Event Notification Report for May 20, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/19/2006 - 05/20/2006
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42591
Rep Org: SULZER PUMPS, INC
Licensee: SULZER PUMPS, INC
Region: 1
City: CHATTANOOGA State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOMMY CRAIG
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: SULZER PUMPS, INC
Region: 1
City: CHATTANOOGA State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TOMMY CRAIG
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 05/20/2006
Notification Time: 12:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2006
Notification Time: 12:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
O.TABATABAI EMAIL
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
O.TABATABAI EMAIL
PART 21 - SULZER PUMPS, INC.
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"Pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 21, reporting requirements, Sulzer Pumps (US), Inc. is reporting a deviation from technical requirements for components to be used in nuclear safety related applications.
"Sulzer Pumps (US) Inc. owns and operates a centrifugal pump repair and manufacturing facility at 4126 Caine Lane, Chattanooga, TN 37421. On May 7, 2006 during manufacturing we became aware of what appeared to be weld repairs to two pump bowl castings to be used in a replacement Essential Service Water Pump we are manufacturing for the J. M. Farley Nuclear Power plant. The supplier for these castings is Stainless Steel Foundry and Engineering, 5110 North 35 th St., Milwaukee, WI 53209, (414) 462-7400.
"The Sulzer Pumps (US) procurement documents to the foundry required weld repairs to the castings be preceded by notification to us, submission for approval of both the proposed weld procedure (WPS) to be used, and the weld procedure qualification record (PQR). Weld maps are also required by our procurement documents.
"In the case of our PO # 08407520, we received material certifications from Stainless Foundry and Engineering which certified no welding was performed to the castings. During our inspection processes we discovered what appeared to be weld repairs not traceable to us or to the above named Stainless Foundry. Subsequent investigation by Sulzer Pumps (US) and foundry representatives concluded that undocumented and unapproved weld repairs were performed by the foundry.
"Additional research by Sulzer Pumps (US) identified other castings supplied by Stainless Foundry and Engineering which were used in orders previously processed and shipped by Sulzer. The documentation supplied by Stainless Foundry stated none of these castings had required weld repair by the foundry. Our records indicate the castings that have been supplied are impellers. However, based on the aforementioned discoveries they too may contain undocumented weld repairs. We have reviewed and identified the nuclear power plants where pumps using these castings were shipped which are listed below. They are: Indian Point, Cust PO# 4500533843, our job number 04JC1423; and E.I. Hatch, Cust PO# 6057240, our job number 04JC1505.
"All other castings from Stainless Foundry and Engineering that we received have been placed on hold and will be returned to the foundry. We are in the process of evaluating our options to obtain replacement castings."
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"Pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 21, reporting requirements, Sulzer Pumps (US), Inc. is reporting a deviation from technical requirements for components to be used in nuclear safety related applications.
"Sulzer Pumps (US) Inc. owns and operates a centrifugal pump repair and manufacturing facility at 4126 Caine Lane, Chattanooga, TN 37421. On May 7, 2006 during manufacturing we became aware of what appeared to be weld repairs to two pump bowl castings to be used in a replacement Essential Service Water Pump we are manufacturing for the J. M. Farley Nuclear Power plant. The supplier for these castings is Stainless Steel Foundry and Engineering, 5110 North 35 th St., Milwaukee, WI 53209, (414) 462-7400.
"The Sulzer Pumps (US) procurement documents to the foundry required weld repairs to the castings be preceded by notification to us, submission for approval of both the proposed weld procedure (WPS) to be used, and the weld procedure qualification record (PQR). Weld maps are also required by our procurement documents.
"In the case of our PO # 08407520, we received material certifications from Stainless Foundry and Engineering which certified no welding was performed to the castings. During our inspection processes we discovered what appeared to be weld repairs not traceable to us or to the above named Stainless Foundry. Subsequent investigation by Sulzer Pumps (US) and foundry representatives concluded that undocumented and unapproved weld repairs were performed by the foundry.
"Additional research by Sulzer Pumps (US) identified other castings supplied by Stainless Foundry and Engineering which were used in orders previously processed and shipped by Sulzer. The documentation supplied by Stainless Foundry stated none of these castings had required weld repair by the foundry. Our records indicate the castings that have been supplied are impellers. However, based on the aforementioned discoveries they too may contain undocumented weld repairs. We have reviewed and identified the nuclear power plants where pumps using these castings were shipped which are listed below. They are: Indian Point, Cust PO# 4500533843, our job number 04JC1423; and E.I. Hatch, Cust PO# 6057240, our job number 04JC1505.
"All other castings from Stainless Foundry and Engineering that we received have been placed on hold and will be returned to the foundry. We are in the process of evaluating our options to obtain replacement castings."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42592
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY LONG
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LARRY LONG
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 05/20/2006
Notification Time: 16:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2006
Event Time: 14:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2006
Notification Time: 16:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2006
Event Time: 14:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2006
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
W.TRAVERS (RA)
C. PAYNE (R2)
L. PLISCO (R2)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
THOMAS BLOUNT (IRD)
W.TRAVERS (RA)
C. PAYNE (R2)
L. PLISCO (R2)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
THOMAS BLOUNT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNUSUAL EVENT - REACTOR TRIP OF BOTH UNITS DUE TO LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER
The licensee experienced a reactor trip to Units 1 & 2 due to loss of all offsite power. This anomaly was believed to be from an overcurrent condition in a relay, and limited to the Catawba switchyard. The reactor tripped due to actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS), and all rods for both Units fully inserted as designed. The Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV did lift momentarily. The decay heat is being released through the secondary PORV's, and steam generator level is being maintained with the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW). Presently, Units 1 & 2 are in EAL 4.5.U.1 (Loss of Offsite Power to Essential Busses for greater than 15 minutes). The licensee indicated there are no steam generator tube leaks in either unit. The licensee activated the TSC at 15:50 EDT.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, as well as State and local government.
* * * UPDATE FROM SI BILLENGER TO HUFFMAN AT 0152 EDT ON 5/21/06 * * *
The licensee terminated from the Unusual Event at 0140 EDT on 5/21/06 based on restoration of offsite power to all essential buses. The licensee is no longer in a Tech Spec cooldown LCO and both units have secured from further cooldown and have stabilized conditions in Mode 3. Both units are still on natural circulation with AFW cooling and decay heat removal through secondary PORVs.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Widmann), NRR (Ross-Lee), IRD (Blount), FEMA (Kimbrell) and DHS(York) have been notified
The licensee experienced a reactor trip to Units 1 & 2 due to loss of all offsite power. This anomaly was believed to be from an overcurrent condition in a relay, and limited to the Catawba switchyard. The reactor tripped due to actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS), and all rods for both Units fully inserted as designed. The Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV did lift momentarily. The decay heat is being released through the secondary PORV's, and steam generator level is being maintained with the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW). Presently, Units 1 & 2 are in EAL 4.5.U.1 (Loss of Offsite Power to Essential Busses for greater than 15 minutes). The licensee indicated there are no steam generator tube leaks in either unit. The licensee activated the TSC at 15:50 EDT.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, as well as State and local government.
* * * UPDATE FROM SI BILLENGER TO HUFFMAN AT 0152 EDT ON 5/21/06 * * *
The licensee terminated from the Unusual Event at 0140 EDT on 5/21/06 based on restoration of offsite power to all essential buses. The licensee is no longer in a Tech Spec cooldown LCO and both units have secured from further cooldown and have stabilized conditions in Mode 3. Both units are still on natural circulation with AFW cooling and decay heat removal through secondary PORVs.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Widmann), NRR (Ross-Lee), IRD (Blount), FEMA (Kimbrell) and DHS(York) have been notified
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 42590
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: STEVE SKAGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: STEVE SKAGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/20/2006
Notification Time: 11:51 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2006
Event Time: 07:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2006
Notification Time: 11:51 [ET]
Event Date: 05/20/2006
Event Time: 07:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/20/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
HIGH PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE
"At 0715 CDT on 05120/06, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a failure of the C-333A Autoclave 2 North High Cylinder Pressure System (HCPS). During a normal cylinder heating cycle the operator noted that the cylinder pressure, as read on a local digital pressure Indicator and on a digital recorder in the Operations Monitoring Room (OMR), unexpectedly fell from 55 psia to a negative value on both instruments. A 14 ton cylinder containing [deleted] U235 assay uranium hexafluoride had been heating (TSR Mode 5) for approximately 8 hours when the failure occurred. The PSS declared the HCPS inoperable and TSR LCO 2.2.4.14B actions were implemented to place the autoclave in Mode 2, 'Autoclave Open and Out-of-Service'. The HCPS is a TSR system designed to minimize the potential of primary system integrity failure (cylinder rupture) during a pressure increase event by tripping the steam supply to the autoclave prior to reaching the Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) of the cylinder.
"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.
"Work Request #5087574" submitted to troubleshoot and repair.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-06-1655; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2006-06; NRC Worksheet No. 42,590"
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"At 0715 CDT on 05120/06, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a failure of the C-333A Autoclave 2 North High Cylinder Pressure System (HCPS). During a normal cylinder heating cycle the operator noted that the cylinder pressure, as read on a local digital pressure Indicator and on a digital recorder in the Operations Monitoring Room (OMR), unexpectedly fell from 55 psia to a negative value on both instruments. A 14 ton cylinder containing [deleted] U235 assay uranium hexafluoride had been heating (TSR Mode 5) for approximately 8 hours when the failure occurred. The PSS declared the HCPS inoperable and TSR LCO 2.2.4.14B actions were implemented to place the autoclave in Mode 2, 'Autoclave Open and Out-of-Service'. The HCPS is a TSR system designed to minimize the potential of primary system integrity failure (cylinder rupture) during a pressure increase event by tripping the steam supply to the autoclave prior to reaching the Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) of the cylinder.
"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.
"Work Request #5087574" submitted to troubleshoot and repair.
"PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-06-1655; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2006-06; NRC Worksheet No. 42,590"
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."