS limit of zero leakage. The leak was isolated by closing a normally open valve in the 1/2 inch line and the leakage stopped.

"Initial Safety Significance: The leak is in a 1/2 inch line which provides over pressure protection from thermal expansion in the volume between 1LP-1 and 1LP-2 (the main pressure boundary isolation valves between the high pressure RCS and the LPI (DHR) system). The leak rate (1 to 3 drops per second) was not significant, except that it was RCS pressure boundary leakage. 1LP-1 is normally closed, but must be opened to establish a DHR path. Valve 1LP-167 is a 1/2 inch check valve which would have limited RCS leakage. Thus, if the leak had grown, it would have been limited to the amount of seat leakage past either 1LP-167 or 1LP-1. It would also have been limited by the 1/2 inch size of the line containing the leak."

Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13 applies to RCS leakage in modes 1 to 4. The licensee plans to fix the leak prior to entry into mode 4.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION AT 00:15 ON 6/16/2006 FROM SAM LARK TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"On 6-14-06 at 1908 hours Oconee reported an RCS pressure boundary leak in a 1/2 inch line connected to the decay heat removal (DHR) line near valve 1LP-1 inside containment. Oconee has reviewed the event in greater detail and has concluded that the event is not reportable. The Basis for TS 3.4.13 states that RCS LEAKAGE includes leakage from connected systems up to and including the second normally closed valve (or outermost isolation valve for systems penetrating containment). However TS 1.1 contains a definition of LEAKAGE which includes 'Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE: LEAKAGE (except SG LEAKAGE) through a nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.' The leakage in this event was isolable, and therefore does not meet the definition of Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE. Therefore the zero leakage criterion of TS 3.4.13 does not apply to this leak. The applicable criterion is 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE. Since the leak does not meet the criterion as Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE, the leak was isolable, and the applicable TS LEAKAGE limit was not exceeded, this event does not meet the reportability criteria for 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73 and event notification 42641 is hereby RETRACTED.

"Additional information and clarification: "During normal operation the leak was isolated by one barrier (valves 1LP-167 and 1LP-1, closed in parallel). The leakage observed on 2-21-06 during a containment tour at Mode 1 was recorded as 1 drop per second. As stated in the initial notification, at that time the leak was believed to be a body-bonnet leak. It was observed at Mode 1 again on 5-25-06 and recorded as 3 drops/second. On 6-14-06, the leakage was recorded as one drop/second while at reduced pressure in Mode 4, before the DHR systems was placed in service. At that point, the leak was isolated by closing an additional valve (1LP-166, normally open), and the leak stopped. The Low Pressure Injection system was placed in service for DHR, which opened 1 LP-1. Later, with system pressure at approximately 285 psig in Mode 5 (outside the applicability of TS 3.4.13), 1LP-166 was reopened to allow additional verification of the leak location. At that time the leak was described as a 'spray' but no leak rate was measured before 1LP-166 was reclosed. The leak rate at that time was estimated as well less than 10 GPM.

"Corrective Action: The affective section of 1/2 inch pipe and associated fittings have been removed for transfer to a Duke laboratory for analysis. Repairs will be completed prior to return to mode 4."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING SHIPMENT OF NI-63

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"On 7/13/06, licensee reported [ to State of MA] that a Raid-M-100 Hand-Held Chemical Agent Monitor (S/N 22653301851) containing up to 100 Mbq (2.7 mCi) of Nickel-63, shipped by licensee employee on 6/5/06 from Anchorage, AK, via United Parcel Service was reported as being not yet received at the licensee's Billerica, MA, site on 6/14/05. A second package, containing work related non-radioactive items, that had been shipped at the same time was received on 6/8/06. The device was in the custody of UPS at the time of the loss. UPS tracking system indicates the package was scanned in AK. Per the licensee, UPS reported on 6/19/06 and on 6/29/06 that its internal investigation had not yet found the missing item. Licensee filed incident report with Anchorage Police Department. The UPS missing package investigation is ongoing."

The site of the event and last known location was UPS, 200 West 34th Avenue, Anchorage, AK.

MA Report 7/31/06, Docket # 07-6484


* * * UPDATE ON 8/3/06 AT 1000 EST BY J KOZAL * * *


Informed the Canadian government of above event via e-mail.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source