Event Notification Report for April 02, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/01/2006 - 04/02/2006
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42466
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DUANE ALVENS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DUANE ALVENS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/02/2006
Notification Time: 15:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2006
Event Time: 14:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2006
Notification Time: 15:21 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2006
Event Time: 14:04 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2006
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
FRANK GILLESPIE (NRR)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
JOHN FROST (DHS)
ERWIN CASTO (FEMA)
DALE POWERS (R4)
FRANK GILLESPIE (NRR)
PETER WILSON (IRD)
JOHN FROST (DHS)
ERWIN CASTO (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS
An Unusual Event was declared per EAL 7.1.4 at 1404 CDT due to strong winds exceeding 74 mph onsite for 5 minutes between 1355-1400 CDT (peak windspeed measured at 83 mph). The Unit remained at 100% power during the incident. Current plant conditions are stable with windspeed approximately 30 mph. Offsite power is stable with a surveillance of the #1 EDG in progress. After completion of walkdowns the licensee will assess exiting the Unusual Event. A preliminary damage report indicated loose guy wire(s) on the met tower.
The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector who is onsite.
* * * UPDATE AT 1621 EDT ON 04/02/06 FROM GENE MACE TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1500 CDT based on current sustained windspeeds less than 74 mph and passage of the storm front. The licensee is continuing their damage assessment walkdowns.
The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Powers), EO (Gillespie), IRD (Wilson), DHS (Mitchell), and FEMA (Mick Roland).
An Unusual Event was declared per EAL 7.1.4 at 1404 CDT due to strong winds exceeding 74 mph onsite for 5 minutes between 1355-1400 CDT (peak windspeed measured at 83 mph). The Unit remained at 100% power during the incident. Current plant conditions are stable with windspeed approximately 30 mph. Offsite power is stable with a surveillance of the #1 EDG in progress. After completion of walkdowns the licensee will assess exiting the Unusual Event. A preliminary damage report indicated loose guy wire(s) on the met tower.
The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector who is onsite.
* * * UPDATE AT 1621 EDT ON 04/02/06 FROM GENE MACE TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1500 CDT based on current sustained windspeeds less than 74 mph and passage of the storm front. The licensee is continuing their damage assessment walkdowns.
The licensee informed state/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Powers), EO (Gillespie), IRD (Wilson), DHS (Mitchell), and FEMA (Mick Roland).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42467
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL SCHWER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL SCHWER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 04/02/2006
Notification Time: 15:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2006
Event Time: 14:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2006
Notification Time: 15:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2006
Event Time: 14:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A MAIN GENERATOR TRIP
"At 1402 Beaver Valley Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip due to a Main Generator trip. Unit 2 was operating at 100% power at the time of the trip [control rods inserted fully]. All systems functioned as expected. Emergency busses [are] being supplied by offsite power. Auxiliary Feedwater started as expected. Both Emergency Diesel Generators started on momentary undervoltage and remained operating unloaded.
"The Control Room Crew entered Emergency Operating procedure E-0, 'Response to Reactor Trip and Safety Injection' and have transitioned as expected to ES-0.1 'Reactor Trip Response.' The plant is stable in Mode 3 with steam generator levels and Reactor Coolant System temperature restored to normal values with Auxiliary Feed System operation.
"The cause of the Generator / Reactor trip is being investigated.
"No radiological releases ongoing or caused by this event.
"Beaver Valley Unit 1 is in Mode 5 for a Steam Generator Replacement outage and was unaffected."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1402 Beaver Valley Unit 2 experienced a reactor trip due to a Main Generator trip. Unit 2 was operating at 100% power at the time of the trip [control rods inserted fully]. All systems functioned as expected. Emergency busses [are] being supplied by offsite power. Auxiliary Feedwater started as expected. Both Emergency Diesel Generators started on momentary undervoltage and remained operating unloaded.
"The Control Room Crew entered Emergency Operating procedure E-0, 'Response to Reactor Trip and Safety Injection' and have transitioned as expected to ES-0.1 'Reactor Trip Response.' The plant is stable in Mode 3 with steam generator levels and Reactor Coolant System temperature restored to normal values with Auxiliary Feed System operation.
"The cause of the Generator / Reactor trip is being investigated.
"No radiological releases ongoing or caused by this event.
"Beaver Valley Unit 1 is in Mode 5 for a Steam Generator Replacement outage and was unaffected."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42468
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: STEVE SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: STEVE SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/03/2006
Notification Time: 03:56 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2006
Event Time: 20:54 [MST]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2006
Notification Time: 03:56 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2006
Event Time: 20:54 [MST]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
EMERGENCY DIESEL TRIP DURING TESTING
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On April 2, 2006 at approximately 20:54 Mountain Standard Time, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 experienced a valid Loss of Power (LOP) actuation on the Train 'B' 4.16 kV safety bus. The event occurred due to personnel error during performance of surveillance test 73ST-9DG02 (Class 1 E Diesel Generator and Integrated Safeguards Test Train B). EDG 'B' had been started In Emergency Mode per the surveillance test by opening the normal supply breaker to the associated 4.16 kV bus and initiating simulated Safety Injection Actuation System (SIAS) and Containment Isolation Actuation System (CIAS) signals. A subsequent portion of the surveillance test was in progress which demonstrates that the EDG 'test mode' trips are bypassed with the EDG operating in Emergency Mode. The step being performed was intended to simulate an Overcurrent (test mode) trip by installing a jumper at the Overcurrent relay. However the jumper was inadvertently installed at the Differential Current relay, which generated an 'Emergency Mode' trip of EDG 'B'. This resulted in the deenergization of the 4.16 kV bus. The operations staff entered Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 40AO-9ZZ12 (Degraded Electrical) and reset EDG 'B'. Upon reset at approximately 21:26 MST, EDG 'B' automatically started in response to a valid Loss of Power (LOP) signal from the deenergized 4.16 kV bus. The EDG 'B' output breaker automatically closed to restore power to the Train 'B' 4.16 kV and equipment sequenced onto the 4.16 kV bus.
"Due to the loss of power on the Train 'B' 4.16 kV bus, the Train 'B' Control Room Essential Filtration System (CREFS) and Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS) were rendered inoperable and LCOs 3.7.11 Condition 'A' and 3.7.12 Condition 'A' were entered. Operability of Train 'B' CREFS and CREATCS was restored when the Train 'B' 4.16 kV bus was reenergized and these LCO Conditions were exited.
"Offsite power remained available to the Train 'A' 4.16 kV bus and EDG 'A' remained operable throughout the event. Shutdown Cooling was unaffected since it was being provided by the Train 'A' safety train, which was supplied by offsite power. The offsite electrical grid is stable.
"Palo Verde Unit 3 Is shutdown and in Mode 5 for its 12th refueling outage. No other ESF actuations occurred and none were required. There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the time of discovery that contributed to this condition. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the ESF actuation and this ENS notification."
The site performed a work stand down to discuss this event and prevent recurrence.
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On April 2, 2006 at approximately 20:54 Mountain Standard Time, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3 experienced a valid Loss of Power (LOP) actuation on the Train 'B' 4.16 kV safety bus. The event occurred due to personnel error during performance of surveillance test 73ST-9DG02 (Class 1 E Diesel Generator and Integrated Safeguards Test Train B). EDG 'B' had been started In Emergency Mode per the surveillance test by opening the normal supply breaker to the associated 4.16 kV bus and initiating simulated Safety Injection Actuation System (SIAS) and Containment Isolation Actuation System (CIAS) signals. A subsequent portion of the surveillance test was in progress which demonstrates that the EDG 'test mode' trips are bypassed with the EDG operating in Emergency Mode. The step being performed was intended to simulate an Overcurrent (test mode) trip by installing a jumper at the Overcurrent relay. However the jumper was inadvertently installed at the Differential Current relay, which generated an 'Emergency Mode' trip of EDG 'B'. This resulted in the deenergization of the 4.16 kV bus. The operations staff entered Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 40AO-9ZZ12 (Degraded Electrical) and reset EDG 'B'. Upon reset at approximately 21:26 MST, EDG 'B' automatically started in response to a valid Loss of Power (LOP) signal from the deenergized 4.16 kV bus. The EDG 'B' output breaker automatically closed to restore power to the Train 'B' 4.16 kV and equipment sequenced onto the 4.16 kV bus.
"Due to the loss of power on the Train 'B' 4.16 kV bus, the Train 'B' Control Room Essential Filtration System (CREFS) and Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS) were rendered inoperable and LCOs 3.7.11 Condition 'A' and 3.7.12 Condition 'A' were entered. Operability of Train 'B' CREFS and CREATCS was restored when the Train 'B' 4.16 kV bus was reenergized and these LCO Conditions were exited.
"Offsite power remained available to the Train 'A' 4.16 kV bus and EDG 'A' remained operable throughout the event. Shutdown Cooling was unaffected since it was being provided by the Train 'A' safety train, which was supplied by offsite power. The offsite electrical grid is stable.
"Palo Verde Unit 3 Is shutdown and in Mode 5 for its 12th refueling outage. No other ESF actuations occurred and none were required. There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the time of discovery that contributed to this condition. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the ESF actuation and this ENS notification."
The site performed a work stand down to discuss this event and prevent recurrence.