Event Notification Report for May 30, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/29/2006 - 05/30/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
4260842609426104261142627
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42608
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: KEN KINGSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: KEN KINGSTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/30/2006
Notification Time: 05:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: 02:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2006
Notification Time: 05:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: 02:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE DUE TO INADVERTENT EMERGENCY SIREN ACTIVATION
"On May 30, 2006, at approximately 0245 CDT, Fort Calhoun Station was notified of inadvertent single siren activation by a Washington County Sheriff Deputy. No actual Emergency exists and no testing is in progress. Local radio station KFAB was notified to broadcast an inadvertent siren activation message. Siren number 27, which is located 5.5 miles South of Blair, NE on State Highway 133, was activated as a result of adverse weather conditions. Crews have been dispatched to repair the failed siren."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
"On May 30, 2006, at approximately 0245 CDT, Fort Calhoun Station was notified of inadvertent single siren activation by a Washington County Sheriff Deputy. No actual Emergency exists and no testing is in progress. Local radio station KFAB was notified to broadcast an inadvertent siren activation message. Siren number 27, which is located 5.5 miles South of Blair, NE on State Highway 133, was activated as a result of adverse weather conditions. Crews have been dispatched to repair the failed siren."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42609
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DON VOGT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DON VOGT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 05/30/2006
Notification Time: 16:14 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: 08:13 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2006
Notification Time: 16:14 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: 08:13 [MST]
Last Update Date: 05/30/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
LOSS OF POWER TO TRAIN "A" 4 KV SAFETY BUS
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR50.73.
"On May 30, 2006, at approximately 08:13 Mountain Standard Time, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 experienced a Loss Of Power (LOP) to Train 'A' (PBAS03) 4 KV safety bus. At the time of the LOP the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) had just been manually removed from the PBAS03 bus following a maintenance surveillance run and was still operating in a post run cool down mode. The PBAS03 bus was still powered from the off site power source and was at rated voltage. An invalid Load Shed signal was received from the Train 'A' Load Sequencer, which opened the normal off site supply breaker to PBAS03 bus, and stripped all of the Ioads off the bus. Next, a valid LOP signal developed, since the PBAS03 bus was de-energized. The EDG 'A' received a valid emergency run mode signal and returned to rated frequency and voltage; however its output breaker did not reclose on bus PBAS03. This reclosure was blocked by the Train 'A' Load Sequencer which had 'stalled' and was not able to provide the permissive for the DG output breaker to close. The failure of the load sequencer is currently under investigation by the PVNGS engineering department.
"Offsite power was available to both safety buses throughout the event; however the invalid Load Shed signal blocked immediate restoration of off site power to the Train 'A' bus. The other (Train 'B') safety bus is being supplied by offsite power; however Train 'B' EDG is not available due to planned outage related maintenance. The offsite electrical grid is stable. Efforts are currently in progress to restore the Train 'B' DG for a redundant power source. In addition, efforts are in progress to clear the Load Shed signal off the Train 'A' bus to allow restoration of power from the off site power source.
"Palo Verde Unit 1 is shutdown and Defueled in a mid-cycle repair outage. The entire core is off loaded to the Spent Fuel Pool and is currently being maintained with inventory and cooling by the Train 'B' components powered from off site power. No other ESF actuations occurred and none were required. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."
At 13:04 MST the 'B' EDG was restored and operable. The licensee also indicated that Train 'A' offsite power is expected to be restored within about 1 hour, or 16:20 EDT.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR50.73.
"On May 30, 2006, at approximately 08:13 Mountain Standard Time, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 experienced a Loss Of Power (LOP) to Train 'A' (PBAS03) 4 KV safety bus. At the time of the LOP the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) had just been manually removed from the PBAS03 bus following a maintenance surveillance run and was still operating in a post run cool down mode. The PBAS03 bus was still powered from the off site power source and was at rated voltage. An invalid Load Shed signal was received from the Train 'A' Load Sequencer, which opened the normal off site supply breaker to PBAS03 bus, and stripped all of the Ioads off the bus. Next, a valid LOP signal developed, since the PBAS03 bus was de-energized. The EDG 'A' received a valid emergency run mode signal and returned to rated frequency and voltage; however its output breaker did not reclose on bus PBAS03. This reclosure was blocked by the Train 'A' Load Sequencer which had 'stalled' and was not able to provide the permissive for the DG output breaker to close. The failure of the load sequencer is currently under investigation by the PVNGS engineering department.
"Offsite power was available to both safety buses throughout the event; however the invalid Load Shed signal blocked immediate restoration of off site power to the Train 'A' bus. The other (Train 'B') safety bus is being supplied by offsite power; however Train 'B' EDG is not available due to planned outage related maintenance. The offsite electrical grid is stable. Efforts are currently in progress to restore the Train 'B' DG for a redundant power source. In addition, efforts are in progress to clear the Load Shed signal off the Train 'A' bus to allow restoration of power from the off site power source.
"Palo Verde Unit 1 is shutdown and Defueled in a mid-cycle repair outage. The entire core is off loaded to the Spent Fuel Pool and is currently being maintained with inventory and cooling by the Train 'B' components powered from off site power. No other ESF actuations occurred and none were required. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."
At 13:04 MST the 'B' EDG was restored and operable. The licensee also indicated that Train 'A' offsite power is expected to be restored within about 1 hour, or 16:20 EDT.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42610
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DANA WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DANA WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/30/2006
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2006
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH TURBINE VIBRATION
"At approximately 1700 hours on May 30, 2006, with Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 operating normally at 100% power, main turbine vibration increased to a value above the procedure limit and reactor operators manually tripped the reactor in accordance with site procedure requirements. All control rods inserted and the auxiliary feedwater system automatically actuated per design. No other significant equipment issues were identified and the reactor was stabilized in mode 3.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the manual reactor trip (4-hour report) and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the RPS and AFW actuations (8-hour report).
"Watts Bar had been monitoring indications of slightly elevated turbine vibration on the main turbine, but the reason for the increase above the procedure limit of 14 mils is not known at this time. TVA will be investigating the cause of the increased vibration to make necessary repairs before turbine startup."
Decay heat is being removed by dumping steam to the main condenser. No safety or relief valves lifted.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (R. CREWS) TO M. RIPLEY 0020 EDT 06/02/06 * * *
"As a result of the initial assessment of the turbine vibration discussed above, TVA has identified damage to the turbine end of the 'C' low pressure turbine. This is consistent with the initial indications of high vibration on the number 7, 8 and 9 bearings and not thought to be associated with previous condition monitoring of the number 11 bearing. Assessment and repair of secondary plant components damaged in the transient are in progress."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (C. Ogle)
"At approximately 1700 hours on May 30, 2006, with Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 operating normally at 100% power, main turbine vibration increased to a value above the procedure limit and reactor operators manually tripped the reactor in accordance with site procedure requirements. All control rods inserted and the auxiliary feedwater system automatically actuated per design. No other significant equipment issues were identified and the reactor was stabilized in mode 3.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the manual reactor trip (4-hour report) and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the RPS and AFW actuations (8-hour report).
"Watts Bar had been monitoring indications of slightly elevated turbine vibration on the main turbine, but the reason for the increase above the procedure limit of 14 mils is not known at this time. TVA will be investigating the cause of the increased vibration to make necessary repairs before turbine startup."
Decay heat is being removed by dumping steam to the main condenser. No safety or relief valves lifted.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (R. CREWS) TO M. RIPLEY 0020 EDT 06/02/06 * * *
"As a result of the initial assessment of the turbine vibration discussed above, TVA has identified damage to the turbine end of the 'C' low pressure turbine. This is consistent with the initial indications of high vibration on the number 7, 8 and 9 bearings and not thought to be associated with previous condition monitoring of the number 11 bearing. Assessment and repair of secondary plant components damaged in the transient are in progress."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (C. Ogle)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42611
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DEAN RAASCH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DEAN RAASCH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/31/2006
Notification Time: 14:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: 09:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2006
Notification Time: 14:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: 09:23 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)
LAURA KOZAK (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) was declared Inoperable at 0923 on 5/30/2006 per TS 5.5.10.c 'Ventilation Filter Testing Program'. Laboratory testing results of a sample of the charcoal adsorber taken on 5/2/2006 did not meet the methyl iodide penetration percentage acceptance criteria of less than or equal to 1.0%. This condition is covered by TS 3.7.9 and both Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered Condition A, 'CREFS Inoperable' with a Required Action of 'Restore CREFS to OPERABLE status' with a Completion Time of 7 Days.
"CREFS is a single train system. Based on the guidance in NUREG-1022 for single train systems that perform safety functions, this condition was determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function'. Technical Specifications allow this system to be inoperable for a period of seven days.
"This condition was not reported within the 8 Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements."
The charcoal has been replaced and the licensee estimates testing at approximately 17:00.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) was declared Inoperable at 0923 on 5/30/2006 per TS 5.5.10.c 'Ventilation Filter Testing Program'. Laboratory testing results of a sample of the charcoal adsorber taken on 5/2/2006 did not meet the methyl iodide penetration percentage acceptance criteria of less than or equal to 1.0%. This condition is covered by TS 3.7.9 and both Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered Condition A, 'CREFS Inoperable' with a Required Action of 'Restore CREFS to OPERABLE status' with a Completion Time of 7 Days.
"CREFS is a single train system. Based on the guidance in NUREG-1022 for single train systems that perform safety functions, this condition was determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function'. Technical Specifications allow this system to be inoperable for a period of seven days.
"This condition was not reported within the 8 Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements."
The charcoal has been replaced and the licensee estimates testing at approximately 17:00.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42627
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: AUBURN State: WA
County:
License #: WN-M0149-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: AUBURN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: AUBURN State: WA
County:
License #: WN-M0149-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 06/08/2006
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2006
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 05/30/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/19/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SOURCES
The State provided the information via e-mail:
"This is notification of an event in Washington State as reported to or investigated by the WA Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection.
"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health (DOH) on-site investigation; media attention): A patient received a total of 89 sealed Iodine-125 (half-life of 60 days) seeds implanted on a permanent basis in the prostate, for a total activity of 33.84 millicuries. This was done at Auburn Regional Medical Center (ARMC), Auburn, Washington, on 25 May 2006.
"The patient was seen / rechecked by ARMC personnel on 26 May 2006. Sometime after that visit, on the same day, he was taken by family members to Good Samaritan Hospital (GSH) in Puyallup, Washington, where he subsequently died of a myocardial infarction.
"The body was released to a funeral home in Buckley, Washington where it was cremated on 30 May 2006 (about 31 millicuries). The cremains were then boxed up on 31 May 2006 and buried that same day.
"Although it was reported the patient and the patient's family were given appropriate verbal and written instructions by ARMC; when the patient was treated at GSH it was for the MI only, and had nothing to do with the prior surgical prostate procedure. The family did not, for whatever reason, inform the staff at GSH. The urologists who had treated the patient for the prostate cancer did not work at GSH and had no connection there.
"Therefore, once the patient died, personnel at GSH had no idea they were also dealing with a radioactive source problem. Personnel at ARMC had no way of knowing of the treatment or death of the patient since it did not occur at their facility or in their city.
"The RSO for Tacoma Radiation Oncology Center (who provides medical physics support and treatment planning for sealed source therapy to clients such as ARMC and GSH) visited the funeral home on 7 June 2006 and surveyed the crematorium using a meter with a NaI probe. Background was noted at approximately 0.4 mR/hr. Readings of approximately 3.0 mR/hr were noted at the entrance to the retort. A filter in the air exhaust system was noted to be reading approximately 1.0 mR/hr so it was removed for decay and ultimate disposal by GSH.
"It appears that most retorts operate at 1600 degrees Fahrenheit, or more, and the titanium capsule would melt a few hundred degrees lower than that. The manufacturer confirmed that all seeds had most likely been melted and would not be recovered whole. The crematorium is at this time on standby until the crematorium is declared clean for further use. It appears the most reasonable way to safely handle this cleaning chore is to have a commercial cleaning company, properly informed and equipped, clean and vacuum the retort with ARMC physics personnel in constant attendance to protect workers from any potential radiation hazards and to remove any contaminated material for decay and disposal. This is scheduled to happen 8 June 2006.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-240
"Isotope and Activity involved: Iodine 125 / 31 millicuries (at time of cremation)
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): to be determined, likely none.
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): melted I-125 seeds.
"Disposition/recovery: clean and hold material for decay
"Leak test? NA
"Vehicle: NA
"Release of activity? Yes
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: NA
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: NA
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: I-125 seeds
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: minimal, likely no consequences
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? Yes
"Was written report provided to patient? Yes
"Was referring physician notified? Yes
"Consultant used? Yes"
Event Report No.: WA-06-042
* * * UPDATE ON 06/19/06 AT 1900 FROM ARDEN SCROGGS TO A. COSTA * * *
This incident was investigated by the WA Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection and the Crematorium facility was released for use.
Notified R4DO (Graves) and NMSS EO (Collins).
The State provided the information via e-mail:
"This is notification of an event in Washington State as reported to or investigated by the WA Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection.
"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health (DOH) on-site investigation; media attention): A patient received a total of 89 sealed Iodine-125 (half-life of 60 days) seeds implanted on a permanent basis in the prostate, for a total activity of 33.84 millicuries. This was done at Auburn Regional Medical Center (ARMC), Auburn, Washington, on 25 May 2006.
"The patient was seen / rechecked by ARMC personnel on 26 May 2006. Sometime after that visit, on the same day, he was taken by family members to Good Samaritan Hospital (GSH) in Puyallup, Washington, where he subsequently died of a myocardial infarction.
"The body was released to a funeral home in Buckley, Washington where it was cremated on 30 May 2006 (about 31 millicuries). The cremains were then boxed up on 31 May 2006 and buried that same day.
"Although it was reported the patient and the patient's family were given appropriate verbal and written instructions by ARMC; when the patient was treated at GSH it was for the MI only, and had nothing to do with the prior surgical prostate procedure. The family did not, for whatever reason, inform the staff at GSH. The urologists who had treated the patient for the prostate cancer did not work at GSH and had no connection there.
"Therefore, once the patient died, personnel at GSH had no idea they were also dealing with a radioactive source problem. Personnel at ARMC had no way of knowing of the treatment or death of the patient since it did not occur at their facility or in their city.
"The RSO for Tacoma Radiation Oncology Center (who provides medical physics support and treatment planning for sealed source therapy to clients such as ARMC and GSH) visited the funeral home on 7 June 2006 and surveyed the crematorium using a meter with a NaI probe. Background was noted at approximately 0.4 mR/hr. Readings of approximately 3.0 mR/hr were noted at the entrance to the retort. A filter in the air exhaust system was noted to be reading approximately 1.0 mR/hr so it was removed for decay and ultimate disposal by GSH.
"It appears that most retorts operate at 1600 degrees Fahrenheit, or more, and the titanium capsule would melt a few hundred degrees lower than that. The manufacturer confirmed that all seeds had most likely been melted and would not be recovered whole. The crematorium is at this time on standby until the crematorium is declared clean for further use. It appears the most reasonable way to safely handle this cleaning chore is to have a commercial cleaning company, properly informed and equipped, clean and vacuum the retort with ARMC physics personnel in constant attendance to protect workers from any potential radiation hazards and to remove any contaminated material for decay and disposal. This is scheduled to happen 8 June 2006.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-240
"Isotope and Activity involved: Iodine 125 / 31 millicuries (at time of cremation)
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): to be determined, likely none.
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number): melted I-125 seeds.
"Disposition/recovery: clean and hold material for decay
"Leak test? NA
"Vehicle: NA
"Release of activity? Yes
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: NA
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: NA
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: I-125 seeds
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: minimal, likely no consequences
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? Yes
"Was written report provided to patient? Yes
"Was referring physician notified? Yes
"Consultant used? Yes"
Event Report No.: WA-06-042
* * * UPDATE ON 06/19/06 AT 1900 FROM ARDEN SCROGGS TO A. COSTA * * *
This incident was investigated by the WA Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection and the Crematorium facility was released for use.
Notified R4DO (Graves) and NMSS EO (Collins).