Event Notification Report for February 14, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/13/2006 - 02/14/2006
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42335
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ED BURKETT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ED BURKETT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/14/2006
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2006
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2006
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2006
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY - CONTRACT SUPERVISOR
A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employees access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employees access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42337
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: CHRISTER DALGREN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: CHRISTER DALGREN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/14/2006
Notification Time: 22:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2006
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2006
Notification Time: 22:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2006
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/14/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
JULIO LARA (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
APPENDIX "R" RELATED UNANALYZED CONDITION
"During an Appendix R analysis update effort, a circuit analysis issue was identified. This issue results in an unanalyzed condition, in that, a fire in fire area 13 could result in the loss of the ability to makeup to the PCS [primary coolant system]. The fire could cause the loss of all charging. It could also potentially start the only available HPSI pump with the suction path isolated. The suction valve closes as a result of the fire. The fire detection system in the area is operable."
The licensee noted that compensatory fire patrols of the area have already been instituted. The licensee is investigating both short term procedural changes and long term equipment modifications.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During an Appendix R analysis update effort, a circuit analysis issue was identified. This issue results in an unanalyzed condition, in that, a fire in fire area 13 could result in the loss of the ability to makeup to the PCS [primary coolant system]. The fire could cause the loss of all charging. It could also potentially start the only available HPSI pump with the suction path isolated. The suction valve closes as a result of the fire. The fire detection system in the area is operable."
The licensee noted that compensatory fire patrols of the area have already been instituted. The licensee is investigating both short term procedural changes and long term equipment modifications.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42338
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: NEWCOMB ENGINEERING
Region: 1
City: CORINTH State: MS
County:
License #: MS-967-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: B.J.SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: NEWCOMB ENGINEERING
Region: 1
City: CORINTH State: MS
County:
License #: MS-967-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: B.J.SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/15/2006
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2006
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 02/14/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
PAUL KROHN (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE
The State provided the following information via email:
"Received notification on 2-14-06 from Newcomb Engineering Company that their Troxler Model 3430 moisture/density gauge [8 millicuries Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries Americium-241:Be] was run over by a bulldozer at a job site. The company RSO stated that the device was smashed in the dirt and they were not getting any abnormal survey readings. He stated that the technician was performing soil densities at the job site facing away from the bulldozer driver. The bulldozer driver was going forward and did not see the technician. The bulldozer driver hit the technician also but he was not injured. The source was not in the shielded position. By his description of the device, DRH [Mississippi Division of Radiological Health] responded to the job site that was approximately 230 miles away with a shielded container. The RSO stated that they would secure the area around the gauge until DRH arrived.
"DRH responded to job site. On arrival, it was apparent that Cs-137 source rod was not shielded. Inspector performed leak tests on sources and did not detect any removable contamination. Gauge was in many pieces. Cesium-137 source rod was placed in shielded container. The base plate of the gauge, that contained the Americium-241:Be source was put in a box and placed in the inspectors toolbox. All other parts of the gauge were put in the box also. Gauge was returned to DRH office for storage until disposal could be arranged.
"Highest reading was 300 mR/hr at 6" from end of source rod. 2 mR/hr at 1 meter from gauge. After putting gauge in shield, highest reading was 0.5 mR/hr at the surface of the top of the shielded container. Surveys [of the area where it was run over] were conducted after the gauge was secured . No readings above background were detected.
"Newcomb Engineering was told that they would have to submit a written report to DRH describing the incident. DRH is going to store the gauge until Newcomb Engineering can arrange disposal."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The State provided the following information via email:
"Received notification on 2-14-06 from Newcomb Engineering Company that their Troxler Model 3430 moisture/density gauge [8 millicuries Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries Americium-241:Be] was run over by a bulldozer at a job site. The company RSO stated that the device was smashed in the dirt and they were not getting any abnormal survey readings. He stated that the technician was performing soil densities at the job site facing away from the bulldozer driver. The bulldozer driver was going forward and did not see the technician. The bulldozer driver hit the technician also but he was not injured. The source was not in the shielded position. By his description of the device, DRH [Mississippi Division of Radiological Health] responded to the job site that was approximately 230 miles away with a shielded container. The RSO stated that they would secure the area around the gauge until DRH arrived.
"DRH responded to job site. On arrival, it was apparent that Cs-137 source rod was not shielded. Inspector performed leak tests on sources and did not detect any removable contamination. Gauge was in many pieces. Cesium-137 source rod was placed in shielded container. The base plate of the gauge, that contained the Americium-241:Be source was put in a box and placed in the inspectors toolbox. All other parts of the gauge were put in the box also. Gauge was returned to DRH office for storage until disposal could be arranged.
"Highest reading was 300 mR/hr at 6" from end of source rod. 2 mR/hr at 1 meter from gauge. After putting gauge in shield, highest reading was 0.5 mR/hr at the surface of the top of the shielded container. Surveys [of the area where it was run over] were conducted after the gauge was secured . No readings above background were detected.
"Newcomb Engineering was told that they would have to submit a written report to DRH describing the incident. DRH is going to store the gauge until Newcomb Engineering can arrange disposal."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.