Event Notification Report for May 01, 2006

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A FIRE IN AN ISOPHASE BUS DUCT LASTING 11 MINUTES

"The Unusual Event was declared due to a fire lasting greater than 10 minutes (after discovery) within the protected area. The fire was located on the Isophase Bus Duct near the Main Transformer. A load reduction to 80% rated thermal power is in progress on Unit 1. The fire was extinguished at 0450 with dry chemicals extinguishers."

The licensee believes the fire was on cabling in the Isophase bus duct due to overheating. The licensee has been monitoring hot spots on the duct cabling for several days. The fire did not apparently impact any other systems and observers are at the location monitoring for any change in conditions. No Tech Spec Limiting Conditions of Operations resulted from the fire and there is no impact on Unit 2 operations (which is currently at 100%). Termination criteria will be based on management judgment and safety assessment.

* * * UPDATE FROM P. UNDERWOOD TO M. RIPLEY 0727 EDT 05/01/06 * * *

"Unusual Event terminated at 0655 [EDT].
Fire extinguished.
Reactor power reduction continuing.
Management evaluating continued operation."

The unit is currently at 77% power and plans are to reduce power to 60% pending their evaluation of continued operation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2 DO (K. Landis), NRR EO (M.J. Ross-Lee), IRD Manager (P. Wilson), DHS (S. York), and FEMA ( M. Roland).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"The licensee's radiation safety officer, [deleted] called the [Illinois Emergency Management Agency Division of Nuclear Safety (IEMA-DNS)] to report that a vehicle used to transport a portable moisture density gauge had been stolen. [The licensee] indicated that a 2004 White Chevy Astro Van with license plate IL 43701F had been stolen from a jobsite at 820 South Damon Street, Chicago, IL at 11:00 hours this morning.

"Chicago Police have been called to the scene to investigate and to alert them as to the situation." The Chicago Police has issued a 'be on the lookout' notice for the stolen vehicle. IEMA-DNS indicated that the licensee reported that the gauge was secured to the vehicle.

The stolen gauge was a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge Model 3430, Serial Number 23187. The gauge has 2 sealed sources a 8 millicurie Cs-137 source (s/n 75-9797) and a 40 millicurie Am-241/Be source (s/n 47-19015).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKY SEALED SOURCE

Baylor University identified a leaking Americium-241 sealed source. They were preparing the source for shipment to Los Alamos as part of the lost source recovery program when they identified leakage during a leak test. The state received conflicting information from the licensee who said that the activity of the source was either 1 millicurie or 191 millicuries. No further information was available at the time of the report. The state will follow up on this report with additional information after they gather it.

* * * UPDATE FROM A. TUCKER TO P. SNYDER AT 1301 ON 5/2/06 * * *

There were no personnel consequences as a result of this incident. No uptakes were reported. The source, ICN serial number 74101, was a one inch diameter check source that was being prepared for shipment to the Los Alamos National Laboratory off-site recovery program on 4/25/06. The source was in storage for some period of time immediately prior to being prepared for shipment. The activity of the source is 0.1909 microcuries of alpha and 0.0234 microcuries beta/gamma.

"The [licensee's] radiation safety staff isolated the source in a sealed container and surveyed all areas to ensure that the facility and other articles in contact with the source have not been contaminated. A contractor has been secured to encapsulate the source so that it can be disposed of."

This event is being tracked as Texas Incident Number I-8329.

Notified R4DO (Bywater) and NMSS (Morell).

LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION (LTOP) TRAINS INOPERABLE

"Event: At 2029 hours, Oconee Unit 3 was in Mode 5 for a refueling outage. The administrative controls which comprise one train of Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) were not yet in service, but a dedicated LTOP operator was in place as a Tech Spec required compensatory measure. Instrument Technicians performing a procedure erroneously isolated the low range RCS pressure indication, which removed the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) from service while required for LTOP. This placed Unit 3 in a one-hour action statement per Technical Specification 3.4.12, Condition H.

"Initial Safety Significance: This is potentially a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (LTOP). Both the automatic PORV train and the Admin Control train were inoperable per Technical Specifications. However, a dedicated LTOP operator was in place meeting the compensatory measures requirement for continued operation per TS 3.4.12, Condition F related to the Admin Control requirement. No event occurred while in this condition which would challenge the LTOP function.

"Corrective Action(s): Operator at the controls recognized the loss of indication and contacted the Instrument Technicians. They verified their error and returned the instrument to service within one hour."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.


*** UPDATE FROM R.P. TODD TO J. KNOKE AT 16:34 ON 06/29/06 ***

"At 0215 EDT on 5-2-06, Oconee made an ENS notification to report a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, specifically Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP).

"The LTOP Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.12 requires that a) the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) be operable, and b) administrative controls be in place to assure greater than 10 minutes are available for operator action to mitigate an LTOP event. As stated in the initial report, during shutdown for a refueling outage instrument technicians erroneously isolated the low range RCS pressure indication, which made the PORV inoperable for automatic operation while required for LTOP. In addition, the administrative controls were not yet fully established.

"However, if a specific sub-set of administrative controls are in place, the TS allows credit for a dedicated LTOP operator as a compensatory measure. Upon further review, Oconee has confirmed that a) the PORV remained available for manual initiation by the dedicated LTOP operator, and b) the dedicated LTOP operator and associated sub-set of administrative controls were in place. This satisfied the required actions of TS 3.4.12 Condition F and assured that an LTOP event could be mitigated. Therefore, Oconee concludes that this event did not constitute a potential loss of safety function.

"Actions were taken to restore the instrument alignment to restore automatic actuation capability for the PORV within the required action time per TS 3.4.12. Therefore there was no operation in a condition prohibited by Tech Specs. As a result, the event is not reportable under 50.72 or 50.73 and the ENS notification is hereby retracted.

"Corrective Action(s): As stated above, the instrument alignment was restored to return the PORV to an operable status for automatic actuation. Subsequently, the full set of administrative controls were established. As shutdown continued, the unit exited the LTOP region."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Decker).

AGREEMENT STATE - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

"The licensee notified [the State of Washington] office via [the] agency hotline phone number at 8:00 a.m. Monday, May 1, 2006 of a theft of a Troxler model 3430 portable moisture/density gauge [Serial Number 27641; 8mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241/Be]. The theft occurred sometime between Friday (p.m.) April 28, 2006 and Monday (a.m.) May 1, 2006 from a temporary jobsite trailer located at the Wal-Mart construction site on 7110 Bridgeport Way, Lakewood, Washington. The gauge was last seen Friday, April 28, 2006 when the gauge was secured in the jobsite trailer by the licensee's gauge user. The Licensee indicated that the gauge operator employed by the licensee arrived at the job-site and found the padlock on the outside of the trailer had been cut. Once in side, he found the chains securing the gauge case had also been cut and the gauge was missing. Nothing else appeared to be missing from the trailer. The gauge user was not present at the jobsite over the weekend and the licensee can not determine the exact day or time it was stolen. A police report was filed with the Lakewood Police Department and given report number 061210259."

Washington Report Number WA-06-020

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BADGE EXPOSURE

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"Dosimetry supplier reported 12 Rem exposure. Licensee determined that employee left badge in truck, in radiation field at several locations [various job sites] during the monitoring period."

TX Incident No. I-8348

* * * UPDATE ON 8/29/2006 FROM STATE OF TEXAS TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"On June 20, 2006, the Licensee notified the Agency that on June 19, 2006, a courtesy call from their dosimeter processor informed them that a worker's film badge indicated an exposure of 12.355 Rem for the month of May, 2006. The RSO removed the worker from rotation to prevent any further exposure. An investigation by the Licensee indicated no abnormal self reading dosimeter readings. The worker could not think of any reason why he would have received that much exposure. The individual only performed work involving radiation on seven occasions in the month of May. During the investigation, it was revealed that the worker had routinely left his dosimetry in the glove box of their work truck at the end of the day. The RSO stated that all of his trucks are in use supporting radiography operations each day. It is believed that the badge was exposed to the majority of the indicated exposure while in the glove box. Individuals who worked with the individual stated that they were not aware of any reason why this worker would have received any unusual exposure. The Licensee assessed the worker's dose to be 59 mrem for the exposure period based on daily exposure records. No Notice of Violation was issued."

Notified the R4DO (Cain) and NMSS EO (Burgess).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF TRITIUM AND CARBON-14 SOURCES

The following report was received via fax:

"The licensee submitted a written report June 11, 2008 documenting the loss of 31 mCi of tritium and 0.6 mCi of carbon-14 which had been discovered missing in May 2008.

"In September 2004, an incoming scientist brought the materials with him to Wadsworth. Since he was not an authorized. user, the RSO placed the material in a freezer in the chemical storage room. In May 2008 the RSO discovered the materials missing and initiated a thorough investigation. Unfortunately the disposition of the materials remains unknown.

"The RSO has implemented corrective actions which include; better inventory practices, increased vigilance over materials in long term storage with an eye towards proper disposal, and no 'general' storage of materials. No reward offered. No press release issued. Incident Closed"

New York Event: NY-11-20
New York Incident: 619

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source