Event Notification Report for May 04, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/03/2006 - 05/04/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
4255142552425534255442555
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42551
Rep Org: AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS
Licensee: AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GEORGE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS
Region: 3
City: COLUMBUS State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GEORGE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/04/2006
Notification Time: 13:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2006
Notification Time: 13:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
PART 21 NOTIFICATION INVOLVING POTENTIAL DEFECT IN AEROVOX CAPACITOR
The following information was provided via email:
"COMPONENT DESCRIPTION:
"13uF X 1000V AC capacitors, SCI P/N 07-020139-00, Aerovox P/N H94S1013A0BA, manufactured between January 2004 and December 2004.
"Capacitors can be either installed in Ametek Solidstate Controls UPS equipment or provided as a spare part. The components are schematically identified as C805, C815, or C705.
"PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE:
"The capacitor failures due to this defect will occur early in the operating life of the device. There are no warning signs that a failure is imminent, or detection method for predicting an approaching failure.
"CAUSE:
"The investigation has revealed that the capacitor failures (date codes 0408 and 0436) were due to manufacturing defects. A failure analysis by Aerovox revealed that a foil tab connecting the capacitor winding to the internal terminal became pinched between the lid and the can during the seaming operation. Within the first year of operation, the insulation covering the connecting tab was cut through. This resulted in terminal to case short.
"EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE:
"The failures described above, could result in loss of output voltage and transfer of the static switch to the bypass source. The resulting failure could result in a potential damage to the load.
"ACTION REQUIRED:
"The observed failure rate of this component is very low at 0.06% (2 out of 3336 units manufactured between 1/1/04 and12/31/04.) Aerovox has implemented corrective actions to preclude further failures.
"Based upon the Aerovox evaluation, Ametek Solidstate Controls believes if a defect was present in a capacitor, the likelihood of a failure should occur early in the operating life. We feel the failure rate has been extremely low and the risk is minimal. Each operating facility will need to evaluate the potential risk to their operation.
"AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION:
"If you wish to replace the capacitors Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please contact Mrs. Jean Falor of our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6230. jean.falor@ametek.com."
Rudimentary listing of stations that received this component installed in equipment or as a spare part:
- Installed in equipment: Oconee, McGuire, Watts Bar, Browns Ferry, STP, Beaver Valley, San Onofre, Nine Mile Point and TMI.
- Spare part: St. Lucie, Palo Verde, Surry, Turkey Point, Diablo Canyon, Harris, Crystal River, Robinson and Comanche Peak.
- International: Korea Hydro, Nuklearna Elec Vrbina, China Nuclear, Laguna Verde and Electrobras.
The following information was provided via email:
"COMPONENT DESCRIPTION:
"13uF X 1000V AC capacitors, SCI P/N 07-020139-00, Aerovox P/N H94S1013A0BA, manufactured between January 2004 and December 2004.
"Capacitors can be either installed in Ametek Solidstate Controls UPS equipment or provided as a spare part. The components are schematically identified as C805, C815, or C705.
"PROBLEM YOU COULD SEE:
"The capacitor failures due to this defect will occur early in the operating life of the device. There are no warning signs that a failure is imminent, or detection method for predicting an approaching failure.
"CAUSE:
"The investigation has revealed that the capacitor failures (date codes 0408 and 0436) were due to manufacturing defects. A failure analysis by Aerovox revealed that a foil tab connecting the capacitor winding to the internal terminal became pinched between the lid and the can during the seaming operation. Within the first year of operation, the insulation covering the connecting tab was cut through. This resulted in terminal to case short.
"EFFECT ON SYSTEM PERFORMANCE:
"The failures described above, could result in loss of output voltage and transfer of the static switch to the bypass source. The resulting failure could result in a potential damage to the load.
"ACTION REQUIRED:
"The observed failure rate of this component is very low at 0.06% (2 out of 3336 units manufactured between 1/1/04 and12/31/04.) Aerovox has implemented corrective actions to preclude further failures.
"Based upon the Aerovox evaluation, Ametek Solidstate Controls believes if a defect was present in a capacitor, the likelihood of a failure should occur early in the operating life. We feel the failure rate has been extremely low and the risk is minimal. Each operating facility will need to evaluate the potential risk to their operation.
"AMETEK SOLIDSTATE CONTROLS CORRECTIVE ACTION:
"If you wish to replace the capacitors Ametek Solidstate Controls will work with you to arrange replacements. Please contact Mrs. Jean Falor of our Client Services group at 1-800-222-9079 or 1-614-846-7500 ext. 6230. jean.falor@ametek.com."
Rudimentary listing of stations that received this component installed in equipment or as a spare part:
- Installed in equipment: Oconee, McGuire, Watts Bar, Browns Ferry, STP, Beaver Valley, San Onofre, Nine Mile Point and TMI.
- Spare part: St. Lucie, Palo Verde, Surry, Turkey Point, Diablo Canyon, Harris, Crystal River, Robinson and Comanche Peak.
- International: Korea Hydro, Nuklearna Elec Vrbina, China Nuclear, Laguna Verde and Electrobras.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42552
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TONY KLEDZIK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TONY KLEDZIK
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/04/2006
Notification Time: 17:19 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2006
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2006
Notification Time: 17:19 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2006
Event Time: 14:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3)
PATTY PELKE (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24-HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT INVOLVING FIRE PROTECTION PLAN VIOLATION
"The Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Operating License requires that a report be made within 24 hours to the NRC operations center via the emergency notification system in the event that a violation of the PNPP Fire Protection Program occurs. On May 2, 2006, it was discovered that a specific set of Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Control Room Control Switch contacts were not designed to isolate the Control Room from the local Division 1 EDG controls in the event of a control room fire. At 1430 on May 4, 2006 it was determined that this deficiency violated the PNPP fire protection program and could adversely affect plant shutdown in the case of a control room fire. A potential fire induced hot short in the diesel generator logic circuit(s), may result in a failure to start or a spurious trip of the Diesel Generator even if control is transferred to remote control. Although repairs and operator actions could have been taken to restore the Division 1 EDG if the Control Room fire caused a failure to start or a spurious trip of the Diesel Generator, these activities were not specifically identified in the Fire Protection safe shutdown analysis or associated operating procedures. The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire in the Unit 1 Control Room could be adversely affected. Compensatory actions (procedure changes) have been completed to address this issue. A written report will follow in accordance with Technical Specification 5.6.6.a and Operating License Condition 2.F."
The licensee discovered this discrepancy while researching a modification. This condition has existed since 1987.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Operating License requires that a report be made within 24 hours to the NRC operations center via the emergency notification system in the event that a violation of the PNPP Fire Protection Program occurs. On May 2, 2006, it was discovered that a specific set of Division 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Control Room Control Switch contacts were not designed to isolate the Control Room from the local Division 1 EDG controls in the event of a control room fire. At 1430 on May 4, 2006 it was determined that this deficiency violated the PNPP fire protection program and could adversely affect plant shutdown in the case of a control room fire. A potential fire induced hot short in the diesel generator logic circuit(s), may result in a failure to start or a spurious trip of the Diesel Generator even if control is transferred to remote control. Although repairs and operator actions could have been taken to restore the Division 1 EDG if the Control Room fire caused a failure to start or a spurious trip of the Diesel Generator, these activities were not specifically identified in the Fire Protection safe shutdown analysis or associated operating procedures. The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire in the Unit 1 Control Room could be adversely affected. Compensatory actions (procedure changes) have been completed to address this issue. A written report will follow in accordance with Technical Specification 5.6.6.a and Operating License Condition 2.F."
The licensee discovered this discrepancy while researching a modification. This condition has existed since 1987.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 42553
Rep Org: GEO TECHNICAL CONSULTING AND TESTIN
Licensee: GEO TECHNICAL CONSULTING AND TESTING
Region: 1
City: WOODBRIDGE State: VA
County:
License #: 45-25135-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SAMIR ALQUTRI
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Licensee: GEO TECHNICAL CONSULTING AND TESTING
Region: 1
City: WOODBRIDGE State: VA
County:
License #: 45-25135-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SAMIR ALQUTRI
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 05/04/2006
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2006
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2006
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2006
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
A Troxler Model 3430 (s/n 360840) was run over at the Fort Belvoir, VA construction site. The source rod is in the stowed and locked position. The gauge case is cracked on the bottom. The area has been posted and the RSO is enroute to perform radiation surveys.
A Troxler Model 3430 (s/n 360840) was run over at the Fort Belvoir, VA construction site. The source rod is in the stowed and locked position. The gauge case is cracked on the bottom. The area has been posted and the RSO is enroute to perform radiation surveys.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42554
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL CAMPBELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL CAMPBELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/04/2006
Notification Time: 18:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2006
Event Time: 09:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2006
Notification Time: 18:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2006
Event Time: 09:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR
"A random test of a contractor supervisor resulted in a positive fitness-for-duty [test] requiring 24 hour fitness-for-duty notification. There was no impact to the plant as a result of this event. Individual access to the protected area has been revoked."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"A random test of a contractor supervisor resulted in a positive fitness-for-duty [test] requiring 24 hour fitness-for-duty notification. There was no impact to the plant as a result of this event. Individual access to the protected area has been revoked."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42555
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DANIEL MALONE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DANIEL MALONE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/04/2006
Notification Time: 21:54 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2006
Event Time: 17:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2006
Notification Time: 21:54 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2006
Event Time: 17:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3)
PATTY PELKE (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNEXPECTED REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) ACTUATION DURING TESTING
"On May 4, 2006, at 1750 hrs, with the plant in Mode 5, an actuation of the reactor protection system occurred with a single control rod fully withdrawn for testing. The actuation occurred when operators opened the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) for a separate testing activity, which caused an apparent pressure perturbation with the steam generator level transmitters. The pressure perturbation resulted in the indicated level of 2 of 4 'A' Steam Generator level transmitters oscillating to below the steam generator low level reactor trip setpoint, before returning to the pre-event level. As a result of the reactor protection system actuation, the control rod inserted into the core as expected.
"The steam generators were aligned in lay-up condition with a nitrogen blanket present at the time the MSIVs were opened.
"The event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv), as a valid actuation of the reactor protection system."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On May 4, 2006, at 1750 hrs, with the plant in Mode 5, an actuation of the reactor protection system occurred with a single control rod fully withdrawn for testing. The actuation occurred when operators opened the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) for a separate testing activity, which caused an apparent pressure perturbation with the steam generator level transmitters. The pressure perturbation resulted in the indicated level of 2 of 4 'A' Steam Generator level transmitters oscillating to below the steam generator low level reactor trip setpoint, before returning to the pre-event level. As a result of the reactor protection system actuation, the control rod inserted into the core as expected.
"The steam generators were aligned in lay-up condition with a nitrogen blanket present at the time the MSIVs were opened.
"The event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv), as a valid actuation of the reactor protection system."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.