Event Notification Report for March 04, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/03/2006 - 03/04/2006
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42385
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICH KLINEFELTER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICH KLINEFELTER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 03/04/2006
Notification Time: 05:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2006
Event Time: 05:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2006
Notification Time: 05:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2006
Event Time: 05:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/04/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Startup | 0 | Startup |
CONTROL RODS DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING SHUTDOWN
"On 03/03/06, Susquehanna Unit 1 operators began the process of shutting down the unit for the 14th Refueling and Inspection Outage. It was expected that during this evolution, 'slow to settle' control rods would be encountered, and rather than delay the continuance of the shutdown to perform operability testing, it was determined that these control rods would conservatively be declared inoperable. Based on previous testing data and trending analysis of operability testing performed during the cycle, PPL believes that the subject control rods would have passed operability tests.
"Accordingly, at 0517 EDT, Technical Specification 3.1.3.f was entered which requires the unit to be taken to Mode 3 in 12 hours when nine or more control rods are inoperable. The inoperable control rods are fully inserted and disarmed, shutdown margin requirements are met, and the control rod system was always fully capable of performing its safety function.
"At the time when the ninth control rod was declared inoperable, Unit One was operating at 0% Power. Unit Two is continuing operation at 100% power.
"PPL is reporting this event as a Technical Specification Required Shutdown per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee."
"On 03/03/06, Susquehanna Unit 1 operators began the process of shutting down the unit for the 14th Refueling and Inspection Outage. It was expected that during this evolution, 'slow to settle' control rods would be encountered, and rather than delay the continuance of the shutdown to perform operability testing, it was determined that these control rods would conservatively be declared inoperable. Based on previous testing data and trending analysis of operability testing performed during the cycle, PPL believes that the subject control rods would have passed operability tests.
"Accordingly, at 0517 EDT, Technical Specification 3.1.3.f was entered which requires the unit to be taken to Mode 3 in 12 hours when nine or more control rods are inoperable. The inoperable control rods are fully inserted and disarmed, shutdown margin requirements are met, and the control rod system was always fully capable of performing its safety function.
"At the time when the ninth control rod was declared inoperable, Unit One was operating at 0% Power. Unit Two is continuing operation at 100% power.
"PPL is reporting this event as a Technical Specification Required Shutdown per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42526
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: COLEY CHAPPELL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: COLEY CHAPPELL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/25/2006
Notification Time: 16:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2006
Event Time: 05:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2006
Notification Time: 16:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/04/2006
Event Time: 05:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/25/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INVALID EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR START
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On March 4, 2006, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 'Refuel,' Instrument Maintenance (IM) technicians were installing a Barton level indicator for reactor vessel level indicator 1B21-R452A as part of a system modification. At 0512 hours, momentary 'Reactor Vessel Water Low Level 2' alarms were received in the Main Control Room, and the Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Emergency Diesel Generator (1B EDG) auto-started. A Reactor Vessel Water Level Low 2 condition sends a start signal to HPCS and the 1B EDG; however, because the HPCS pump control switch was in pull-to-lock, the pump did not start and did not inject water into the reactor vessel.
"The initiating signal was reset, and at 0524 hours the 1B EDG was shutdown with the Maintenance Switch placed in 'Maintenance.'
"Investigation determined that the 1B EDG had auto-started approximately 15 minutes after the IM technicians had completed work and placed the 1B21-R452A indicator back in service. The computer point alarm typer data was reviewed, and it was observed that only a single set of alarm points were received. Typically, when an alarm is caused by improperly valving in an instrument, multiple alarm points are received due to 'ringing.' Based on the 15 minute time delay and the lack of ringing, the apparent cause was determined to be an air bubble that was introduced during the modification and then migrated to the level transmitter, resulting in an invalid low level signal and an auto-start of the 1B EDG. Corrective actions included reviewing the remaining Barton installation modification work packages for unusual piping configurations that could contribute to air entrapment, and-for adequate system isolation requirements; i.e., bypassing trip units or removing components from service in order to prevent inadvertent actuations.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid actuation of an EDG."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On March 4, 2006, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 'Refuel,' Instrument Maintenance (IM) technicians were installing a Barton level indicator for reactor vessel level indicator 1B21-R452A as part of a system modification. At 0512 hours, momentary 'Reactor Vessel Water Low Level 2' alarms were received in the Main Control Room, and the Unit 1 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) Emergency Diesel Generator (1B EDG) auto-started. A Reactor Vessel Water Level Low 2 condition sends a start signal to HPCS and the 1B EDG; however, because the HPCS pump control switch was in pull-to-lock, the pump did not start and did not inject water into the reactor vessel.
"The initiating signal was reset, and at 0524 hours the 1B EDG was shutdown with the Maintenance Switch placed in 'Maintenance.'
"Investigation determined that the 1B EDG had auto-started approximately 15 minutes after the IM technicians had completed work and placed the 1B21-R452A indicator back in service. The computer point alarm typer data was reviewed, and it was observed that only a single set of alarm points were received. Typically, when an alarm is caused by improperly valving in an instrument, multiple alarm points are received due to 'ringing.' Based on the 15 minute time delay and the lack of ringing, the apparent cause was determined to be an air bubble that was introduced during the modification and then migrated to the level transmitter, resulting in an invalid low level signal and an auto-start of the 1B EDG. Corrective actions included reviewing the remaining Barton installation modification work packages for unusual piping configurations that could contribute to air entrapment, and-for adequate system isolation requirements; i.e., bypassing trip units or removing components from service in order to prevent inadvertent actuations.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid actuation of an EDG."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.