Event Notification Report for March 22, 2006

ON-SITE FATALITY

"On March 22, 2006 at approximately 0341 hours the site medical response team responded to a notification that a Duke employee had collapsed due to personal illness in the Unit 2 Reactor Lower Containment. Unit 2 is currently shutdown in Mode 6 in a refueling outage. The site medical response team called for an ambulance to transport the individual offsite. After the ambulance arrived on site, the ambulance attendants were notified by radiation protection personnel that the individual was considered potentially contaminated because he could not be surveyed. The ambulance left the site at approximately 0459. Radiation Protection personnel accompanied the individual to the medical facility. Upon arrival at the medical facility, a complete survey of the individual was made and no radioactive contamination was found either on the individual or on his clothing. The individual did not survive the personal illness. This situation is determined to be reportable per 10 CPR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi) because this event will be reported to an offsite government agency, OSHA. At this time no press release is planned."

The individual was sitting down in containment because he was not feeling well. His co-worker started up a ladder, turned, and noticed the individual was slumped over. He was pronounced dead in the ambulance when it arrived at the hospital. Containment temperature at this time was in the upper 60s.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIATION EXPOSURE

The State provided the following information via email:

"The Manager Health Physics, Cardinal Health called to report an incident which occurred today out of their Colton, CA pharmacy. A generator was being shipped via contract carrier from Colton to their Palm Springs pharmacy. The wrong shielding was used. Instead of a [Transportation Index] TI 1 which it was shipped as it was actually a TI 20. Upon arriving at the Palm Springs pharmacy it had a surface reading of 1,000 mr/hr. Estimate 4 hours with the driver. [The Manager Health Physics] was not aware if the driver had a personnel exposure device or what type of vehicle was utilized or the distance the generator was from the driver."

CA Report Number: 032206

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

PRODUCT MASS DIFFERENT THAN ANALYZED

The following was discovered In Building [DELETED] "Accumulation of product in a process vessel was discovered whose mass was different than analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis for a health physics related consequence."

The licensee is continuing to evaluate the cause. The system involved is shut down and no other similar systems are operating. The licensee will continue to evaluate and determine the cause prior to restarting the process. This is not a criticality safety issue.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM J. WHEELER TO M. RIPLEY 1034 EDT 04/13/06 * * *

"On March 22, 2006, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) made a 24-hour report to the operations center based on 10CFR70, Appendix A, (b)(1). 10CFR70, Appendix A, (b)(1) requires a 24-hour report for a condition that resulted in the facility being in a state that was different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) and that resulted in failure to meet the performance requirements of Section 70.61. The report was made because it was discovered that product had accumulated in a process vessel whose mass was greater than that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis for a health physics related consequence.

"The health physics consequence evaluation assumed that the entire mass of product was respirable. Between March 24, 2006, and April 6, 2006, measurements of the actual product mass were taken, and it was determined that less than 1 percent of the mass was respirable. The actual respirable product mass was 3 percent of the amount that would result in a high health physics consequence assuming a release of material. Substitution of the actual respirable product mass into the health physics consequence evaluation resulted in a low consequence and thus performance requirements were met. Based on this information, it is requested that this event report be retracted.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2 DO (R. Haag) and NMSS EO (G. Morell)

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.

POTENTIAL LOSS OF COMMUNICATION SIRENS

"On March 22, 2006, an unscheduled poll of the North Anna sirens was initiated. During the period from 1251 to 1303 hours, actuation signals were not received at the transmitter and no outgoing signal was transmitted to the sirens. This event is a loss of the Emergency Notification System and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii).

"At 1303 hours, telecommunications notified [the plant staff] that the siren system was operational. The cause of the failure is being investigated."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

TURBINE TRIP / REACTOR TRIP CAUSED BY MAIN GENERATOR TRIP

"This notification fulfills the 4-hr. non-emergency reporting requirement for Reactor Protection System actuation and the 8-hr. non-emergency reporting requirement for an ESF actuation (specifically Auxiliary Feedwater System start).

"At 1624 EST, Unit 2 reactor tripped from full power due to main generator trip caused by actuation of the main generator neutral overvoltage relay (the 100% stator ground fault relay also actuated). Safety Injection did not actuate and was not required to actuate.

"All automatic actions occurred as designed (e.g., steam dump operation, feedwater system, etc.).

"The operating crew responded to the trip using emergency procedures. The unit is being maintained in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) using General Operating Instructions.

"No primary steam or steam generator safety valves opened due to this trip.

"An investigation has been initiated to determine the cause of this unit trip. A recovery plan will be developed."

All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. Decay heat is being removed by auxiliary feedwater feeding the steam generators and steaming through the steam dump valves to the main condenser. Offsite power is stable and all emergency busses are being powered via offsite power. All Emergency Diesel Generators are available if required.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.