Event Notification Report for March 07, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/06/2006 - 03/07/2006
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 42392
Rep Org: US ENGINEERING LABS
Licensee: US ENGINEERING LABS
Region: 1
City: RAHWAY State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-30107-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARTIN MYGRANT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: US ENGINEERING LABS
Region: 1
City: RAHWAY State: NJ
County:
License #: 29-30107-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARTIN MYGRANT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 03/07/2006
Notification Time: 07:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2006
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2006
Notification Time: 07:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2006
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/07/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
ILTAB (e-mailed)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
ILTAB (e-mailed)
MISSING TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE FOUND
In the last week or two during an inventory check at a temporary job site storage building, at the University of Pennsylvania, it was discovered that a Troxler Moisture Density gauge, Model 3411B, serial number 9524, was missing. US Engineering Labs RSO was notified by NRC Region 1 that their gauge had been recovered by a Philadelphia Fire Department located in Northeast Philadelphia. The gauge is stored at a Hazmat storage facility. The RSO said he is going to meet with an NRC Region 1 Inspector and pick up the gauge. The gauge is fully padlocked and still in its case. It does not appear that the case containing the Troxler Moisture gauge had been opened.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
In the last week or two during an inventory check at a temporary job site storage building, at the University of Pennsylvania, it was discovered that a Troxler Moisture Density gauge, Model 3411B, serial number 9524, was missing. US Engineering Labs RSO was notified by NRC Region 1 that their gauge had been recovered by a Philadelphia Fire Department located in Northeast Philadelphia. The gauge is stored at a Hazmat storage facility. The RSO said he is going to meet with an NRC Region 1 Inspector and pick up the gauge. The gauge is fully padlocked and still in its case. It does not appear that the case containing the Troxler Moisture gauge had been opened.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 42393
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MAURER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: ROBERT MAURER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/07/2006
Notification Time: 19:41 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2006
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Notification Time: 19:41 [ET]
Event Date: 03/07/2006
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
FUELS GROUP Email
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
FUELS GROUP Email
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THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
UNANALYZED CONDITION OF CRITICALITY CONTROLS
"Approximately 37 liters of High Enriched Uranyl Nitrate (HEUN) solution was inadvertently transferred to a filter enclosure not currently approved for operation. The filter enclosure was equipped with two independent safety-related drains that diverted the solution to the building floor and maintained a safe slab configuration within the enclosure and on the building floor. Upon discovery of this condition, operations in the affected area were terminated and corrective actions were initiated. This condition lead to the determination that the existing safety analysis control flow down was not completed for the operation of this enclosure.
"The equipment, which was not approved for use, was connected to a solution transfer line in service. This allowed unattended transfer of solution to a process enclosure. This condition lead to the determination that the existing safety analysis control flow down was not completed for the operation of this enclosure. The safety-related enclosure drains have been inspected by safety personnel and verified to remain free of obstructions to ensure functionality.
"Operations in Solvent Extraction Area and all solution transfers to Solvent Extraction were suspended. The unapproved enclosure is being physically disconnected from the Solvent Extraction process prior to releasing the affected Solvent Extraction Area for use. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the workers, the public, or the environment due to the incomplete control flow down of the safety analysis.
"The safety significance of the event is very low, because the system worked as required and maintained a safe slab configuration.
"Operations in Solvent Extraction Area and all solution transfers to Solvent Extraction were suspended on March 6, 2006. Starting on March 7, 2006, reviews are being conducted on other out of service equipment to ensure similar conditions don't exist. The unapproved enclosure will be physically disconnected from the Solvent Extraction process prior to releasing the affected Solvent Extraction Area for use."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
UNANALYZED CONDITION OF CRITICALITY CONTROLS
"Approximately 37 liters of High Enriched Uranyl Nitrate (HEUN) solution was inadvertently transferred to a filter enclosure not currently approved for operation. The filter enclosure was equipped with two independent safety-related drains that diverted the solution to the building floor and maintained a safe slab configuration within the enclosure and on the building floor. Upon discovery of this condition, operations in the affected area were terminated and corrective actions were initiated. This condition lead to the determination that the existing safety analysis control flow down was not completed for the operation of this enclosure.
"The equipment, which was not approved for use, was connected to a solution transfer line in service. This allowed unattended transfer of solution to a process enclosure. This condition lead to the determination that the existing safety analysis control flow down was not completed for the operation of this enclosure. The safety-related enclosure drains have been inspected by safety personnel and verified to remain free of obstructions to ensure functionality.
"Operations in Solvent Extraction Area and all solution transfers to Solvent Extraction were suspended. The unapproved enclosure is being physically disconnected from the Solvent Extraction process prior to releasing the affected Solvent Extraction Area for use. There were no actual or potential safety consequences to the workers, the public, or the environment due to the incomplete control flow down of the safety analysis.
"The safety significance of the event is very low, because the system worked as required and maintained a safe slab configuration.
"Operations in Solvent Extraction Area and all solution transfers to Solvent Extraction were suspended on March 6, 2006. Starting on March 7, 2006, reviews are being conducted on other out of service equipment to ensure similar conditions don't exist. The unapproved enclosure will be physically disconnected from the Solvent Extraction process prior to releasing the affected Solvent Extraction Area for use."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.