Event Notification Report for March 05, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/04/2006 - 03/05/2006
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42387
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: TIM GAFFNEY
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: TIM GAFFNEY
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 03/05/2006
Notification Time: 11:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2006
Event Time: 07:10 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2006
Notification Time: 11:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2006
Event Time: 07:10 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/05/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING RATIO.
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.
"On March 5, 2006 at approximately 0710 MST Palo Verde Unit 3 experienced a reactor trip (RPS actuation) from 100% rated thermal power due to low departure from nucleate boiling [ratio] (DNBR) trips on all four channels of the core protection calculators (CPCs). The unit was at normal temperature and pressure prior to the trip.
"Prior to the reactor trip, at approximately 0704 MST, a CEAC [Control Element Assembly Calculator] #1 sensor fail alarm was received. While investigating the alarm, at 0710 MST, a control element assembly (CEA) deviation alarm for CEAC #1, all four CPC channel sensor fail alarms, and a CEA withdrawal prohibit alarm were received. The reactor tripped six seconds later. A CEA calculator (CEAC) fail alarm was received on CEAC #1. The apparent cause is presently suspected to be a failure of CEAC #1. An investigation has commenced to determine the root cause of the reactor trip.
"All of the control rods fully inserted into the core. Four of eight steam bypass control valves quick opened, per design, directing steam flow to the condenser. No main steam or primary relief valves lifted and none were required. There was no loss of heat removal capability or loss of safety functions associated with the event. Electrical buses transferred to offsite power as designed. The Shift Manager determined this event was an uncomplicated reactor trip. No significant LCOs have been entered as a result of this event. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event nor contributed to the event.
"Unit 3 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3. No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. The event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or resulted in any releases of radioactive materials. There were no adverse safety consequences or implications as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.
"On March 5, 2006 at approximately 0710 MST Palo Verde Unit 3 experienced a reactor trip (RPS actuation) from 100% rated thermal power due to low departure from nucleate boiling [ratio] (DNBR) trips on all four channels of the core protection calculators (CPCs). The unit was at normal temperature and pressure prior to the trip.
"Prior to the reactor trip, at approximately 0704 MST, a CEAC [Control Element Assembly Calculator] #1 sensor fail alarm was received. While investigating the alarm, at 0710 MST, a control element assembly (CEA) deviation alarm for CEAC #1, all four CPC channel sensor fail alarms, and a CEA withdrawal prohibit alarm were received. The reactor tripped six seconds later. A CEA calculator (CEAC) fail alarm was received on CEAC #1. The apparent cause is presently suspected to be a failure of CEAC #1. An investigation has commenced to determine the root cause of the reactor trip.
"All of the control rods fully inserted into the core. Four of eight steam bypass control valves quick opened, per design, directing steam flow to the condenser. No main steam or primary relief valves lifted and none were required. There was no loss of heat removal capability or loss of safety functions associated with the event. Electrical buses transferred to offsite power as designed. The Shift Manager determined this event was an uncomplicated reactor trip. No significant LCOs have been entered as a result of this event. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event nor contributed to the event.
"Unit 3 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3. No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. The event did not result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or resulted in any releases of radioactive materials. There were no adverse safety consequences or implications as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42418
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 4
City: MONROE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5119-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE HENRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 4
City: MONROE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5119-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE HENRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 03/14/2006
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2006
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/05/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
ROBERT PIERSON (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PATIENT RECEIVED IMPROPER MEDICAL DOSE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"On March 5, 2006, a technician at St. Francis North Hospital contacted the Cardinal Health pharmacy to inform them that a scan on a patient had shown lung imaging instead of the expected cardiac imaging after administering a dose labeled Myoview. An investigation revealed that the customer's Tc-99m Myoview dose for cardiac imaging had mistakenly been dispensed as a Tc-99m MAA dose which is for lung imaging.
"The cause of this event was a failure by the dispensing pharmacist to follow proper Cardinal Health compounding procedures. The pharmacist pulled the wrong kit from the refrigerator. The pharmacist performed a QC test on the dose, but failed to label the starting point on the QC chromatography strip, which led to a misinterpretation of the failing test as a passing test.
"In order to prevent a recurrence of this event, the pharmacy is going to begin requiring all employees performing QC tests to label the starting point of all QC strips. Also, the pharmacy is planning to switch brands of MAA since the Drax MAA vial and the Myoview vials are identical in appearance."
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"On March 5, 2006, a technician at St. Francis North Hospital contacted the Cardinal Health pharmacy to inform them that a scan on a patient had shown lung imaging instead of the expected cardiac imaging after administering a dose labeled Myoview. An investigation revealed that the customer's Tc-99m Myoview dose for cardiac imaging had mistakenly been dispensed as a Tc-99m MAA dose which is for lung imaging.
"The cause of this event was a failure by the dispensing pharmacist to follow proper Cardinal Health compounding procedures. The pharmacist pulled the wrong kit from the refrigerator. The pharmacist performed a QC test on the dose, but failed to label the starting point on the QC chromatography strip, which led to a misinterpretation of the failing test as a passing test.
"In order to prevent a recurrence of this event, the pharmacy is going to begin requiring all employees performing QC tests to label the starting point of all QC strips. Also, the pharmacy is planning to switch brands of MAA since the Drax MAA vial and the Myoview vials are identical in appearance."