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Event Notification Report for March 03, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/02/2006 - 03/03/2006

EVENT NUMBERS
42386423844240142440

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42386
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CHRIS SKINNER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/04/2006
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2006
Event Time: 18:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 91 Power Operation 91 Power Operation
Event Text
REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION FLOWPATH INOPERABLE

"This notification is being made in accordance with License Condition 2.F for Nine Mile Point Unit 2 which states in part 'report any violations of the requirements contained in Section 2.C of this license in the following manner: initial notification shall be made within 24 hours to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System, with written follow-up within 30 days in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 50.73(b), ( c), and (e).' License Condition 2.C (2) states in part 'Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.' This notification describes a licensee identified condition where both redundant Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) trains were apparently inoperable in violation of Technical Specifications. The condition has been corrected.

"At 1800 on 3 March 2006, while operating at 91 % power (coast down to refueling), Nine Mile Point Unit 2 identified a condition in which both trains of SGT were apparently rendered inoperable for intermittent time periods of a few hours in length, starting from 17 February 2006 through about 1900 on 28 February 2006. This was not recognized at the time; as such the requirement to initiate a plant shutdown per LCO 3.0.3 was not performed. The condition was caused by use of a heavy-duty tarp and associated cargo net supporting it from underneath, installed across the Unit 2 Reactor Building Hoist Well. Installation of the tarp and net across the hoist well occurred between the above dates, for time periods of a few hours each, in order to support refueling preparations, thereby avoiding spread of contamination during rigging activities. The blockage of the Reactor Building Hoist Well would have obstructed or significantly degraded the design flow paths of both trains of SGT if called upon to perform their safety functions in a design basis accident. Therefore current information indicates this tarp installation configuration renders the SGT system inoperable.

"The tarp and net were permanently removed at about 1900 on 28 February 2006 when a supervisor questioned if tarp installation was allowed while the reactor was at power.

"Although removal of the tarp and net typically required only a few minutes effort by plant workers, its installation and continued blockage of the ventilation flow path would have resulted in declaration of the [SGT] safety systems to be inoperable if not removed. Workers were not sensitive to the safety function of the open ventilation flow path provided by the hoist well, and no programmatic training or administrative requirements were identified which prohibited the configuration at conditions other than cold shutdown.

"Nine Mile Point is in the process of taking compensatory measures to preclude installation of the tarp when SGT is required to be operable by briefing operations, radiation protection and refuel worker crews on ventilation requirements and sensitivity to safety functions. Operations took physical control (lock and key) of the tarp. Corrective actions to provide administrative controls on the tarp installation are in process. Detailed evaluation of the safety significance of the condition is ongoing.

"Initial review of plant records indicate that this configuration was also installed intermittently around July 2003. It was recognized as undesirable but was not identified as an operability or reportability issue at the time. Corrective action to prevent its recurrence was not effective. More detailed information on specific dates and durations when this configuration existed will be provided in the 30 day written LER report, after a detailed review.

"The instances noted above and any similar conditions identified will be explained in detail in the follow-up LER that will be submitted as required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) - 'Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications .'"

Unit-1 is not affected since they have a different method to control use of this tarp. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM T. RESTUCCIO TO HUFFMAN AT 2209 ON 3/28/06 * * *

"At 1800 on 3 March 2006, while operating at 91% power (coast down to refueling), Nine Mile Point Unit 2 identified a condition in which both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) system were apparently inoperable for intermittent time periods of a few hours of length, starting from 17 February 2006 through about 1900 on 28 February 2006. This was not recognized at the time; as such the requirement to initiate a plant shutdown per LCO 3.0.3 was not performed. The condition was caused by use of a heavy-duty tarp and associated cargo net supporting it from underneath, installed across the Unit 2 reactor Building Hoist Well. Installation of the tarp and net across the hoist well occurred between the above dates, for time periods of a few hours each, in order to support refueling preparations, thereby avoiding the spread of contamination during rigging activities. The blockage of the reactor Building Hoist Well would have obstructed or significantly degraded the design flow paths of both trains of SGT if called upon to perform their safety functions in a design basis accident. Review of plant records indicate that this condition was also installed intermittently around July 2003.

"A subsequent evaluation of the safety significance of this condition has been performed. This evaluation considered actual area of flow path remaining with the tarp in place, as well as bounding outside temperatures during the times the tarp may have been installed. The evaluation has concluded that the secondary containment function, and therefore the SGT system, remained operable and would have performed its intended safety function during a design basis accident during the time periods the tarp may have been installed during the last three years. This evaluation provides the basis for retraction of the ENS report of March 4, 2006."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO(Cook) has been notified.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 42384
Rep Org: RI DEPT OF RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH
Licensee: ANVIL INTERNATIONAL
Region: 1
City: NORTH KINGSTON   State: RI
County:
License #: 3D064-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JACK FERRUOLO
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 03/03/2006
Notification Time: 16:52 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2006
Event Time: 14:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/03/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
SCOTT FLANDERS (NMSS)
BETH HAYDEN (OPA)
SANDRA LAI (OSTP)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE

A radiography trainee was traversing from one cell to another with the trainer at a fixed radiography facility. Neither individual had a radiation meter. The trainee picked up a guide tube containing a 93 Curie Ir-192 source. The guide tube was held for approximately one minute and the individual was in the vicinity for approximately three minutes.

The licensee estimates the individual received a dose of 2-3 rems whole body and 1000 rems to the hand. Rhode Island Department of Health Radiation Control estimates the dose at 8 rems whole body and 18000 rems to the hand. The individual is being transferred to the Emergency Room.

The job has been shut down. The state Department of Radiation Control will visit the site on Monday.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 42401
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH - WAUWATOSA
Region: 3
City: WAUWATOSA   State: WI
County:
License #: 079-1311-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 03/09/2006
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2006
Event Time: 06:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
Event Text
WISCONSIN AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION EVENT

The State provided the following information via email:

"On Friday, March 3, 2006 at 6:45 am a vial containing 890 mCi of Tc-99m Cardiolite ruptured while in a heating block. Two employees entered the area immediately, visually confirming the rupture through a window in the heating box and with a survey meter. The employees unplugged the heating box and shut the door. They returned 15 minutes later after the heating box and vial had cooled. The heating box was cleaned and waste was placed in a lead shielded container for decay. No individuals were contaminated. Wipes were taken each day until 3/07/06 when contamination levels were reduced to 2-3 times background. This event will be followed up by DHFS on the next inspection.

"Media attention: None"

Wisconsin Event Report ID No. 35


General Information or Other
Event Number: 42440
Rep Org: NH DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
Licensee: MARY HITCHCOCK MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: LEBANON   State: NH
County:
License #: 130R
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TWILA KENNA
HQ OPS Officer: DORIS LEWIS
Notification Date: 03/22/2006
Notification Time: 16:19 [ET]
Event Date: 03/03/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT INVOLVING THE WRONG RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL

The following information was received via facsimile:

"NH Radiological Health Section 'Agency' was notified on March 7, 2006, by an e-mail from the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital of the wrong radiopharmaceutical injected into a patient. [The] delay was caused by conflicting information concerning whether the dose administered exceeded the reporting threshold. Four millicuries of Tl-201 Cl [Thallium Chloride] was administered [via] IV to a patient instead of the intended Tc-99 pertechnetate. Due to the error, the administration resulted in a whole body dose of 5.2 Rem. The patient and both the Authorized User and referring physician were notified of the error and the correct radiopharmaceutical was administered.

"The Licensee's RSO conducted an investigation and interviewed persons involved with the administration. A written explanation of the event was obtained. [The] cause of [the] incident was identified as inattention to labeling on part of [the] technician. Remedial instruction was given to the technician.

NH Report ID No: NH-06-001