Event Notification Report for April 27, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/26/2006 - 04/27/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
42531425324253342534
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42531
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DALE TURINETTI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DALE TURINETTI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/27/2006
Notification Time: 09:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2006
Event Time: 02:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2006
Notification Time: 09:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2006
Event Time: 02:07 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
LOW PRESSURE STEAM LINE PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL INADVERTENTLY INITIATED
"On 4/27/06 at 02:00, with D.C. Cook Unit 2 in Mode 5 and the Control Rod Drive System de-energized under clearance and incapable of withdrawal, Instrumentation and Controls Technicians were beginning Instrumentation Channel Operational Test and Trip Actuating Device Operational Tests. The block for Main Steam Line Low Pressure Safety Injection was inadvertently removed. This allowed the existing low steam generator pressure (0 psig) and low RCS temperature (186 degrees F) to initiate a Low Steam Line Pressure Safety Injection and a Steam Line Isolation signal.
"At 02:07 Unit 2 had a Main Steam Line Low Pressure Safety Injection signal on both Trains. The following components automatically started:
Unit 2 West Centrifugal Charging Pump (on minimum flow recirc path with injection path isolated for LTOP -- no injection to RCS)
Unit 2 South Safety Injection Pump (on minimum flow recirc path with injection path isolated for LTOP - no injection to RCS)
Unit 2 East Residual Heat Removal Pump
Unit 2 East Component Cooling Water Pump
Unit 2 CD Emergency Diesel Generator
Both Trains of Unit 2 Control Room Pressurization
Both Trains of Unit 2 Phase A Containment Isolation signal
Both Trains of Unit 2 Containment Ventilation Isolation.
Both Trains of Unit 1 Control Room Pressurization Fans
Unit 1 West Essential Service Water Pump
"All available equipment actuated as expected for this condition.
(The Unit 2 Boron Injection Tank was isolated under clearance for LTOP. The Unit 2 East Centrifugal Charging Pump, Unit 2 West Residual Heat Removal Pump, and Unit 2 West Component Cooling Water Pump were already running. The Unit 2 AB Emergency Diesel Generator was under a clearance for maintenance. The Unit 2 North Safety Injection Pump was under an administrative clearance for LTOP. The Unit 1 East Essential Service Water Pump was already running.)
"After diagnosing the event, operators manually blocked the Steam Line Isolation and manually reset Safety Injection signals for both trains. Components were returned to normal status for plant conditions."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 4/27/06 at 02:00, with D.C. Cook Unit 2 in Mode 5 and the Control Rod Drive System de-energized under clearance and incapable of withdrawal, Instrumentation and Controls Technicians were beginning Instrumentation Channel Operational Test and Trip Actuating Device Operational Tests. The block for Main Steam Line Low Pressure Safety Injection was inadvertently removed. This allowed the existing low steam generator pressure (0 psig) and low RCS temperature (186 degrees F) to initiate a Low Steam Line Pressure Safety Injection and a Steam Line Isolation signal.
"At 02:07 Unit 2 had a Main Steam Line Low Pressure Safety Injection signal on both Trains. The following components automatically started:
Unit 2 West Centrifugal Charging Pump (on minimum flow recirc path with injection path isolated for LTOP -- no injection to RCS)
Unit 2 South Safety Injection Pump (on minimum flow recirc path with injection path isolated for LTOP - no injection to RCS)
Unit 2 East Residual Heat Removal Pump
Unit 2 East Component Cooling Water Pump
Unit 2 CD Emergency Diesel Generator
Both Trains of Unit 2 Control Room Pressurization
Both Trains of Unit 2 Phase A Containment Isolation signal
Both Trains of Unit 2 Containment Ventilation Isolation.
Both Trains of Unit 1 Control Room Pressurization Fans
Unit 1 West Essential Service Water Pump
"All available equipment actuated as expected for this condition.
(The Unit 2 Boron Injection Tank was isolated under clearance for LTOP. The Unit 2 East Centrifugal Charging Pump, Unit 2 West Residual Heat Removal Pump, and Unit 2 West Component Cooling Water Pump were already running. The Unit 2 AB Emergency Diesel Generator was under a clearance for maintenance. The Unit 2 North Safety Injection Pump was under an administrative clearance for LTOP. The Unit 1 East Essential Service Water Pump was already running.)
"After diagnosing the event, operators manually blocked the Steam Line Isolation and manually reset Safety Injection signals for both trains. Components were returned to normal status for plant conditions."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42532
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: ROBERTSON, INC
Region: 4
City: JONESBORO State: AR
County:
License #: AR-987BP0512
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JARED THOMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: ROBERTSON, INC
Region: 4
City: JONESBORO State: AR
County:
License #: AR-987BP0512
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JARED THOMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/27/2006
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2006
Notification Time: 10:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/25/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
ILTAB (EMAIL) (NSIR)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
ILTAB (EMAIL) (NSIR)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TROXLER GAUGE
The licensee provided the following information via email:
"Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, announced today that one radioactive gauge is missing from a job site in Jonesboro, Arkansas. The gauge may pose a health risk to persons if handled or carried for an extended period of time. The missing gauge is in a yellow plastic transport case and weighs approximately 90 pounds.
"The gauge is described as a Troxler Electronic Laboratory Model 3440 (Serial #36212) soil moisture/density gauge containing 9 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 44 millicuries of Americium-241/ Beryllium.
"State police, local government officials and law enforcement agencies, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management have also been notified."
The gauge appears to have been missing for at least a week.
* * * UPDATE AT 1638 ON 5/4/06 FROM JARED THOMPSON VIA EMAIL * * *
The following information was provided via email:
"The Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) conducted an investigation in the Jonesboro, Arkansas area for the missing Troxler gauge (Serial Number 36212) on April 27, 2006. DHHS staff talked with licensee staff and the former Radiation Safety Officer. Based on these discussions, it appears that the gauge may have been inadvertently stolen when the portable storage building was stolen in mid-April. The gauge was last known to be inside a homemade, galvanized metal building.
"On May 5, 2006, the licensee offered a reward for the return of the gauge. DHHS has been in contact with the scrap metal broker in the Jonesboro area in the event the building is scrapped."
Notified R4DO (Bywater), NMSS (Reamer) and ILTAB (email).
* * * UPDATE FROM JARED THOMPSON VIA EMAIL AT 1046 EDT ON 7/25/06 * * *
The State provided the following information via email:
"The Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) received notification on July 17, 2006 that the missing Troxler gauge (Model 3440; Serial Number 36212) was anonymously returned to the licensee's jobsite in Jonesboro, Arkansas on July 14, 2006. The transportation case and source rod were locked and secured. The gauge appeared to be in normal working condition and a leak test was performed by the RSO. The gauge is being shipped to Troxler for routine calibration and maintenance. DHHS considered this event to be closed."
Notified R4DO (Farnholtz), NMSS (Morell) and ILTAB (email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The licensee provided the following information via email:
"Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, announced today that one radioactive gauge is missing from a job site in Jonesboro, Arkansas. The gauge may pose a health risk to persons if handled or carried for an extended period of time. The missing gauge is in a yellow plastic transport case and weighs approximately 90 pounds.
"The gauge is described as a Troxler Electronic Laboratory Model 3440 (Serial #36212) soil moisture/density gauge containing 9 millicuries of Cesium-137 and 44 millicuries of Americium-241/ Beryllium.
"State police, local government officials and law enforcement agencies, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Arkansas Department of Emergency Management have also been notified."
The gauge appears to have been missing for at least a week.
* * * UPDATE AT 1638 ON 5/4/06 FROM JARED THOMPSON VIA EMAIL * * *
The following information was provided via email:
"The Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) conducted an investigation in the Jonesboro, Arkansas area for the missing Troxler gauge (Serial Number 36212) on April 27, 2006. DHHS staff talked with licensee staff and the former Radiation Safety Officer. Based on these discussions, it appears that the gauge may have been inadvertently stolen when the portable storage building was stolen in mid-April. The gauge was last known to be inside a homemade, galvanized metal building.
"On May 5, 2006, the licensee offered a reward for the return of the gauge. DHHS has been in contact with the scrap metal broker in the Jonesboro area in the event the building is scrapped."
Notified R4DO (Bywater), NMSS (Reamer) and ILTAB (email).
* * * UPDATE FROM JARED THOMPSON VIA EMAIL AT 1046 EDT ON 7/25/06 * * *
The State provided the following information via email:
"The Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) received notification on July 17, 2006 that the missing Troxler gauge (Model 3440; Serial Number 36212) was anonymously returned to the licensee's jobsite in Jonesboro, Arkansas on July 14, 2006. The transportation case and source rod were locked and secured. The gauge appeared to be in normal working condition and a leak test was performed by the RSO. The gauge is being shipped to Troxler for routine calibration and maintenance. DHHS considered this event to be closed."
Notified R4DO (Farnholtz), NMSS (Morell) and ILTAB (email).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42533
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOEL STODOLA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOEL STODOLA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/28/2006
Notification Time: 03:20 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2006
Event Time: 22:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/21/2006
Notification Time: 03:20 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2006
Event Time: 22:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/21/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Intermediate Shutdown | 0 | Intermediate Shutdown |
BOTH SAFETY INJECTION TRAINS DECLARED INOPERABLE
At 22:30 on 04/27/2006 the Kewaunee Power Station declared both trains of Safety Injection (SI) inoperable. SI Pumps A & B were declared out of service per Surveillance Procedure SP 87-125 (Shift Instrument Channel Checks-Operating) due to SI Accumulator B level change of greater than or equal to 3%. SI Accumulator B level indicator (LI-935) indicated 30%. Previous indication recorded for SI Accumulator B was 33%. Per SP-87-125 'If the SI pumps are not vented prior to a level decrease of greater than or equal to 3%, the SI pumps become INOPERABLE.' TS 3.0.c (Standard Shutdown Sequence) was entered. At 0130 on 4/28/2006, venting of both SI Pumps was completed. SI Pump A was returned to service and SI Pump B remains out of service due to SW Train B inoperability.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 6/21/06 AT 0922 EDT FROM JERRY RISTE TO GERRY WAIG * * *
"On 4/28/06, with Train B of SI already inoperable for other reasons, EN#42533 was made under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for both trains of Safety Injection (SI) being inoperable due to excessive level drop in an SI Accumulator which had the potential to gas-bind both trains.
"Subsequent evaluation has determined that, under the existing plant conditions, an SI train should only be declared inoperable if it is found that gas is actually present in the SI pump. Since venting after the event revealed no gas present, neither SI train was rendered inoperable by the Accumulator level drop, and thus both trains were never inoperable. Therefore, EN#42533 is being retracted."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (K. O'Brien)
At 22:30 on 04/27/2006 the Kewaunee Power Station declared both trains of Safety Injection (SI) inoperable. SI Pumps A & B were declared out of service per Surveillance Procedure SP 87-125 (Shift Instrument Channel Checks-Operating) due to SI Accumulator B level change of greater than or equal to 3%. SI Accumulator B level indicator (LI-935) indicated 30%. Previous indication recorded for SI Accumulator B was 33%. Per SP-87-125 'If the SI pumps are not vented prior to a level decrease of greater than or equal to 3%, the SI pumps become INOPERABLE.' TS 3.0.c (Standard Shutdown Sequence) was entered. At 0130 on 4/28/2006, venting of both SI Pumps was completed. SI Pump A was returned to service and SI Pump B remains out of service due to SW Train B inoperability.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 6/21/06 AT 0922 EDT FROM JERRY RISTE TO GERRY WAIG * * *
"On 4/28/06, with Train B of SI already inoperable for other reasons, EN#42533 was made under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for both trains of Safety Injection (SI) being inoperable due to excessive level drop in an SI Accumulator which had the potential to gas-bind both trains.
"Subsequent evaluation has determined that, under the existing plant conditions, an SI train should only be declared inoperable if it is found that gas is actually present in the SI pump. Since venting after the event revealed no gas present, neither SI train was rendered inoperable by the Accumulator level drop, and thus both trains were never inoperable. Therefore, EN#42533 is being retracted."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (K. O'Brien)
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42534
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOEL STODOLA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOEL STODOLA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 04/28/2006
Notification Time: 03:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2006
Event Time: 19:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2006
Notification Time: 03:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/27/2006
Event Time: 19:29 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Intermediate Shutdown | 0 | Intermediate Shutdown |
TWO TRAINS OF SHIELD BUILDING VENTILATION INOPERABLE
At 19:29 on 04/27/2006 the Kewaunee Power Station declared two trains of Shield Building Ventilation (SBV) inoperable. Train B SBV was declared inoperable on 4/25/2006 at 17:25 when SW Train B was declared out of service for a leak that developed on the branch header to Diesel Generator B and TS 3.3.e.2 was entered. On 4/27/2006 at 19:29 QA typing discrepancies in RR-119 were discovered. QA-2 components were used in a QA-1 system, which could potentially cause a failure of some safety related equipment powered from this relay rack. As a result, all safety related equipment powered from RR-119 were declared inoperable and the appropriate technical specifications entered. SBV Train A Damper Control is powered from RR-119 and was declared inoperable at 19:29 on 4/27/2006 resulting in two trains of SBV being inoperable and TS 3.6.c.1 entered. The QA-2 components that may have an adverse affect on QA-1 safety related components in RR-119 have been removed and both trains of SBV were declared operable at 00:29 on 4/28/2006.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM JERRY RISTE TO W. GOTT 1524 EDT ON 6/16/06 * * *
"This event was reported on April 27, 2006 (Event Number 42534) for two trains of shield building ventilation (SBV) being declared inoperable. Train B SBV was declared inoperable due to loss of the service water spray system for the SBV charcoal filters and Train A SBV was declared inoperable due to relay rack RR-119 Quality Assurance typing discrepancies (relay rack provides power for SBV Damper Control). Subsequent review of analysis determined that the SBV spray system is not required for post-LOCA operation to control the release of radioactive material. Therefore, Train B of SBV was not required to be declared inoperable when Train B service water was declared out of service. With only one Train of SBV being inoperable, this event is not reportable and is being retracted.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (P. Louden).
At 19:29 on 04/27/2006 the Kewaunee Power Station declared two trains of Shield Building Ventilation (SBV) inoperable. Train B SBV was declared inoperable on 4/25/2006 at 17:25 when SW Train B was declared out of service for a leak that developed on the branch header to Diesel Generator B and TS 3.3.e.2 was entered. On 4/27/2006 at 19:29 QA typing discrepancies in RR-119 were discovered. QA-2 components were used in a QA-1 system, which could potentially cause a failure of some safety related equipment powered from this relay rack. As a result, all safety related equipment powered from RR-119 were declared inoperable and the appropriate technical specifications entered. SBV Train A Damper Control is powered from RR-119 and was declared inoperable at 19:29 on 4/27/2006 resulting in two trains of SBV being inoperable and TS 3.6.c.1 entered. The QA-2 components that may have an adverse affect on QA-1 safety related components in RR-119 have been removed and both trains of SBV were declared operable at 00:29 on 4/28/2006.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM JERRY RISTE TO W. GOTT 1524 EDT ON 6/16/06 * * *
"This event was reported on April 27, 2006 (Event Number 42534) for two trains of shield building ventilation (SBV) being declared inoperable. Train B SBV was declared inoperable due to loss of the service water spray system for the SBV charcoal filters and Train A SBV was declared inoperable due to relay rack RR-119 Quality Assurance typing discrepancies (relay rack provides power for SBV Damper Control). Subsequent review of analysis determined that the SBV spray system is not required for post-LOCA operation to control the release of radioactive material. Therefore, Train B of SBV was not required to be declared inoperable when Train B service water was declared out of service. With only one Train of SBV being inoperable, this event is not reportable and is being retracted.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (P. Louden).