Event Notification Report for June 04, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/03/2006 - 06/04/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
42737
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42737
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JEFF WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JEFF WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 07/27/2006
Notification Time: 21:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2006
Event Time: 04:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2006
Notification Time: 21:00 [ET]
Event Date: 06/04/2006
Event Time: 04:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID RPS BUS 'B' AND DIVISION 2 PCIS ACTUATIONS
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On June 4, 2006, at 0419 [CST], with Unit 1 in Mode 1 'Run' at approximately 100% power, the 1B Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus unexpectedly de-energized. As a result, an RPS Bus B half-scram and Division 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolations were received. All affected containment isolation valves closed as designed. RPS Bus B was transferred to its alternate feed, and restoration activities were begun.
"A walkdown found that the 1B RPS MG set output breaker had opened. Troubleshooting identified that the cause was a failure of the 1B RPS MG set voltage regulator. The voltage regulator was replaced and successfully tested, and the 1B RPS MG set was returned to service.
"Laboratory testing of the failed voltage regulator found that the stability potentiometer had failed, with excessive vibration identified as the apparent cause. Although the vibration levels at the MG set are considered to be normal, the voltage regulator is mounted in a control cabinet that sits directly on the generator end of the MG set. The normal vertical vibration on the 1B MG set was measured at greater than 2g, which could be sufficient over time to degrade the voltage regulator potentiometers. A design change has been initiated for both Units to isolate the voltage regulators from the RPS MG set vibrations.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On June 4, 2006, at 0419 [CST], with Unit 1 in Mode 1 'Run' at approximately 100% power, the 1B Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus unexpectedly de-energized. As a result, an RPS Bus B half-scram and Division 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolations were received. All affected containment isolation valves closed as designed. RPS Bus B was transferred to its alternate feed, and restoration activities were begun.
"A walkdown found that the 1B RPS MG set output breaker had opened. Troubleshooting identified that the cause was a failure of the 1B RPS MG set voltage regulator. The voltage regulator was replaced and successfully tested, and the 1B RPS MG set was returned to service.
"Laboratory testing of the failed voltage regulator found that the stability potentiometer had failed, with excessive vibration identified as the apparent cause. Although the vibration levels at the MG set are considered to be normal, the voltage regulator is mounted in a control cabinet that sits directly on the generator end of the MG set. The normal vertical vibration on the 1B MG set was measured at greater than 2g, which could be sufficient over time to degrade the voltage regulator potentiometers. A design change has been initiated for both Units to isolate the voltage regulators from the RPS MG set vibrations.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.