Event Notification Report for February 10, 2006

LOSS OF ASSESSEMENT CAPABILITY

"On February 10, 2006, the Clinton Power Station lost the function of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The SPDS is unavailable for planned maintenance on an un-interruptible power supply (UPS).

"This event is reportable due to the major loss of emergency assessment capability per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) (when the SPDS has been unavailable for 8 hours or greater).

"The UPS outage is expected to be 3 days in duration.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE FROM LEFFEL TO HUFFMAN AT 1535 EST ON 2/14/06 * * *

"Repairs to the un-interruptible power supply (UPS) were completed and the plant process computer was recovered at 1030 hours on 2/14/06. The SPDS has been fully restored."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Lara) notified.

POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY

"As a result of Wolf Creek's 2005 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection, a re-evaluation of concerns described in NRC Information Notice (IN 92-18), 'POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF REMOTE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY DURING A CONTROL ROOM FIRE' was performed. During that re-evaluation it was identified that in the event of a fire in the control room, 39 motor operated valves (MOVs) credited for post-fire safe shutdown could potentially fail in an unanalyzed condition. Of those 39 MOVs, failure of 4 of them could potentially prevent achieving and maintaining safe shutdown (SSD) conditions.

"In the 39 MOV circuits identified above, an intra-cable hot short between one conductor on the hot side of the indication circuit and another conductor on the load side of the control room hand switch could bypass the torque switch and energize either the open or close coil. If this occurs, the open or close contactor will close and the motor will operate in either the open or close direction until the motor stalls, possibly resulting in damage to the valve such that it cannot be manually operated.

"Present system operability is not affected as there has been no occurrence of a fire in the Control Room and compensatory actions are in place to detect and mitigate the effects of a fire in the Control Room.

"Actions taken or planned: An hourly fire watch was established in the Control Room due to a previous condition identified on 11/16/2005 in accordance with AP 10-104, Breech procedure. The condition identified today will be referenced on the active Breach Request that was implemented on 11/16/2005."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

FAILURE TO MEET THE FITNESS FOR DUTY TESTING REQUIREMENTS

"10 CFR26.24 describes the chemical and drug testing programs for persons subject to this part. 10 CFR26.24(2) states that 'Random testing must be conducted at an annual rate equal to at least 50 percent of the workforce.' On 2/10/06 at 0830, Wolf Creek determined that the random testing rate was 49.41 percent for calendar year 2005, which is below 50 percent. 10 CFR26.73 states that notification to the NRC Operations Center must be made by telephone within 24 hours."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM L. TAYLOR TO J. KNOKE AT 16:22 ON 2/28/2006 * * *

This event is being retracted. A manual verification of the 2005 data was conducted. It confirmed that the random test rate for 2005 exceeded 50%, therefore this event is not reportable per 10 CFR 26.73.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (J. Whitten)

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION

"At 1345, a notification was made to the Ohio EPA. This notification was based on 1) Any unanticipated bypass which exceeds any effluent limitation in the NPDES Permit and 2) Any discharge of water to the storm drains that is not covered by the following excerpt from the permit.

"The event itself was the pumping of rain water that had sulfuric acid (pH approximately 2.6) in it to a storm drain. Approximately 10 gallons of this mixture was pumped to the drain. The 10 gallons pumped contained approximately 1 milliliter of sulfuric acid. Sample taken at the storm drain out fall indicated normal pH value of 8.03."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

POTENTIALLY DEFECTIVE MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE LOCKING MECHANISM

As part of the Pre-Operational Check, Operators discovered the one of their CPN Model MC-1 Moisture Density Gauges had a potentially defective locking mechanism, i.e., "the handle could be moved down through the blocking mechanism no matter which position the key was in."

The CPN Model MC-1, S/N M18012172 was manufactured approximately 30 years ago and contains two sources; 10 mCi Cs-137 and 50 mCi Americium-241/Be (nominal). The unit is currently locked in its' storage container at the Sierra Army Depot in CA, awaiting return to the manufacturer for evaluation and repair.

The licensee notified NRC Region 3 Office.

INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATIONS

"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of a 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) system. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below.

"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated:

"On February 10, 2006, at 1120 EST, a surveillance was in progress to calibrate the Division 2 Fuel Pool Ventilation Exhaust Radiation Monitor D11-K611D. During jumper removal an adjacent terminal was contacted by the jumper while still connected to a 24 VDC power source resulting in a blown power supply fuse. The loss of the power supply resulted in the following automatic actions: Primary Containment Isolation Valve Group 14; Drywell and Suppression Chamber Ventilation System; and Group 16, Nitrogen Inerting System received an isolation signal. All primary containment isolation valves in both groups were previously in their safety function position (closed).

"Secondary containment isolated resulting in a trip of the Reactor Building Heating and Ventilation System and Division 2 Standby Gas Treatment System automatically started. The Control Center Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System automatically shifted into the Recirculation mode. The initiation signal was invalid because it did not result in response to an actual high radiation condition, nor did it trip as a result of any other requirement for initiation of the safety function, such as a downscale or inoperable trip, for example.

"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.

"The Division 2 Standby Gas Treatment System automatically started, secondary containment fully isolated, Reactor Building Heating and Ventilation System tripped, and the Control Center Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System automatically shifted into the Recirculation mode. These were complete actuations. The primary containment isolation valves Group 14 and 16 remained in their safety function (closed) position. This was a complete actuation.

"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.

"The above systems functioned successfully."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.