Event Notification Report for May 26, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/25/2006 - 05/26/2006
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42606
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL SCHWER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL SCHWER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/26/2006
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2006
Event Time: 14:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2006
Notification Time: 17:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2006
Event Time: 14:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1)
CATHERINE HANEY (NRR)
THOMAS BLOUNT (IRD)
MEL GRAY (R1)
CATHERINE HANEY (NRR)
THOMAS BLOUNT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 18 | Power Operation |
SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM TRAIN INOPERABLE
"Beaver Valley Unit 1 commenced a Technical Specification required shutdown at 1415 hours due to Train B Solid State Protection System inoperable. The condition was discovered during testing and the Unit is required to be in Mode 3 by 1846 hours. Train A of Solid State Protection System remains operable and in service. Investigation of the Solid State Protection problem is in progress."
The licensee believes that the problem is caused by a faulty memory card. They are continuing to investigate the problem. The unit was at 18% power at 1727 EDT on the way to mode 3.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/27/06 AT 0114 EDT FROM R. GREEN TO A. COSTA * * *
"Beaver Valley Unit 1 entered mode 3 at 1831 hours on 5/26/06. Train B Solid State Protection was repaired and tested satisfactorily. It was returned to OPERABLE status at 1915 hours on 5/26/06. The failure was in the memory portion of the universal logic card in the low power trip block circuitry. A root cause investigation is ongoing. All technical specifications action statements were exited when Train B Solid State Protection was declared OPERABLE. Reactor start up is planned for 0500 on 5/27/06."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (M. Gray).
"Beaver Valley Unit 1 commenced a Technical Specification required shutdown at 1415 hours due to Train B Solid State Protection System inoperable. The condition was discovered during testing and the Unit is required to be in Mode 3 by 1846 hours. Train A of Solid State Protection System remains operable and in service. Investigation of the Solid State Protection problem is in progress."
The licensee believes that the problem is caused by a faulty memory card. They are continuing to investigate the problem. The unit was at 18% power at 1727 EDT on the way to mode 3.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/27/06 AT 0114 EDT FROM R. GREEN TO A. COSTA * * *
"Beaver Valley Unit 1 entered mode 3 at 1831 hours on 5/26/06. Train B Solid State Protection was repaired and tested satisfactorily. It was returned to OPERABLE status at 1915 hours on 5/26/06. The failure was in the memory portion of the universal logic card in the low power trip block circuitry. A root cause investigation is ongoing. All technical specifications action statements were exited when Train B Solid State Protection was declared OPERABLE. Reactor start up is planned for 0500 on 5/27/06."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (M. Gray).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42661
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MCDONNELL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MCDONNELL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 06/23/2006
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2006
Event Time: 15:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2006
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/26/2006
Event Time: 15:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R1)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
IAN JUNG (NRR)
ILTAB (via email)
MARVIN SYKES (R1)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
IAN JUNG (NRR)
ILTAB (via email)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LICENSED NUCLEAR MATERIAL
"In Event Notifications 42597and 42599 on May 22, and 23, 2006, respectively, as updated on May 26, 2006 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station notified the NRC that during ongoing activities to remove non-fuel material from the Pilgrim Spent Fuel Pool it had been identified that nine (9) irradiated neutron detectors containing very small quantities (less than 0.003 grams each) of special nuclear material were not in their expected locations. Per the inventory sheets, the neutron detectors were expected to be enclosed in "dry tubes" in the Spent Fuel Pool. Processing of the "dry tubes" identified that the neutron detectors are not in their expected locations.
"Subsequent investigation has determined that an error in the records was introduced in 1996 when the current base inventory sheets were developed. During the 1996 inventory, the assumption was made that these nine (9) "dry tubes" contained neutron detectors. The investigation has determined that the detectors, although moved to the spent fuel pool, were removed from the "dry tubes" prior to the "dry tubes" removal from the reactor vessel in 1987.
"This affected the validity of the 1996 base inventory. A written report will be submitted consistent with 10 CFR 20.2201(b)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY MICHAEL MCDONNELL TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1459 ON 06/26/06 * * *
"Worst case isotope totals for the 9 detectors combined would be the following (all other isotopes would be an order of magnitude or more lower):
U 235 - 5.382E-08 Curies, Pu 239 - 2.376E-07 Curies, Pu-238 - 3.510E-08 Curies, Pu 241 - 4.572E-08 Curies"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Perry) and NRR EO (MJ Ross-Lee).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
"In Event Notifications 42597and 42599 on May 22, and 23, 2006, respectively, as updated on May 26, 2006 Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station notified the NRC that during ongoing activities to remove non-fuel material from the Pilgrim Spent Fuel Pool it had been identified that nine (9) irradiated neutron detectors containing very small quantities (less than 0.003 grams each) of special nuclear material were not in their expected locations. Per the inventory sheets, the neutron detectors were expected to be enclosed in "dry tubes" in the Spent Fuel Pool. Processing of the "dry tubes" identified that the neutron detectors are not in their expected locations.
"Subsequent investigation has determined that an error in the records was introduced in 1996 when the current base inventory sheets were developed. During the 1996 inventory, the assumption was made that these nine (9) "dry tubes" contained neutron detectors. The investigation has determined that the detectors, although moved to the spent fuel pool, were removed from the "dry tubes" prior to the "dry tubes" removal from the reactor vessel in 1987.
"This affected the validity of the 1996 base inventory. A written report will be submitted consistent with 10 CFR 20.2201(b)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY MICHAEL MCDONNELL TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1459 ON 06/26/06 * * *
"Worst case isotope totals for the 9 detectors combined would be the following (all other isotopes would be an order of magnitude or more lower):
U 235 - 5.382E-08 Curies, Pu 239 - 2.376E-07 Curies, Pu-238 - 3.510E-08 Curies, Pu 241 - 4.572E-08 Curies"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Perry) and NRR EO (MJ Ross-Lee).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source