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Event Notification Report for March 30, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/29/2006 - 03/30/2006

EVENT NUMBERS
42931424544245542461

Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 42931
Rep Org: U.S. AIR FORCE
Licensee: U.S AIR FORCE
Region: 4
City: HILL AFB   State: UT
County:
License #: 42-23539-01AF
Agreement: Y
Docket: 03028641
NRC Notified By: LTCOL MARK WRODEL
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/24/2006
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2006
Event Time: 12:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 10/24/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
ILTAB E-MAIL
Event Text
LOSS OF TWO AMERICIUM - 241 SOURCES DUE TO AIRCRAFT MISHAP

A representative from the Air Force Master Material Licensee reported that a U.S Air Force F-16 aircraft with a LANTIRN (Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting IR for Night) , targeting and ranging device attached to the aircraft, crashed in Utah's Great Salt Lake test range area near Hill AFB. The LANTIRN pod contained two 4 microCurie Am-241sources (a total of 8 micro Curie). The USAF is evaluating whether or not a recovery effort will take place.

The licensee discussed this issue with Rachel Browder NRC Region 4.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42454
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4     State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN DAMPF
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 03/30/2006
Notification Time: 21:40 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2006
Event Time: 16:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
INADEQUATE OPERATOR RESPONSE TIME FOR COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM REALIGNMENT DURING A LARGE BREAK LOCA

"At 1650 on March 30, 2006, a concern was identified where the operators in the training simulator could not complete realignment of the component cooling water (CCW) flow to the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger in a timely manner under certain accident scenarios. This could result in exceeding the maximum design temperature of the CCW system. In addition, assumptions made in the containment pressure and temperature analysis following a large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) are non-conservative with respect to when CCW flow to the RHR heat exchangers is manually established in accordance with emergency operating procedures.

"Callaway plant FSAR indicates CCW system flow is manually aligned to the RHR heat exchangers prior to the recirculation phase of emergency core cooling system (ECCS). If the automatic transfer of the RHR pumps to cold leg recirculation, which happens at the Lo-Lo-1 level of the refueling water storage tank (RWST), occurs before CCW flow has been manually aligned to the RHR heat exchanger, containment sump water at temperatures up to 270F can be circulated through the RHR heat exchanger without CCW flow on the other side of the heat exchanger. The CCW side of the heat exchanger would contain stagnant water. This water can heat up quickly with no established flow and exceed the design rated temperature of the system.

"Recent simulator scenarios of large break LOCAs have shown that the CCW alignment is not reached before the Lo-Lo-1 RWST alarm level is reached. The CCW alignment is completed as part of procedure ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. A review of two large break LOCA scenarios completed on 3-20-06 show that it takes between 1:00 and 1:30 minutes to initiate the step to align CCW to the RHR heat exchangers and takes between 3:00 and 4:30 minutes to complete the alignment.


"In addition to CCW system temperature concerns, an assumption that CCW flow is established to the RHR heat exchanger prior to reaching the Lo-Lo-1 level in the RWST is made in the containment temperature and pressure response analyses. As a result, a failure to establish CCW flow to the RHR switchover would result in an adverse impact on the inputs used in the Licensing Bases Containment Analysis. However, preliminary sensitivity runs using containment analyses codes indicate that post-peak temperature and pressure are not significantly affected by this issue.

"Actions taken:

"1650 Declared both trains of CCW inoperable. Declared both trains of ECCS inoperable and entered Technical Specification 3.0.3

"1710 Both trains of CCW aligned with flow through the RHR heat exchangers

"1711 Exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 "

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY GREG BRADLEY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1747 EDT ON 05/22/06 * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous notification made on 3/30/06 (EN# 42454). That report was made per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation. An engineering evaluation has determined the RHR and CCW systems would have fulfilled their safety functions had they been necessary to respond to an event. Since the safety functions would have been performed there are no applicable reporting criteria under 50.72 or 50.73 and Event Notification 42454 is retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified."

Notified R4DO (Shaffer).


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42455
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WALT COOMBS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/31/2006
Notification Time: 02:26 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2006
Event Time: 21:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE ABOVE ALLOWABLE LIMITS

"At 21:00 hours on 3/30/06, Unit Two feed water header check valves 2-0220-58A and 2-0220-62A LLRT [local leak rate test] results were both indeterminate, as a result both were greater than the allowable La containment leakage rate allowed by Tech Spec 5.5.12." La is defined as the maximum allowable leak rate at a specified pressure.

"This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)."

The "indeterminate" leak rate was higher than the test equipment could read.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1635 EDT ON 5/8/06 FROM JIM STORTZ TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"ENS Retraction - Feed Water Header Check Valve Leakage > La Containment Leakage

"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS report made on 3/31/2006 at 0226 EDT (Event # 42455). The initial report was made when it appeared the Unit 2 feed water header check valves 2-0220-58A and 2-0220-62A LLRT (local leak rate test) results were both indeterminate. As a result, both valves appeared to have had a leakage rate greater than the allowable La containment leakage rate allowed by Tech Spec 5.5.12, where La is defined as the maximum allowable primary containment leak rate at accident pressure. Quad Cities assigned all leakage experienced during this test to the primary containment isolation valves being tested and reported the situation as a condition that seriously degraded the nuclear power plant per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

"Subsequently, Quad Cities Station performed testing on 4/2/06 utilizing a higher fill rate test methodology. The subsequent test was completed with satisfactory results.

"Based on this subsequent testing, ENS report (# 42455) is being retracted."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Pelke).


General Information or Other
Event Number: 42461
Rep Org: WHITING CORPORATION
Licensee: WHITING CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: MONEE   State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK KWASNY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 03/31/2006
Notification Time: 17:56 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
DALE POWERS (R4)
FRANK GILLESPIE (NRR)
Event Text
PART 21 - CRANE OVERSTRESS CONDITIONS

The following is a summary of information provided by the manufacturer via email:

On March 30, 2006, as part of a crane design analyses and study, Whiting Corporation identified two overstress conditions. One is on the Girder End connection of a low head room bridge and one on a single fastener in a main hoist gear case application. It is recommended that the affected cranes at the facilities listed below be restricted to 50% capacity for the over stressed end connection and 50% or 85 % capacity for the suspected over-stressed bolt until such time as the fastener or end connection can be inspected and evaluated or replaced. The following list identifies the facilities where the bridges and trolleys are suspected to be affected by the Whiting Corporation.

Oyster Creek, Three Mile Island, Seabrook

Oconee, McGuire, Shearon Harris, St. Lucie, Catawba

D. C. Cook

Cooper, Waterford, Grand Gulf, San Onofre, Palo Verde, Columbia Generating Station

Whiting Corporation is attempting to contact the customers directly to notify them of this circumstance.


* * * PART 21 UPDATE - CRANE OVERSTRESS CONDITIONS VIA E-MAIL ON 04/03/06 AT 1800 EDT ENTERED BY MACKINNON* * *

The following is a summary update of information provided by the manufacturer via e-mail

Indian Point added.

R1DO (Finney), R2DO (Tom Decker), R3DO (Anne Marie Stone), R4DO (Linda Smith), NRR Part 21 (Omid Tabatabai) & NRR Part 21 (Jack Foster) notified via e-mail.