Event Notification Report for February 20, 2006

SITE AREA EMERGENCY - REACTOR SCRAM

"While shutting down Unit 1 IAW LGP-2-1 with the main turbine off line the plant experienced a turbine control system (EHC) malfunction. This resulted in opening all main turbine bypass valves and subsequent reactor low pressure condition. The low pressure condition resulted in a closure of all main steam isolation valves (MSIV's) and automatic reactor scram. Three rods failed to indicate fully inserted on the scram. Plant emergency operating procedures were entered. All ECCS and plant systems operated as expected. All control rods are fully inserted and the ATWS emergency operating procedure has been exited."

The main turbine had been taken off line prior to this event and shutdown was being conducted with heat removal on the bypass valves. Pressure control is currently by using the steam line drains with the Safety Relief Valves in manual. Level is being maintained using normal feedwater. The electrical grid is stable though the plant is not yet on backfeed. Diesel generators are operable.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

The NRC entered Monitoring Mode at 0243.

Notified R4DO (Graves), DHS (SWO), FEMA (J Kanupp), DOE (S. Morrone), EPA(NRC) (Nowak), USDA (Amanda), HHS (Kleiman).

* * * UPDATE AT 0402 ON 2/20/2006 * * *

In addition to the initial notification, La Salle is reporting a group 1 isolation in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(a).

* * * UPDATE AT 0435 ON 2/20/2006 * * *

The site exited the Site Area Emergency and entered the recovery phase.

* * * UPDATE AT 05:59 ON 2/20/2006 * * *

"At the time of the scram @ 0023 hours rod 38-43 showed position 24 and rods 26-15 and 34-47 showed unknown. Based on more than one rod out condition, it is unanalyzed until shutdown margin can be verified."

* * * UPDATE AT 0655 ON 2/20/2006 * * *

NRC exited Monitoring Mode.

Notified IRD (Wilson), NRR EO (J. Lyons), R3DO (Lara), R4DO (Graves), NRR (Dyer), DHS (SWO), FEMA (Eerwin), DOE (Joe Stambaugh), NRC (does not take updates), USDA (Jim Brzostek), HHS (SOC) (Lt Hrynyshen).

* * * UPDATE FROM DAN COVEYOU TO JOE O'HARA AT 0700 ON 02/22/06 * * *

"Post trip evaluations have confirmed that all control rods were fully inserted within four minutes of the reactor scram. A review of the post-trip data suggests that there were only control rod indication problems on the three subject rods and all control rods were fully inserted immediately at the time of the reactor scram. Follow-up evaluations also demonstrated that even if the three subject control rods remained fully withdrawn in a cold shutdown condition, the reactor would have remained adequately shutdown. Additional confirmatory evaluations are continuing."

The licensee issued a press release on this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

R3DO(Hills) has been notified.

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THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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ALARM RESOLUTION IN URANIUM RECOVERY UNIT - 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION

"In accordance with 10CFR74.57(f)(2), a report to NRC is required for the following event. On February 20, 2006 the Alarm Threshold Limit was exceeded for [DELETED] Extraction (Column Based) System. This was reported to the Measurement Control Unit Manager on February 20, 2006 at approximately 08:00 a.m. The time in which the alarm was initially reported was approximately 07:00 on February 20, 2006. The initial test difference exceeded the Alarm Threshold Limit. An internal investigation is underway.

"Per E41-116 and the FNMCP, an Alarm Investigation Team was established since a process monitoring test exceeded its alarm threshold limit. NRC Ops was contacted at about 15:45 on February 20, 2006. The NPD MC&A contact at NRC (Tom Pham) was contacted via voice mail at about 15:40 on February 20, 2006. Our resident inspector was notified via voice mail at approximately 15:55 on February 20, 2006."

Note similar event report #42314.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY H. Crouch * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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24 HOUR NOTIFICATION - POSSIBLE UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO A FIXTURE FAILURE

"At approximately 10:50 on February 20, 2006, a large [DELETED] component was being removed from a vertical cold water rinse tank using a crane. While suspended directly over the tank, the fixture failed and the component was dropped into the tank. There was no significant damage to the tank or the component. Approximately 20 gallons of water was expelled from the tank and the crane was damaged from the 'recoil' of the crane hook.

"There were no injuries resulting from this event. The final configuration of the component in the tank is an analyzed situation that is currently authorized by the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). Under the guidance of Industrial Health and Safety and Criticality Safety, the component was removed from the water tank using a different type of fixture and a different crane. The cranes were then locked out to prevent use. BWXT has suspended all use of this type of fixture for component handling until the cause of the failure is understood.

"In reviewing the ISA, BWXT concluded this event (dropping a large component due to a fixture failure) was not specifically analyzed in the ISA. However, protective clothing evaluations had been performed and documented under OSHA regulations, to ensure that the worker is protected against chemical consequences. It is clearly bounded by the criticality safety and radiological safety analysis and did not result in failure to meet the criticality or radiological performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. The potential chemical consequences are not as clear and BWXT is continuing to evaluate whether this type event could have resulted in failure to meet the performance requirements. Further, BWXT does not believe the potential chemical consequences of this event would fall under the definition of Hazardous Chemicals produced from licensed materials in 10 CFR 70.4, however, further discussions with NRC are required to reach consensus on this. Therefore, BWXT is reporting this event under 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(b)(1).

"If it is concluded the potential chemical consequences do not fall under the 10 CFR 70.4 definition, this notification will be withdrawn."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY H. Crouch * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- DELIVERY VEHICLE ACCIDENT WITH UNIT DOSE SHIPPING CONTAINERS ONBOARD

The State provided the following information via email:

"Received notification on 2-20-06 at 8:00 AM from Cardinal Health Nuclear Pharmacy that one of their delivery vehicles had hit a bridge on Hwy 61 North of Vicksburg, MS, near Cary, MS, located in Sharkey County. The RSO stated that the bridge was covered in ice due to the freezing rain weather conditions. The driver apparently lost control of the pick-up and hit the bridge. The truck rolled over. The camper shell came off in the accident and the unit dose shipping containers were scattered on the roadway. The RSO stated that the driver had stated that the unit doses appeared OK and not leaking. The RSO stated that the driver had removed all the shipping containers from the roadway and secured them at the accident scene. The RSO stated that he had a survey meter with him and was en route to the wreck site. He stated that he would notify DRH if he needed assistance, but thought he would be able to handle situation.

"The isotopes involved were Tc-99m, I-131, and F-18. The activity is 75 mCi of FDG (Fluorodeoxyglucose); 12 mCi of I-131; 475 mCi of bulk Tc-99m; 100 mCi/unit doses of Tc-99m.

"DRH did not respond to job site. RSO called DRH and stated the shipping containers were secured and not damaged. He said he checked the unit doses for leakage and did not detect any contamination. All doses and shipping containers were put in RSO's vehicle and returned to Flowood facility. RSO stated that after he returned to Flowood facility, he wiped all containers and did not detect an removable contamination."


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source