Event Notification Report for February 22, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/21/2006 - 02/22/2006
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 42377
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: JAMES TORTORELLI
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 2 State: IL
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
NRC Notified By: JAMES TORTORELLI
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 02/28/2006
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2006
Event Time: 17:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2006
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2006
Event Time: 17:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
CHARLES MILLER (NMSS)
MICHAEL MARKLEY (NMSS)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
CHARLES MILLER (NMSS)
MICHAEL MARKLEY (NMSS)
PART 21 NOTIFICATION - DEFECT IN A PORT REDUCER
"Honeywell, Metropolis Facility (MTW) mechanics were installing a new BS&B manufactured rupture disc, corresponding safety head, and port reducer on the inlet of the relief valve on the Alternate Primary Cold Trap, E-600. The disc and head were part of an approved change. The safety heads (disc holders) have a port between the disc and relief valve to install a tell-tale indicator. This safety head was for a 1-1/2 in. disc. The normal port size of ½ in. pipe (normal O.D. = 0.84 in.) was reduced to ¼ in. pipe (normal O.D. = 0.54 in.) to allow clearance between the safety head fasteners and the companion flange studs. To facilitate the site requirements of ½ in. pipe size and the clearance needs of the manufacturer, the port reducer was fabricated from a single piece of metal, in this case Monel. MTW had already welded a ½ in. Hex valve to the port and the mechanics had installed the head / disc / port reducer / valve assembly onto the piping. As the tell-tale gauge was installed, the port reducer broke into two pieces. The break was at the machined reduction in the outer diameter.
"On inspection a fabrication flaw was found in the port reducer. The large end of the port reducer has an I.D. of 0.55 inches and the small end has an O.D. of 0.54 inches, machined down from the O.D. of 0.84 at the large end. The small O.D. section was specified to be 2.00 inches long. It was improperly machined approximately 2.63 inches long so that the 0.55 I.D. came within a very small distance of the 0.54 O.D. When the gauge was being hand tightened, the port reducer broke at this thin wall point.
"MTW reverted to the previous design and all port reducers were collected for investigation.
"The licensee notified NRC Region 2 (J. Pelchat)."
"Honeywell, Metropolis Facility (MTW) mechanics were installing a new BS&B manufactured rupture disc, corresponding safety head, and port reducer on the inlet of the relief valve on the Alternate Primary Cold Trap, E-600. The disc and head were part of an approved change. The safety heads (disc holders) have a port between the disc and relief valve to install a tell-tale indicator. This safety head was for a 1-1/2 in. disc. The normal port size of ½ in. pipe (normal O.D. = 0.84 in.) was reduced to ¼ in. pipe (normal O.D. = 0.54 in.) to allow clearance between the safety head fasteners and the companion flange studs. To facilitate the site requirements of ½ in. pipe size and the clearance needs of the manufacturer, the port reducer was fabricated from a single piece of metal, in this case Monel. MTW had already welded a ½ in. Hex valve to the port and the mechanics had installed the head / disc / port reducer / valve assembly onto the piping. As the tell-tale gauge was installed, the port reducer broke into two pieces. The break was at the machined reduction in the outer diameter.
"On inspection a fabrication flaw was found in the port reducer. The large end of the port reducer has an I.D. of 0.55 inches and the small end has an O.D. of 0.54 inches, machined down from the O.D. of 0.84 at the large end. The small O.D. section was specified to be 2.00 inches long. It was improperly machined approximately 2.63 inches long so that the 0.55 I.D. came within a very small distance of the 0.54 O.D. When the gauge was being hand tightened, the port reducer broke at this thin wall point.
"MTW reverted to the previous design and all port reducers were collected for investigation.
"The licensee notified NRC Region 2 (J. Pelchat)."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42356
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DARYL CLARK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DARYL CLARK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 02/22/2006
Notification Time: 04:51 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2006
Event Time: 01:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2006
Notification Time: 04:51 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2006
Event Time: 01:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO VALID MAIN TURBINE LOAD REJECT SIGNAL
"At 0122 hours (CST) on February 22, 2006, the Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed from 85% power due to a valid turbine-generator load reject signal. The maximum reactor pressure was approximately 1050 PSIG during the event. All control rods inserted to their full-in position. Reactor water level decreased to approximately -10 inches, which resulted in automatic Group 2 and 3 isolations as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 is in Mode 3, maintaining reactor pressure, and reactor water level in the normal level band. An investigation into the Unit 1 scram and load reject is in progress.
"Unit 2 remains at 85% power.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
No SRVs opened during the transient. Post shutdown electrical lineup is normal with the exception of the loss of one offsite power supply. Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser and feedwater being provided via main feedwater. Unit 2 is in a Tech Spec LCO for Loss of One Offsite power source.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0122 hours (CST) on February 22, 2006, the Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed from 85% power due to a valid turbine-generator load reject signal. The maximum reactor pressure was approximately 1050 PSIG during the event. All control rods inserted to their full-in position. Reactor water level decreased to approximately -10 inches, which resulted in automatic Group 2 and 3 isolations as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 is in Mode 3, maintaining reactor pressure, and reactor water level in the normal level band. An investigation into the Unit 1 scram and load reject is in progress.
"Unit 2 remains at 85% power.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
No SRVs opened during the transient. Post shutdown electrical lineup is normal with the exception of the loss of one offsite power supply. Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser and feedwater being provided via main feedwater. Unit 2 is in a Tech Spec LCO for Loss of One Offsite power source.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42357
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CONAM MMP
Region: 4
City: CARSON State: CA
County:
License #: CA4832-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CJ SALGADO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: CONAM MMP
Region: 4
City: CARSON State: CA
County:
License #: CA4832-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CJ SALGADO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/22/2006
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2006
Event Time: 08:30 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2006
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2006
Event Time: 08:30 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
GREG PICK (R4)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL EXTREMITY OVEREXPOSURE
At 0830 PST on 2/22/06 following a radiography shoot at the BP Refinery in Carson, CA, the Assistant Radiographer approached the camera without a survey meter and disconnected the guide tube. The Radiographer noticed that the pigtail was hanging out indicating that the source was not in the shielded volume. A preliminary estimate of the overexposure to the Assistant Radiographer is between 128 - 358 Rem to either hand based on a duration of 14 seconds from a 62.88 Ci Ir-192 source used in the INC-IR100 camera, S/N 6744. The Assistant Radiographer's pocket dosimeter (PD) showed off-scale high (100 mR) while the Radiographer's PD indicated 10 mR. Both employee's submitted their OSLs (Optically Stimulated Luminescent) whole body badges for readings. The Assistant Radiographer has no physical manifestations of a radiological overexposure at this time. The State of CA was notified at 1150 PST and has initiated an investigation into this incident.
CA Investigation # 022206.
At 0830 PST on 2/22/06 following a radiography shoot at the BP Refinery in Carson, CA, the Assistant Radiographer approached the camera without a survey meter and disconnected the guide tube. The Radiographer noticed that the pigtail was hanging out indicating that the source was not in the shielded volume. A preliminary estimate of the overexposure to the Assistant Radiographer is between 128 - 358 Rem to either hand based on a duration of 14 seconds from a 62.88 Ci Ir-192 source used in the INC-IR100 camera, S/N 6744. The Assistant Radiographer's pocket dosimeter (PD) showed off-scale high (100 mR) while the Radiographer's PD indicated 10 mR. Both employee's submitted their OSLs (Optically Stimulated Luminescent) whole body badges for readings. The Assistant Radiographer has no physical manifestations of a radiological overexposure at this time. The State of CA was notified at 1150 PST and has initiated an investigation into this incident.
CA Investigation # 022206.